

STUDY

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HOW WORK SHAPES DEMOCRACY

Political Preferences, Populist Attitudes and Far-Right Voting Intentions Among the European Labour Force – A Cross-Country Survey Project in the Face of the 2024 EU Elections

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SUMMARY

In the face of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the study at hand investigates the role of work, working conditions, and workers' voice for (anti-)democratic attitudes and far-right voting intentions. For this purpose, primary survey data was collected among the labour force in ten EU countries (N=15,000). While in all countries, far-right populists obtain sizeable shares of the voting intentions in the data, the majority of respondents in all countries neither intend to vote right-wing nor have voted right-wing in the past and consider the principle of democracy as very important. The world of work is highly relevant when it comes to understanding and combating the rise of the political far right. This study finds consistent and strong evidence that good working conditions and workers' voice provide a buffer against anti-democratic attitudes. Furthermore, concerns about transformations of the labour market play a crucial role for the attitudes towards democracy. Yet, there is no straightforward link with far-right voting intentions: The extent to which democratic attitudes translate into corresponding voting preferences depends on the supply side of the respective party system and the political climate of the country in question. The study closes with proposed instruments towards a fairer and more democratic labour market across the EU.

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1 Introduction

Currently, many democracies in the European Union are undergoing fundamental changes threatening the European idea as a whole. Recent parliamentary elections across several European countries show a common thread: Right-wing populist parties – often proclaiming a clear Anti-European agenda – achieve electoral successes and in some cases come into power. Recent examples are Italy and the Netherlands, but also in the Scandinavian countries far right parties are gaining ground. It is puzzling that in such a variety of countries shaped by different forms of governance (such as presidential systems or parliamentary democracies), different historical background experiences (for example in former socialist Eastern vs. capitalist Western European countries), different economic conditions, and different models of social partnership, the radical right agenda appears as equally persuasive.

The 2024 elections to the European Parliament, which were the point of departure of the study at hand, saw mixed results for far-right populist parties: While far-right populist parties have made gains, they did not achieve a breakthrough, and the pro-European Union groups still maintain a majority in the European Parliament. There were gains in several countries for parties described as far-right populist, but not as strongly as had been predicted before the elections. Most of the far-right gains were concentrated in countries that elect large numbers of seats: France, Italy, and Germany. In France and Italy, the Rassemblement National and Fratelli d'Italia soared and won the election with roughly 30% of the votes. In Hungary, Austria, and Belgium (Flanders) far-right parties also won most of the votes. In Germany, Poland and the Netherlands far-right parties took second place. However, in the Nordic countries Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, where far-right parties became increasingly successful in recent years, they were defeated by pro-European left-wing parties in the 2024 EU election. Despite the general gains for far-right parties, the three main pro-EU groups – the European People's Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and Renew Europe – continued to hold a majority within the European Parliament. This provides the chance for democratic parties and institutions to foster and (re)build structures and social contexts in which pro-democratic attitudes can grow and be maintained.

The report at hand aims to contribute to a better understanding of the causes of the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. An important finding of existing research on this topic is that the rise of far-right and anti-democratic attitudes is linked to the experience of social disintegration – in other words a lack of social belonging (Heitmeyer, 2001). It is life-threatening for democracies if a growing part of the population is, on the one hand, accountable for shaping the society by democratic rights but, on the other hand, does not actually feel part of this society and the fundamental values and rules that make it up. The multiple crises of this time and the major social changes, such as digitalization and decarbonization, cause that new distributional conflicts are coming to the fore, while at the same time central social issues need to be renegotiated. This presents societies with enormous challenges. Social disintegration or a lack of social participation reflects the experience of not being involved in these central negotiation processes or not seeing one's own interests represented there (Kohlrausch, 2024). A central place for the negotiation of social conflicts and disputes about distribution is work and the workplace, which makes gainful employment a central mechanism of social integration. Research across European countries shows that employees are less likely to hold anti-democratic attitudes and less likely to vote for the far right if a just balance of interests is achieved. Concrete opportunities to have a say in the working environment strengthen democratic attitudes and reduce the likelihood of voting for far-right parties (Kiess & Schmidt, 2024; Hövermann, 2023).


The risk and fear of social disintegration is an important aspect explaining illiberal, anti-democratic tendencies. From in-depth analyses of political attitudes in Germany we know that integration in the labour market provides protection from illiberal and anti-democratic attitudes. This integration is warranted on the one hand by the material security of gainfully employed people. On the other hand, work as an experiential space offers an opportunity to shape one's immediate surroundings and earn recognition for work and good performance. But this is not the case for everyone: for a certain group of the gainfully employed, the workplace is a space with little specific experience of material security, recognition, control, and self-efficacy. This poses the danger of polarization in the working world, democratic disintegration and ultimately also an increase in anti-democratic attitudes.

For trade unions these conflicts represent both a threat and an opportunity: on the one hand, they could also suffer from general increasing distrust in democratic institutions and can be seen as just another actor who is unable to solve the enormous problems. On the other hand, they can become relevant actors in fighting the far-right by putting issues of fair employment, social security and redistribution on the political agenda. However, to achieve the latter, we need an in depth understanding of the social situation and attitudes of those tending to support far-right parties as well as of those being resilient to their often rather simple answers to the complex challenges of current Europe.

Building on these considerations, the study at hand addresses the following main research questions: What is the role of work, working conditions, and workers' voice in the genesis of anti-democratic attitudes and far-right populist voting intentions? Are more democratic work settings associated with less illiberal anti-democratic attitudes?

To answer these questions, we analyse original data from an online survey in ten European countries. The analyses presented are guided by the conceptual model presented in Figure 1.1. According to this model, the work environment informs voting intentions indirectly, via a multi-stage process. We postulate that intentions to vote for a far-right populist party are embedded in a cluster of anti-democratic attitudes, that includes dissatisfaction with democracy, distrust in current political institutions, a populist outlook on society and derogation of minority groups. The main hypothesis of this study is that a positive and democratic work environment – that is, the experience that one can have an effective voice on the work floor, a good quality of work, high levels of job satisfaction and the absence of worries regarding the future of one's job – offers levers to fight the anti-democratic sentiments on which far-right populists capitalize. We furthermore foresee that the interplay between the world of work, democratic preferences and voting is linked to individual background characteristics (i.e., socio-demographic variables and employment status), the presence of work councils and unions, as well as the national context (in terms of the political context and the dominant collective bargaining regime).

Figure 1.1. Conceptual model of the study



Source: own illustration

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Following this introduction, the report starts with a description of the study's methodology that includes information on the samples, measurement instruments and statistical analyses (chapter 2). In the subsequent chapters, the different elements of the conceptual model are scrutinized. Chapter 3 analyses the prevalence of far-right populist preferences among European workers by focusing on aspects of democratic preferences, institutional trust, populist, and intergroup attitudes, as well as far-right populist voting intentions. Chapter 4 maps the work environment with a special focus on industrial citizenship rights while in chapter 5 the political consequences of the work environment are analysed before the findings are discussed in chapter 6.

2 Methodology: The Work and Democracy in Europe Survey

To investigate the linkages between work environment on the one hand and (anti-)democratic attitudes and political preferences on the other, we organized the Work and Democracy in Europe Survey (WADES) in the period from November 2023 to January 2024 in ten European countries. This primary, cross-national survey data collection was necessary because no secondary datasets were available that combined the essential measurement of the central elements of the proposed conceptual model. The collection of primary data shortly before the 2024 EU elections also allows to relate the findings directly to the rapidly changing political context.

This chapter describes the methodological background of this data collection and the statistical analysis. Consecutively, we discuss (1) the selection of country cases, (2) the samples and their representativeness, (3) fieldwork details, (4) the most important measurements and (5) the applied statistical analyses.

2.1 Selection of country cases: bargaining regimes

The institutional, political, and labour market context is likely to play an important role in how work environments shape workers' democratic preferences. To examine the nexus between work and democratic preferences in depth and comprehensively, this study employs a cross-national comparative design, selecting ten country cases: France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden. These countries were chosen to represent the diverse contextual landscape of European societies. The selection is grounded in the theoretical framework of bargaining regimes (Müller, 2021; Müller, Vandaele, & Waddington, 2019). Collective bargaining is a cornerstone of the European democratic and social model, enabling employers and trade unions to negotiate independently vis-à-vis employment terms, including wages, working hours, and working conditions. This process is particularly beneficial for individual workers with weaker negotiating power, by offering them protection against economic exploitation and ensuring they receive a fairer share of the economic pie. For employers, collective bargaining provides a structured mechanism for conflict resolution. The national models of collective bargaining are diverse. Yet despite these differences, five ideal-typical regimes or geographical clusters of collective bargaining with shared institutional characteristics can be identified: North, Centre-West, South, Centre-East and West. Because regional, economic, and cultural environments heavily influenced the development of these systems, the collective bargaining systems overlap in important ways with the broader regional divisions within Europe. Below, the most important differences between the regimes are summarized, based on the work of Müller (2021). Table 2.1 furthermore summarizes key characteristics of the countries selected in this study.

The **Northern regime** (in this study represented by Denmark and Sweden; also including Finland) – This regime operates within a framework of strong voluntarism characterized by minimal state intervention in industrial relations – with Finland as an exception, as the state plays a greater role there, especially in the declaration of the general applicability of collective agreements. This model is defined by consensus-based corporatism, where employers and trade unions play a crucial role in policymaking. High bargaining coverage, averaging over 87%, is a hallmark of this regime which is primarily conducted at the industry level. This extensive coverage is supported by multi-employer bargaining and high density among employers (76%) and unions (65%), facilitated by the 'Ghent system,' which links unemployment insurance to union membership. Collective bargaining in the Nordic model is multi-tiered and highly coordinated and incorporates workplace negotiations in tandem with industry-level coordination.

Company-level representation in the Nordic model is predominantly trade union-based, which ensures strong linkage and communication between different bargaining levels. The Northern bargaining regime is embedded in a broader social-democratic welfare regime characterized by high social expenditure and the associated low levels of material deprivation and inequality.

The **Central-Western regime** (in this study represented by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany; also including Austria, Luxembourg and Slovenia) – This model is founded on the principle of social partnership between employers and trade unions. This cooperative approach results in industrial relations characterized by compromise, even if strike rates in Belgium and the Netherlands are comparatively high. Although there is a trend towards decentralization to the company level, collective bargaining is nonetheless predominantly conducted at the industry-level. The system generally boasts comparatively high bargaining coverage, i.e. averaging 76.3%. This is largely due to the high organization rates of employers and their support for multi-employer bargaining. Employer density in this region exceeds 80%, which is significantly higher than union density, which is two to three times lower. A key aspect of the Centre-West model is the institutional support for collective bargaining. This support is displayed in various ways, such as the frequent use of the extension mechanism in Belgium and the Netherlands, which broadens the applicability of collective agreements to include non-union members, thereby maintaining high coverage rates. However, there are some notable differences among the countries in this cluster. Germany presents an outlier with a lower bargaining density, due to a lower employer density and a trend of employers withdrawing from industry-level bargaining. In addition, in Germany general applicability is used less frequently and the strike frequency is considerably lower than in Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgium maintains a strong union presence, with union density still above 50%. Nevertheless, recent state interventions in Belgium have somewhat constrained the scope for autonomous wage setting, indicating a shift in the traditional dynamics of collective bargaining.

The **Southern regime** (in this study represented by France, Italy and Spain; also including Greece and Portugal) - The collective bargaining model in Southern Europe is characterized by a high degree of state intervention in regulating the employment relationship, with Italy being an exception due to its more voluntarist tradition. Collective bargaining predominantly takes place at the industry level, with a high bargaining coverage of 76.3%. The Southern model shows the largest variation in organizational strength of collective actors, especially of the unions. Union density is relatively high in Italy (37%) but considerably lower in France (8%) and Spain (14%). The bargaining coverage is nonetheless high because of the state's role in ensuring high bargaining coverage through legal extensions of collective agreements to non-organized firms. EU interventions have attempted to decentralize collective bargaining, particularly in response to the 2008/2009 economic crisis, leading to more restrictive criteria for the extension of collective agreements and support for company-level negotiations by non-union institutions. Within Europe, the countries of the Southern bargaining regime are characterized by relatively high levels of inequality and material deprivation.

The **Central-Eastern regime** (in this study represented by Poland and Hungary; also including Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) – This model of collective bargaining is characterized by neoliberal policies aimed at making labour markets more flexible and attracting foreign direct investment. Collective bargaining in this model is fragmented and highly decentralized, with the company being the dominant bargaining level in most countries, leading to low bargaining coverage. The reluctance of employers' associations to engage in multi-employer bargaining further hinders industry-level bargaining in this model. There is a lack of institutional support for multi-employer bargaining by the state in many countries, resulting in increased importance of legislation at the expense of collective bargaining. Neoliberal policies have limited the development of industry-level bargaining from the beginning of the transition process in these countries. The low rates of collective organization on both sides, with 12.3% union density and 52.4% employer's density, contribute to the fragmentary nature of collective bargaining in this model. Despite the trend of decreasing regulatory capacity of collective bargaining, social dialogue structures still play an important role for trade unions to influence socio-economic decisions and compensate for the lack of collective bargaining. Levels of social expenditure in these countries are among the lowest in Europe, with comparatively high levels of material deprivation as a consequence.

Finally, Müller (2021) also distinguished a **Western bargaining regime** (comprising Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the UK). The model is characterized by a voluntarist tradition of industrial relations with minimal state intervention. Private sector collective bargaining typically occurs at the company level, while more centralized bargaining is limited to the public sector. This has low levels of collective bargaining coverage (36.2%) as a result. Union density plays a crucial role in determining the coverage of collective bargaining. Despite the voluntarist tradition, state regulation has become significant over time, particularly in the UK, leading to a shift in power dynamics favouring employers. There is a lack of support for multi-employer bargaining, and legislation aimed at increasing individual workers' rights has been introduced in response to EU Directives. Overall, the trend suggests a shift towards a system based on individual rights and away from a system based collective bargaining and collective labour law. In the original design of the survey, Ireland was selected as a country case to represent the Western regime. However, due to problems which occurred during the fieldwork in Ireland, we had to omit this case because of data problems (see also section 2.3, p. 8).

Table 2.1. Key characteristics of the selected country cases

| | Denmark | Sweden | Belgium | Germany | The Netherlands | France | Italy | Spain | Poland | Hungary |
|--|---|--------|--------------------|---------|-----------------|-------------------------|-------|-------|--------------------------|---------|
| <i>Collective bargaining regime</i> | North | | Centre-West | | | South | | | Centre-East | |
| <i>Industrial relations regime</i> | Corporatist | | Social partnership | | | Polarised state-centred | | | Fragmented state-centred | |
| <i>Dominant level of collective bargaining over wages in terms of the coverage of agreements negotiated*</i> | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | 1: 'predominantly at sector or industry level'; 2 'predominantly at company or enterprise level'; 3 'intermediates/alternates between central and industry level' | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Mandatory extension of collective agreements to non-organised employers*</i> | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| | 0 'neither legal provisions for mandatory extension, nor a functional equivalent'; 1 'extension rather exceptional, used in some industries only, because of absence of sector agreements, very high thresholds, and/or veto powers of employers'; 2 'extension used in many industries, but there are thresholds and Ministers can decide not to extend (clauses in) collective agreements'; 3 'extension is virtually automatic and more or less general (incl. enlargement)' | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Status of works councils*</i> | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| | 0 'Works council or similar institutions of employee representation confronting management do not exist or are exceptional'; 1 'Works councils (etc.) are voluntary, i.e. even where they are mandated by law, there are no legal sanctions for non-observance'; 2 'existence and rights of works council or structure for employee representation within firms/establishments confronting management are mandated by law/established through basic general agreement between unions & employers' | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Involvement of works councils (or similar structures) in wage negotiations*</i> | 1 | na | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| | 1 'Works councils is formally (by law or agreement) barred from negotiating (plant-level) agreements and involvement of works councils in negotiating (plant-level) agreements is rare'; 2 'Works councils is formally (by law/agreement) barred from negotiating (plant-level) agreements, but informally negotiate over workplace-related working conditions or "employment pacts", incl. pay'; 3 'Works councils (or mandated representatives) formally negotiate (plant-level) collective agreements, if no union is present (and/or subject to ballot)'; 4 'Works councils (or mandated representatives) formally negotiate (plant-level) collective agreements, alongside/instead of trade unions'; na Not applicable | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bargaining coverage (%)**</i> | 84 | 89 | 96 | 55 | 80 | 98 | 80 | 77 | 18 | 30 |
| <i>Wage share as a % of GDP (%)**</i> | 55 | 53 | 59 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 52 | 54 | 48 | 47 |
| <i>Coverage of employers' associations (%)**</i> | 68 | 88 | 82 | 58 | 80 | 75 | 56 | 75 | 20 | 21 |
| <i>Trade union density (%)**</i> | 77 | 68 | 54 | 15 | 18 | 8 | 37 | 14 | 13 | 9 |
| <i>Strike volume (days not worked due to industrial action per 1.000 employees in employment)**</i> | 11 | 1 | 63 | 6 | 43 | 74 | 42 | 54 | 3 | 1 |
| <i>GDP per capita in pps, 2022 (EU-average = 100)***</i> | 136 | 119 | 120 | 117 | 130 | 100 | 97 | 86 | 79 | 76 |
| <i>Total expenditure on social protection per head of population, 2021***</i> | 15,966 | 12,532 | 10,933 | 11,785 | 12,885 | 11,875 | 8,792 | 6,428 | 3,215 | 2,505 |
| <i>Inequality – GINI Coefficient of equivalised disposable income, 2022***</i> | 27.7 | 27.6 | 24.9 | 29 | 26.3 | 29.8 | 32.7 | 32 | 26.3 | 27.4 |
| <i>Material deprivation rate, 2022***</i> | 3.4 | 1.8 | 5.7 | 8.4 | 2.6 | 7.5 | 8.9 | 9.2 | 4.8 | 13.4 |

Source: *OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database (www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm), ** Müller, Vandaele & Waddington, 2019; Figures of 2017 or closest available data,*** Eurostat

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Note that this selection of ten countries also guarantees variability in the political forces in power, and the strength of far-right political parties in particular. In two countries, parties that can be classified as far-right populist (see Rooduijn et al., 2023) are currently in power, i.e. Hungary and Italy. In Hungary, Victor Orban – leader of the FIDESZ party – has been prime minister since 2010. In Italy, Fratelli d’Italia won the 2022 elections and Giorgia Meloni has been the Italian prime minister since then. In Poland, the far-right populist PiS (Law and Justice) party founded by the Kaczynski brothers entered into power in 2015 but lost the 2023 elections and ended up in opposition just before the fielding of the survey. In all the other countries, far-right populist parties are present as well, although with varying degrees of electoral success and political power (for a brief overview see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. Overview of far-right populist parties in the ten considered EU countries (based on popu-list.org)

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|----------------|---|
| <p>France</p> | <p>Far-right parties in France have experienced fluctuating yet notable success over the past few decades, with the National Front (now National Rally) being the most prominent example. Established in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen as an amalgam of various far-right groups, the party initially struggled to gain traction. However, it began to achieve significant electoral success in the 1980s and 1990s by capitalizing on economic discontent, anti-immigrant sentiments, and concerns about national identity.</p> <p>Marine Le Pen, who took over leadership from her father in 2011, has worked to soften the party’s image, rebranding it as the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) in 2018. This rebranding has aimed to make the party more palatable to a broader electorate by distancing it from its extremist past. Yet in terms of its core ideology and its policy positions, the party remained as radical as ever. Over time, the party has modified its positions on the economy, from an initially economically liberal (anti-tax) party to welfare chauvinist stances. Popu-list.org considers the RN today as relatively left-wing in socio-economic terms, (at least in so far as a chauvinist understating of welfare provisions and state intervention in the economy can be considered left-wing) and classifies the RN as far right, populist, and Eurosceptic.</p> <p>The RN has seen substantial support in both national and European elections. Marine Le Pen advanced to the second round of the presidential elections in 2017 and 2022, a significant achievement that under-scored the party’s growing influence. The RN also performed strongly in the 2019 European Parliament elections, reflecting its ability to mobilize voters around issues of nationalism and Euroscepticism. In the European Parliament, the RN is member of the Identity and Democracy group.</p> <p>Despite not winning the presidency, the RN’s consistent electoral presence highlights a persistent undercurrent of far-right support in France, driven by socio-economic anxieties and a desire for more stringent immigration policies.</p> <p>A second noteworthy far-right party in France that advocates a drastic reduction in immigration with a strong populist and Eurosceptic rhetoric is Reconquête launched in 2021. In the 2022 presidential election Reconquête placed fourth as the best newcomer with 7% of the vote.</p> |
| <p>Belgium</p> | <p>In Belgium, the political far-right has gained considerable traction for several decades already. Key among these parties is one of Europe’s oldest populist and far-right party Vlaams Belang (VB), which has seen notable success in the Flanders region – the only region in Belgium where the party competes. Rooted in Flemish nationalism, VB advocates for strict immigration controls, law and order policies, and Flemish independence from Belgium. The party’s appeal has grown, especially amid concerns about national identity, economic uncertainty, and dissatisfaction with traditional political parties. Other Belgian parties have established a cordon sanitaire against the VB – i.e., they refuse to cooperate with it in any way or at any level of government.</p> <p>In the 2019 federal elections, VB made substantial gains, becoming the second-largest party in Flanders and the third largest in the federal parliament. This success has been attributed to effective campaigning, a focus on social media, and tapping into widespread discontent over issues such as migration and integration. Additionally, the party has worked to rebrand itself, attempting to distance its image from its more radical, far-right origins.</p> <p>Despite this success, VB and other far-right entities face challenges, including difficulty forming coalitions due to the mainstream parties’ reluctance to align with them. Nonetheless, the rise of VB signals a significant shift in Belgium’s political landscape, reflecting growing divisions and the increasing polarization of the electorate. In the European Parliament, VB is member of the Identity and Democracy group.</p> |

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| Denmark | <p>In recent years, far-right parties in Denmark have gained traction, reflecting a broader European trend towards populism and nationalism. The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) has been the most prominent far-right party, advocating for stringent immigration policies, cultural conservatism, and national sovereignty. Founded in 1995, DF's influence peaked in the 2015 parliamentary elections when it became the second-largest party, securing 21% of the vote.</p> <p>The party's success is attributed to its ability to capitalize on public concerns over immigration, integration, and national identity. DF has effectively used these issues to shift the political discourse to the right, influencing mainstream parties to adopt more restrictive immigration stances. This success has also been aided by a robust media presence and skilful political manoeuvring, allowing DF to maintain a significant role in shaping national policy despite not always being part of the government. DF is classified by the Popu-List as populist and far-right, although it is slightly more moderate than many other parties belonging to the party family, probably due to the fact that the party has supported a liberal-conservative government coalition for many years, and, hence, had to compromise.</p> <p>However, recent years have seen a decline in support for the Danish People's Party, with their vote share dropping significantly in the 2019 and even more so in the 2022 elections. This decline is partly due to internal conflicts and the emergence of new far-right competitors, such as the New Right (Nye Borgerlige), which have drawn some of their voter base. Nonetheless, the impact of far-right parties on Denmark's political landscape remains substantial, continuing to influence national debates on immigration and identity. In the European Parliament, DF is member of the Identity and Democracy group.</p> |
| Germany | <p>Far-right parties in Germany have seen a resurgence in recent years, particularly with the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Founded in 2013 initially as a mostly Eurosceptic party dominated by right-wing academics, the AfD has shifted focus towards anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and nationalist rhetoric and swiftly moved into a far-right direction. This shift coincided with growing public discontent over the 2015 migrant crisis and the policies of Chancellor Angela Merkel, which the AfD leveraged to increase its support base. Popu-list classifies the party as far right since 2015.</p> <p>The AfD achieved its first significant electoral success in the 2017 federal elections, securing 12.6% of the vote and becoming the third-largest party in the Bundestag. This marked the first time a far-right party had entered the German federal parliament since World War II. The AfD's success continued in subsequent state elections, particularly in eastern Germany, where economic and social discontent have been more pronounced. In the 2021 federal election, AfD dropped to being the fifth-largest party. However, since 2023 polling shows AfD as the second most popular party again. In the European Parliament, the AfD was a member of the Identity and Democracy group since 2019 until the AfD was expelled from the group in May 2024.</p> <p>While the party has faced internal divisions and controversy over extremist remarks by some members, it has maintained a substantial voter base by capitalizing on issues such as immigration, national identity, and criticism of the European Union. The AfD's presence in German politics represents a significant shift in the post-war political landscape, reflecting broader European trends of rising populism and nationalism. Despite condemnation from mainstream parties, the AfD continues to influence the national debate on key issues.</p> |
| Hungary | <p>Far-right parties in Hungary have gained substantial influence over the past decade, primarily through the success of FIDESZ and the formerly far-right Jobbik party. FIDESZ, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has dominated Hungarian politics since 2010. Although originally a liberal progressive force mobilising against the communist regime, it underwent significant ideological change, reinventing itself after it as a centre-right party. FIDESZ adopted increasingly nationalist and far-right policies, emphasizing anti-immigration, Euroscepticism, and the promotion of traditional Christian values. Popu-list therefore classifies FIDESZ now as a populist far-right and Eurosceptic party.</p> <p>FIDESZ held the presidency between 1998 and 2002 in a first Orbán government and is in power in Hungary now since 2010. Orbán's government has implemented stringent measures against immigration, curtailed the influence of foreign-funded NGOs, and restructured the judiciary and media to consolidate power. These moves have resonated with many Hungarian voters, particularly in rural areas, leading to landslide victories in multiple elections. In the 2022 Hungarian general elections FIDESZ not only won a two-thirds majority in 2010, but it also received the highest vote share by any party since the fall of communism in 1989.</p> <p>A second relevant party – Jobbik – which was once known for its extreme nationalist and anti-Roma rhetoric, has moderated its stance in recent years to appeal to a broader electorate, but is still classified by Popu-list as populist right-wing party. This strategic shift enabled Jobbik to become the second-largest party in the National Assembly in 2018. Since 2020 Jobbik is part of a political alliance alongside all other liberal opposition parties in an attempt to defeat Orbán, which resulted in 34,5% of the vote for the alliance in the 2022 election. However, the party has faced internal splits, with some members leaving to form new far-right groups.</p> <p>The success of these parties highlights the appeal of nationalist and populist sentiments in Hungary, driven by concerns over sovereignty, cultural identity, and dissatisfaction with the EU. Despite criticism from the EU and international observers, far-right parties in Hungary have maintained strong support by addressing these issues and promoting an agenda centred on nationalistic pride and sovereignty. Until 2021 FIDESZ was a member of the European People's Party in the European Parliament, but since then served with the Non-Inscrits group.</p> |

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| Italy | <p>Far-right parties in Italy have seen significant success in recent years, particularly through the rise of the League (Lega) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia). The League, originally a regionalist party known as the Northern League, transformed under the leadership of Matteo Salvini into a national force with a strong anti-immigration, Eurosceptic, and nationalist platform. Popu-list classifies Lega as populist and far right. Salvini's rhetoric on restricting immigration and prioritizing Italian sovereignty resonated with many voters, leading the League to become one of the most prominent parties in Italy.</p> <p>In the 2018 general elections, the League entered a coalition government with the populist Five Star Movement (M5S), with Salvini serving as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. During his tenure, Salvini implemented strict immigration policies and advocated for law-and-order measures, further solidifying the League's support base.</p> <p>Brothers of Italy (Fdi), led by Giorgia Meloni, has also gained traction with a similar nationalist agenda. At the outset, Fdi concentrated on socio-economic and civil rights issues, with no significant traces of populism in its campaigns, but starting from 2014 it emphasized more apparent traits of populism, nativism, and Euroscepticism in its platform, as well as a strong stance against illegal immigration and is therefore classified as a far-right and populist party by Popu-list. Despite this evolution, Fdi still upholds its dedication to social conservatism, family policies, and the advocacy of small and medium-sized enterprises. This preserves its unique profile, not just within the right-wing coalition, but also when contrasted with Lega. In the 2022 general elections, Brothers of Italy emerged as the leading party in a right-wing coalition, with Meloni becoming Italy's first female Prime Minister. While Lega is a member of the Identity and Democracy group, Brothers of Italy is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists, which is led by Meloni since 2020.</p> |
| Netherlands | <p>Far-right parties in the Netherlands have gained notable success in recent years, primarily through the influence of the Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD). The PVV, led by Geert Wilders, was founded in 2006 and has become known for its anti-Islam, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic positions. Wilders' outspoken and often controversial rhetoric has attracted significant media attention and a dedicated voter base. The PVV is classified by Popu-List as populist and far right. The PVV achieved substantial electoral success in the 2010 general elections, becoming the third-largest party and securing a role as a support party in the minority government. In subsequent elections, the PVV maintained a strong presence, capitalizing on public concerns over immigration, integration, and national identity. In the 2023 general elections, the PVV became the largest party in the House of Representatives. In May 2024 a provisional agreement has been reached between the PVV and three other party leaders to form a right-wing government. In the European Parliament, the PVV is a member of the Identity and Democracy group.</p> <p>The FvD, founded by Thierry Baudet in 2016, represents another significant force in the Dutch far-right landscape. The party advocates for national sovereignty, direct democracy, and stringent immigration controls and is also classified by Popu-list as a populist and far-right party, although country experts consider FvD recently no longer as a radical right party, but as an extreme right party. The party rejects the "cultural-marxist" elite and its institutions and propagates the "great replacement" conspiracy theory. The FvD saw rapid electoral success, winning the most seats in the 2019 provincial elections and making substantial gains in the 2021 general elections. However, in the 2023 general elections, FvD lost five of their eight seats in the House of Representatives.</p> |
| Poland | <p>Far-right parties in Poland have experienced growing influence, particularly through the dominance of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Founded in 2001 by Jarosław Kaczyński and his late brother Lech, PiS blends nationalist, conservative, and populist elements. The party emphasizes traditional values, national sovereignty, and a robust stance against immigration, which has resonated with many Polish voters. Popu-list considers PiS since 2015 as populist and far right and describes it as social conservative, economically protectionist and statist, anti-immigration, anti-Russian, and Eurosceptic.</p> <p>PiS first came to power in 2005 but gained substantial influence after winning the 2015 general elections, securing both the presidency and a parliamentary majority. This victory allowed PiS to implement extensive reforms, including changes to the judiciary, media, and education system, which critics argue have eroded democratic checks and balances. Since 2015, PiS has set the country on an illiberal trajectory, capturing the judiciary, usurping constitutional bodies, attacking liberal civil society, and imposing severe restrictions on abortion access. The party's policies often stress Polish identity, Catholic values, and resistance to EU pressure, particularly regarding immigration quotas and judicial independence.</p> <p>The success of PiS has been bolstered by economic policies that include social welfare programs, such as the popular "500+" child benefit scheme, which have improved living standards for many Poles. This combination of economic populism and cultural conservatism has maintained PiS's appeal, especially in rural areas and among older voters. In the 2023 general elections PiS again received most of the votes, but the opposition managed to form a majority coalition government, which ended the two-term rule of PiS. In the European Parliament, PiS is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists.</p> <p>While PiS is the main far-right force, other smaller groups like Confederation (Konfederacja) – a far-right alliance – also advocate nationalist and anti-EU positions, further reflecting the prominence of far-right sentiment in Polish politics. These parties continue to shape the national discourse by focusing on issues of sovereignty, identity, and resistance to external influences.</p> |

| | |
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| Spain | <p>Far-right parties in Spain have recently gained prominence, primarily through the rise of Vox. Founded in 2013 by former members of the conservative People's Party (PP), Vox initially struggled to gain traction but found success by capitalizing on nationalist sentiments, opposition to Catalan independence, and growing discontent with traditional political parties.</p> <p>Vox's breakthrough came in the 2018 Andalusian regional elections, where it secured 12 seats, marking the first significant far-right presence in a Spanish parliament since the Franco era. This success was followed by substantial gains in the 2019 national elections, where Vox won 24 seats in April and then increased its share to 52 seats in November, becoming the third-largest party in the Spanish Congress. In the European Parliament, Vox is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party; it declined to join the Identity and Democracy group.</p> <p>Vox's platform includes strong opposition to illegal immigration, a hard stance on crime, and the defence of Spanish unity against separatist movements. The party also pro-motes conservative social policies, advocating for traditional family values and opposing progressive legislation on issues such as gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights. Vox is classified by Popu-list as a far-right, Eurosceptic, populist party, but it is also explicitly anti-feminist and right-wing in economic terms.</p> |
| Sweden | <p>In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) are the most notable far-right political force. Founded in 1988, the SD struggled for mainstream acceptance due to its roots in the neo-Nazi movement and its hardline nationalist and anti-immigration stance. However, under the leadership of Jimmie Åkesson since 2005, the party has worked to moderate its image and broaden its appeal.</p> <p>The SD first entered the Swedish Parliament in 2010, winning 5.7% of the vote. Their support has steadily increased, with the party receiving 17.5% of the vote in the 2018 elections, making it the third-largest party in the Riksdag. In the 2022 general election the SD received 20.5% of the vote becoming the second largest party in the Riksdag. The administration led by Moderate Party leader Kristersson is a minority government that relies on confidence and supply from the SD. Within the European Union, the SD is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party.</p> <p>The party's platform focuses on significantly reducing immigration, promoting Swedish culture, and strengthening law and order. Popu-list classifies SD since its inception as far-right and since 2001 as populist. SD's success has influenced mainstream political discourse in Sweden, with other parties adopting stricter immigration policies in response to the SD's popularity.</p> |

2.2 Samples and representativeness

Given the centrality of work in the research question, the relevant target population for the survey is the active labour force, i.e. the persons working (either as employee or self-employed) or unemployed persons actively looking for work. We additionally restrict the population to persons between 18 and 65 years old, because these age limits largely overlap with the definition of active labour force. Throughout this report, we will use the term 'workers' to refer to this population. Thus, our concept of 'workers' does not refer to a specific social class (such as blue-collar workers) but includes all persons who are gainfully employed or looking to be.

In each of the ten countries, a sample of 1,500 individuals was surveyed. These respondents were recruited via marketing company IPSOS, who manage online access panels in a wide variety of countries. It is relevant to note that these panels are not constructed on the basis of a probability-based sample but are based on self-selection. This means that persons who are interested in completing online surveys on a regular basis in return for a small compensation can sign up for the panel and become a member. This procedure is cost-effective but entails risks for representativeness of the surveys (Cornesse et al., 2020). Notably, two threats to representativeness may arise. First, only persons with internet access will be represented in these online access panels and internet penetration rates are far from 100%. Some groups of persons (e.g., older, or less educated individuals), are disproportionately "not online" and therefore have no chance of being part of the sample. Second, and more importantly, it is easy to imagine that the group who takes the effort to register themselves to a panel has a particular profile that does not necessarily represent the working population at large.

In order to remedy these shortcomings to the extent possible, quotas can be implemented, or weighting factors can be applied. In this study, quotas were constructed on the basis of the variables gender, age and education. Concretely, this means that, based on administrative population data, it is calculated how many respondents within the sample are expected to belong to a particular gender, age cohort or educational group. Subsequently, the survey is distributed among panelists in such a way that the obtained samples represent the population distribution as good as possible. Table 2.3 shows the population distributions, quotas and realized sample for each of the ten countries. Overall, the quotas match the realized sample closely. The main deviations are that males are somewhat underrepresented in all countries but Poland and that the samples contain slightly fewer lower educated persons than expected in about half of the countries (the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Italy, and Spain). To tackle the deviations between the quotas and the realized sample arise, post-stratification weights are applied. This procedure guarantees that the samples are representative for gender, age, and education specifically.

Yet, with respect to other characteristics (such as, among other things, digital literacy levels, political interest or free time available), biases in the sample are not unlikely. As a result, caution is needed when making precise statements about the prevalence, frequency of agreement in the population at large, or even attempting to predict election outcomes. If the types or amounts of bias in the samples differ between countries, international comparisons could be misguided as well. Therefore, in this report, we refrain from drawing inferences based on small differences and idiosyncrasies. Instead, we focus on more robust and stable patterns. Furthermore, relations between variables (such as correlations or regression coefficients) are known to be much more robust against biases in the sample (Heggestadt et al., 2015). Questions about whether certain population groups (men, younger individuals, rural residents, parents, low-income individuals, etc.) are more likely than others to vote for or share right-wing populist attitudes can thus be answered in a more valid manner.

Table 2.3. Sampling design – population distribution, quota and realized sample by gender, age and education

| | | Gender | | Age cohort | | | | | Educational level | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|--------|--------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------------------|--------|-------|
| | | Male | Female | 18-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-65 | Low | Medium | High |
| France | Population distribution | 51.1% | 48.9% | 9.3% | 22.1% | 25.0% | 26.1% | 17.5% | 11.3% | 42.4% | 46.4% |
| | Quota | 766.6 | 733.4 | 139.7 | 331.5 | 374.5 | 391.4 | 262.9 | 168.9 | 635.6 | 695.5 |
| | Realized sample | 714 | 786 | 144 | 344 | 335 | 402 | 275 | 148 | 645 | 707 |
| Belgium | Population distribution | 52.9% | 47.1% | 6.7% | 25.2% | 25.6% | 24.7% | 17.7% | 11.5% | 37.6% | 50.9% |
| | Quota | 793.9 | 706.1 | 101.2 | 378.4 | 383.9 | 371.2 | 265.3 | 173.2 | 563.3 | 763.4 |
| | Realized sample | 734 | 766 | 108 | 326 | 401 | 382 | 283 | 173 | 539 | 788 |
| Denmark | Population distribution | 52.2% | 47.8% | 11.8% | 23.3% | 20.7% | 23.9% | 20.3% | 16.7% | 42.1% | 41.2% |
| | Quota | 782.6 | 717.4 | 177.4 | 348.9 | 310.7 | 357.9 | 305.1 | 250.7 | 632.0 | 617.4 |
| | Realized sample | 747 | 753 | 178 | 330 | 311 | 367 | 314 | 246 | 624 | 630 |
| Germany | Population distribution | 53.0% | 47.0% | 8.3% | 21.3% | 22.8% | 23.4% | 24.2% | 13.5% | 53.4% | 33.1% |
| | Quota | 795.5 | 704.5 | 124.5 | 319.8 | 342.1 | 350.3 | 363.3 | 202.0 | 801.0 | 496.9 |
| | Realized sample | 763 | 737 | 126 | 301 | 330 | 365 | 378 | 204 | 794 | 502 |
| Hungary | Population distribution | 53.2% | 46.8% | 5.6% | 22.3% | 26.3% | 29.5% | 16.4% | 9.5% | 59.3% | 31.2% |
| | Quota | 798.6 | 701.4 | 83.5 | 334.7 | 393.8 | 442.4 | 245.6 | 143.2 | 889.1 | 467.7 |
| | Realized sample | 753 | 747 | 97 | 294 | 403 | 451 | 255 | 132 | 896 | 472 |
| Italy | Population distribution | 56.9% | 43.1% | 5.7% | 18.9% | 23.9% | 30.4% | 21.1% | 29.9% | 46.9% | 23.3% |
| | Quota | 853.6 | 646.4 | 85.1 | 283.6 | 358.6 | 456.3 | 316.3 | 447.8 | 703.0 | 349.2 |
| | Realized sample | 804 | 696 | 89 | 256 | 363 | 459 | 333 | 417 | 721 | 362 |
| The Netherlands | Population distribution | 52.4% | 47.6% | 14.1% | 22.6% | 20.6% | 22.4% | 20.3% | 16.7% | 39.2% | 44.1% |
| | Quota | 785.7 | 714.3 | 211.7 | 338.5 | 309.7 | 335.6 | 304.4 | 250.7 | 587.8 | 661.5 |
| | Realized sample | 748 | 752 | 212 | 305 | 315 | 349 | 319 | 226 | 594 | 670 |
| Poland | Population distribution | 54.0% | 46.0% | 4.8% | 23.4% | 31.0% | 25.2% | 15.6% | 3.4% | 59.3% | 37.4% |
| | Quota | 810.2 | 689.8 | 72.1 | 351.6 | 465.0 | 377.4 | 233.9 | 50.5 | 888.9 | 560.6 |
| | Realized sample | 845 | 655 | 76 | 367 | 460 | 383 | 214 | 47 | 889 | 564 |
| Spain | Population distribution | 52.7% | 47.3% | 6.3% | 19.5% | 26.1% | 29.0% | 19.1% | 31.7% | 24.2% | 44.1% |
| | Quota | 790.6 | 709.4 | 94.5 | 292.9 | 391.6 | 435.0 | 286.0 | 475.9 | 363.2 | 660.9 |
| | Realized sample | 751 | 749 | 99 | 278 | 397 | 443 | 283 | 456 | 373 | 671 |
| Sweden | Population distribution | 53.0% | 47.0% | 9.5% | 24.1% | 23.3% | 23.3% | 19.8% | 10.9% | 41.6% | 47.5% |
| | Quota | 795.5 | 704.5 | 142.5 | 361.4 | 350.1 | 349.5 | 296.4 | 163.2 | 624.6 | 712.2 |
| | Realized sample | 747 | 753 | 149 | 380 | 302 | 359 | 310 | 122 | 643 | 735 |

Source: Population distributions are based on Eurostat data for the labour force, 2022



2.3 Fieldwork details

Table 2.4 summarizes a series of facts about the fieldwork. The actual fieldwork of the survey started on November 22nd, 2023 in all ten case study countries. In most countries, the fieldwork lasted for about one month and was concluded before the end of the year. In Sweden, however, fieldwork was extended to the beginning of January 2024 to obtain the 1,500 sample units.

The survey is a CAWI survey (Computer Assisted Web Interview) that was administered online via the Tivian platform managed by IPSOS. The average survey length was around 13 minutes in all countries. Not all sample units that started also completed the survey. If panelists did not fall within the population definition (employee, self-employed or looking for work; between 18 and 65 years old), they were deliberately screened out and not counted as a completed survey. Furthermore, a number of panelists who started the survey decided to quit the survey. The number of 'quitters' varied widely from 37 in Spain to 369 in France. Finally, the conversation rate shows the number of completed surveys compared to the number of initial clicks. It ranges from 25% in France, where every fourth person who clicked on the survey link also finished the survey to 70% in Belgium, where more than two of three finished the survey.

Table 2.4. Details of the fieldwork – by country

| | Fieldwork period | | Ave. length of survey (in minutes) | Fieldwork results | | |
|-----------------|------------------|------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|------------|-----------------|
| | Start | End | | Quitters | Screenouts | Conversion rate |
| France | 22/11/2023 | 28/12/2023 | 13 | 369 | 23 | 25% |
| Belgium | 22/11/2023 | 28/12/2023 | 12 | 178 | 56 | 70% |
| Denmark | 22/11/2023 | 28/12/2023 | 13 | 160 | 55 | 50% |
| Germany | 22/11/2023 | 13/12/2023 | 13 | 209 | 45 | 51% |
| Hungary | 22/11/2023 | 28/12/2023 | 14 | 262 | 88 | 54% |
| Italy | 22/11/2023 | 22/12/2023 | 12 | 76 | 231 | 30% |
| The Netherlands | 22/11/2023 | 28/12/2023 | 12 | 228 | 44 | 65% |
| Poland | 22/11/2023 | 22/12/2023 | 14 | 147 | 38 | 47% |
| Spain | 22/11/2023 | 15/12/2023 | 12 | 37 | 296 | 41% |
| Sweden | 22/11/2023 | 5/01/2024 | 14 | 48 | 239 | 48% |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

WSI

The survey was also conducted in Ireland, a country characterized by a Western bargaining regime. However, as a result of several serious anomalies during the data collection process we decided to discard this data. First, the fieldwork took longer than in other countries, and the average questionnaire duration (17 minutes) deviated notably from the other countries. However, the most important reason to not use the Ireland data was related to serious concerns regarding the quality of the data.¹ Moreover, a comparison of our survey data with the European Social Survey for Ireland shows strongly divergent findings (e.g., more than a full-scale point difference on the institutional trust items). For these reasons, we decided that it was prudent to exclude the Irish data from the report.

¹ Items from a single scale that are expected to correlate negatively and do so in all other case study countries, turn out to be positively related in Ireland (this is the case of the reverse-worded item in the workers' voice scale). In addition, the proportions of explained variance were unusually high in Ireland and much higher than in all other case study countries.

2.4 Measurement and instruments

The questionnaire was designed purposefully to answer the research questions described in Chapter 1. A complete questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. Below, we provide an overview of the main concepts used in this study as well as the origins of the survey items.

Voting intentions – To gauge party-political preferences, respondents were asked about their intentions to vote during the upcoming EU elections (to be organized roughly six months after the survey) using the following question:

In June, citizens in all countries of the European Union (EU) will have the opportunity to elect representatives for the European Parliament. If these elections were held today, who would you vote for?

Depending on the country, a list of political parties that were likely to participate in the 2024 EU elections was provided (at the moment of questionnaire design, final lists were not deposited yet). The responses to this question allow to assess whether citizens have a preference to vote for a far-right populist party or not (using the PopuList classification; Rooduijn et al., 2023). To separate ‘new’ from ‘loyal’ far-right wing voters, respondents were additionally asked to indicate whether they had voted for a particular far-right populist party in previous elections.

Democratic preferences and political attitudes

Preferences regarding democratic government were measured using four questions that were taken from round 10 of the European Social Survey:

- The importance of democracy:
 - How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?
(0 – Not at all important to 10 – Extremely important)
- Satisfaction with democracy:
 - And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?
(0 – Extremely dissatisfied to 10 – Extremely satisfied)
- Preferences for direct democracy / referenda:
 - How important do you think it is for democracy in general that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?
(0 – Not at all important for democracy in general to 10 – Extremely important for democracy in general)
- Preference for an authoritarian leader:
 - How acceptable for you would it be for [country] to have a strong leader who is above the law?

To measure trust in institutions, three items from the core module of the European Social Survey were used:

On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you personally trust each of the following institutions
(0 – No trust at all to 10 – Complete trust):

- The [country]’s parliament
- The legal system
- The European Union

However, three institutions were added to the list, given the specific purpose of this study:

- The political party you like best
- The trade unions
- The public news media in [country]

Populism was measured using a five-item scale that is inspired by the scale proposed by Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014). These items are formulated as individual statements, and respondents are asked to indicate their agreement using a 5-point scale (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly):

- The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- The power should be returned to the people.
- It would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people.
- Ordinary citizens know better than specialized politicians.

Intergroup attitudes

To capture attitudes towards immigrants, the three-item immigrant threat scale from the core module of the European Social Survey was included in the questionnaire:

- Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? (0 – Bad for the economy to 10 – Good for the economy)
- Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0 – Cultural life undermined to 10 – cultural life enriched)
- Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? (0 - A worse place to 10 - A better place)

Generalized prejudice towards diverse minority groups were operationalized via the concept of group-focused enmity (short: GFE, Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011). Six groups that are regularly the target of negative prejudice were included: Muslims, Jews, unemployed persons, women, homosexuals and transgender persons. For each group two statements were developed, one positively worded and one expressing negative attitudes. For these items, we started from existing surveys and made adaptations where necessary (e.g., to make the scale balanced). The items for the six groups (and the source of these items) are:

– Muslims:

- There are too many Muslims in your country. (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011)
- The Muslim culture fits well into your country. (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011)

– Jews:

- Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind. (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011)
- In general, Jews are trustworthy. (Belgian National Elections Survey; Abts et al., 2015)

– Unemployed persons:

- Unemployed people live a comfortable life at the expense of society. (Zick, Küpper & Mokros, 2023)
- Most unemployed people do a lot of effort to try to find a job. (European Social Survey, round 8)

– Women:

- A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family. (European Social Survey, round 5)
- Women are as suitable as men to lead a big company.

– Homosexuals:

- Equal rights for homosexuals are a threat for our norms and values. (Belgian National Elections Survey; Abts et al., 2015)
- It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women. (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011)

- Transgender persons:
 - Sex change operations are morally wrong.
 - Transgender persons should be free to live their own life as they wish.

Work environment

Several concepts related to the work environment are included in the survey. Note that these questions are asked to the working respondents only (not to the unemployed).

First, we included a series of items capturing job autonomy, working conditions and job content that tap into the *quality of work*. These items are based on the European Working Conditions Survey. Respondents are confronted with statements about their job and are asked to indicate to what extent they think this statement applies to them, using a 4-point scale (1 – Not at all true; 2 – A little true; 3 – Quite true; 4 – Very true):

- Management at my work allows me to decide how my own daily work is organized.
- I can choose or change my pace of work.
- Supervising the work of others is an important part of my job.
- I can contribute my own ideas and perspectives to the work.
- I can get support and help from my co-workers when needed.
- My job requires that I work very hard.
- I never seem to have enough time to get everything done in my job.
- My job consists mainly of monotonous tasks.
- My job gives me the chance to learn new things.
- My job offers good opportunities for promotion.

To measure job satisfaction, two items of the European Social Survey round 5 were included. The responses are recorded on a scale from 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (Extremely satisfied):

- How satisfied are you in your main job?
- And how satisfied are you with the balance between the time you spend on your paid work and the time you spend on other aspects of your life?

To capture satisfaction with pay, we added the following item proposed by Hövermann, Kohlrausch & Voss (2022) also measured on a scale from 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (Extremely satisfied):

- Considering all your efforts and achievements in your job, how satisfied are you with your pay?

The experience of democratic efficacy and voice at the workplace is measured using a 4-item instrument proposed by Kiess & Schmidt (2020; 2024). Respondents were offered a 5-point agree-disagree scale to indicate their level of agreement with these scales:

- I feel ignored when it comes to decisions in my day-to-day work.
- In my company, I can talk openly about works councils and trade unions without having to fear disadvantages.
- The best way to solve problems or conflicts in the company is together with my colleagues.
- If I become active in my company, I can change something for the better.

Finally, we developed two new items to measure how concerned workers are about specific challenges impacting their career prospects. The response options for these questions are 1 - Not at all worried, 2 - Somewhat worried, and 3 - Strongly worried:

- To what extent are you worried that digitalization (that is, the increased use of computers, robots and artificial intelligence) might negatively affect your job and career prospects?
- To what extent are you worried that the measures governments take against climate change might negatively affect your job and career prospects?

Demographic, socio-economic, and job-related variables

In the statistical models, we investigate how the concepts discussed above are differentially distributed across demographic categories, socio-economic strata, and segments of the labour market. To that end, the following profile variables were measured and constructed:

- Gender: male and female. 15 respondents indicated the non-binary option. Because of the small number, these persons are removed from further analysis.
- Age – grouped into five cohorts (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 44-54; 55-65 years old)
- Education: low (up to lower secondary education) – middle (higher secondary education) – high (tertiary education)
- Migration background: a dummy indicating whether the respondent or at least one of the parents were born abroad
- Occupational class: this indicator distinguishes between job categories based on type of work and status. A distinction is made between blue collar workers, white collar workers and higher professionals. Examples of jobs in the higher professional category are general managers, engineers, legal professionals, or medical doctors. The category of white-collar workers includes administrative staff, care workers and office clerks. Jobs such as labourers, mechanics and machine operators belong to the group of blue-collar workers.
- Household income: Respondents were asked to situate their household income in one of ten income brackets (roughly representing income deciles in the country), using the following question:
 - What is your household's total income per month, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.
- This household income was subsequently corrected for the number of household members that are dependent on this income (with equalization factors 1 for the first person, 0.5 for every additional person over 14 years old and 0.3 for children younger than 14). The resulting equalized household income was finally partitioned into four quartiles.

For the working population, the following additional information regarding their employment was gathered:

- Sector of employment:
 - Which type of organisation do you work for?
 - Central or local government
 - Other public sector (such as education and health)
 - A state-owned enterprise
 - A private firm

– Company size:

How many employees in total work at your workplace, that is the local site where you work?

- 1 (I work alone)
- 2-9
- 10-49
- 50-249
- 250 and over

– Contract type:

What type of contract do you have?

- Unlimited duration
- Limited duration
- No contract

The last two categories were collapsed, thus creating a dichotomy between ‘unlimited duration’ and ‘no unlimited duration’.

– The presence of workers’ representation in the workplace

Does a trade union, works council or similar committee representing employees exist at your company or organization?

- Yes
- No

Finally, all respondents were also asked whether they are currently member of a trade union. If they answered this was not the case, a follow-up question asked whether they had been a member in the past.

2.5 Statistical analyses

In this report, three types of statistical techniques are used. First, to explore the survey items measuring central concepts, descriptive statistics – such as average or percentages – are presented by country. All descriptive statistics are weighted for age, gender, and education so that the results are representative with respect to these characteristics.

Often, batteries of survey items are included with the specific purpose of measuring an underlying construct (such as institutional trust or experience of democratic efficacy at the workplace). Before items are combined into a scale variable, the measurement quality (i.e., reliability, validity, and dimensionality) is assessed by inspecting Cronbach’s alpha and conducting Exploratory Factor Analysis by country. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of the internal consistency of a scale (essentially representing the intercorrelations between the items). Exploratory Factor Analysis uncovers the dimensionality of the concepts underlying a set of items and shows how strongly items reflect the underlying construct (by means of the factor loadings). Only when these tests yield satisfactory outcomes, scales are constructed. All multi-item scales in this report are based on the average of the items and are transformed so that they range from 0 to 10.

To explore relations between variables, we make use of multivariate regression analyses. In most cases we apply the linear variant of this technique. Linear regression essentially predicts a dependent variable or outcome by means of a series of independent variables or predictors. The parameters of interest of this analysis are regression coefficients. These coefficients show how the prediction for the dependent variable evolves if a particular predictor increases with 1 unit while all other predictors are kept constant. Positive (negative) regression coefficients indicate that a predictor has a positive (negative) impact on the outcome variable. It is important to keep in mind that the regression coefficients display net effects of a certain predictor, controlling for all variables in the model. To separate effects that can be generalized to a wider population from chance fluctuations, we perform tests of statistical significance. When an effect is statistically significant, this implies that it is so large that it can be reasonably excluded that it is caused by chance. To indicate significance of the effects, asterisks are used (* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$). The regression models also yield R-squared, that is a measure of the proportion of variation in the outcome variable that can be explained by all predictors together.

In the case of intentions to vote for a far-right populist party, the outcome variable is dichotomous (intention vs. no intention). For this specific analysis we use logistic instead of linear regression. The underlying logic is similar, but in this case the regression parameters are odds ratios. These odds ratios show the multiplicative effect of a 1-unit increase of a predictor on the odds of having intentions to vote for a far-right populist party. An odds ratio larger than 1 implies that an increase in the predictor increases the odds of a far-right vote. Odds ratios smaller than 1 are indicative of a negative effect. Also here, significance tests are performed.

All analyses are carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics version 29. All analyses are weighted for gender, age, and education.

3 Democratic backsliding? Far-right populist preferences among European workers

3.1 The far-right populist threat to liberal democracy

As a point of departure, this chapter explores the cluster of attitudes that are the breeding ground of far-right politics. Although academics differ in their exact definition of the political far right, its ideology can be characterized by several core elements (Mudde, 2019). A first constitutive element is *nativism*, that is an exclusionary combination of nationalism and xenophobic tendencies. The far-right ideological project strives for a nation state that is inhabited by members of the idealized native group and from which ‘alien elements’ – that are perceived as hostile – should be excluded. In contemporary Europe, particularly ethnic minority groups stemming from migration are construed as unwelcome elements threatening the nativist ideal. Second, a common dominator of the political far-right is that it harbours anti-democratic tendencies, such as authoritarian leadership and *populism*. Populism is a political ideology that, at its core, revolves around three key components: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and Manichaeism (Akkerman et al., 2014). *People-centrism* emphasizes the primacy of ‘the people’ in political decision-making. The populist leaders thereby depict themselves as the voice of the people, promising to prioritize the concerns of ordinary citizens over those of entrenched elites. This *anti-elitism* is a second central tenet of populism, portraying established elites – be they political, economic, or intellectual – as out-of-touch and self-serving (Mudde, 2004; Abts & Rummens, 2007). Third, *manicheism* means that populism divides society into a simplistic binary of good versus evil. In populist rhetoric, the homogenized people are seen as good and fundamentally juxtaposed against the corrupt elites. This antagonistic worldview serves to galvanize supporters while demonizing opponents, amplifying social polarization and undermining nuanced dialogue. Populism is considered as a thin-centred ideology, meaning that it is combined with a host ideology that defines concretely who belongs to the good people and the corrupt elites and formulates a political program on that basis. In the case of far-right populism, the nativist element implies that the native population is seen as the homogenous people, whose interests are pitted against those of immigrants and a corrupt liberal political elite who implement multicultural policies instead of protecting traditional way of life of the people. Very often, the political far-right makes appeal to traditionalist values that are rooted in nostalgia for an idealized past and emphasize the role of the traditional family, religious communities, and the natural environment. Other host ideologies give a different interpretation of the populist configuration. In the case of socialist populism, for example, class plays a dominant role instead of ethnic group.

The rise of far-right populism constitutes a challenge to the key pillars of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the – sometimes paradoxical – interplay of two different traditions. On the one hand, it contains a democratic (procedural) tradition that focuses on popular sovereignty: the procedures should guarantee the participation of the *demos* (people) in political decision making. However, liberal democracy is also rooted in a liberal (substantive) tradition that guarantees the rule of law and individual freedoms. From this perspective, it is not legitimate that the fundamental rights of the minority are violated, even if this is supported by a majority of the population. The combination of both traditions is by no means straightforward. Liberal democracy is a constant exercise in balancing democratic and liberal elements. Far-right populism proposes to change the equilibrium between democracy and liberalism fundamentally. In a form of “majoritarian extremism” (Mudde, 2021), it radicalizes the idea of popular sovereignty, pitting the will of ‘the people’ personified by a strong leader against the political establishment that is seen as corrupt. At the same time, the liberal pillar is downplayed, and fundamental

rights of minorities become subordinate to the imagined will of the people. Contemporary far-right populism can be seen as an “illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism” (Mudde, 2021) as it is a response to the depoliticization of decision-making, which has characterized politics in the last decades. While political leaders often said that “there is no alternative” or “we cannot decide that”, populists have responded by stating that everything is political (Mudde, 2021), yet in an illiberal way, as it fundamentally rejects any type of limitation to the power of the majority (Mudde, 2021).

In today’s Europe, immigration is the main issue around which far-right politicians organize themselves. The most characterizing feature of manifestos of far-right political parties is their consistent rejection of immigration and its economic and cultural consequences. Over the past decades, Muslim communities have become a focal point of prejudice and discrimination (O’Brien, 2016), but other minority groups are subject to hostility as well – take for example the anti-LGBTIQ+ rhetoric of far-right politicians. From the far-right populist perspective, these groups pose a threat to the traditional customs and norms of the nation. By consequence, their minority rights, and liberal values such as freedom or equality are subjugated to the ‘will of the people’. In this sense, the rise of far-right populism entails a clear risk of democratic backsliding, eroding the institutions of liberal democracy and introducing autocratic tendencies.

This chapter studies to what extent the core elements of far-right populism find support among the European labour force. To do so, we first focus on workers’ evaluations and preferences regarding democratic procedures and institutions. Second, we investigate the prevalence of populist attitudes among European working populations. In a third section, we investigate workers’ attitudes towards minority groups in general and immigrants in particular. Finally, we give an overview of intentions to vote for far-right populist parties in the 2024 EU elections.

3.2 Democratic preferences and evaluations

To gain insight in the democratic values, a logical starting point is to gauge whether European workers endorse democracy as a political system and whether they are satisfied with the current state of democracy in their country. For this purpose, the survey asked respondents (1) *how important it is to live in a country that is governed democratically?* and (2) *on a whole, how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country.* Table 3.1 displays per country the average score on these items.

In general, support for the principle of democracy is quite strong across the participating countries. In all countries, the average importance of democracy is above 7.5 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the average over the pooled sample of all countries together equals 8.15. Furthermore, the country average show relatively little variation. The lowest score is observed in Belgium (7.65), while the highest average is found in Sweden (8.71). The range of country averages is thus about one scale point. Clearly, European working populations have not relinquished the principle of democratic government. However, that European workers find it important to live in a democratically governed country does by no means imply that they are satisfied with the current state of democracy. In every country, average ratings of satisfaction with how democracy works are markedly below the importance score. Across all countries, the average satisfaction with democracy amounts to 5.56 on a scale from 0 to 10. This average, however, hides considerable cross-country variations. By far the lowest level of democratic satisfaction is found in Hungary (3.82). Also, in France (4.91), Spain (5.31), Poland (5.35) and Italy (5.41) scores close to the midpoint of the scale are found. Higher levels of satisfaction are recorded in Denmark (6.74), Sweden (6.50) and the Netherlands (6.37). The high satisfaction scores in Northern Europe confirm studies that show that popular satisfaction with democracy is driven

by factors such as economic performance (Claassen & Magalhães, 2022) and accountability (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008).

Although the importance of and satisfaction with democracy provide a relevant point of departure, these indicators do not provide insight in how citizens understand the concept of democracy. Two additional survey questions shed some light onto this issue. To measure the popularity of referendums (an instrument of direct rather than representative democracy), respondents were asked *how important they think it is for democracy that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums* (0 – Not at all important to 10 – Extremely important). Direct democracy via referenda turns out to be a quite popular idea throughout Europe, with average scores between 6.35 (the Netherlands) and 7.58 (Hungary). Differences between countries are relatively small and a clear pattern is not immediately apparent. These findings cannot be explained by the actual experience with elements of direct democracy either. Hungary organized national referendums in recent years (2019 and 2022 respectively) and appear at the high end of the country ranking. Then again, Italy organized a referendum in 2022 as well, but scores around the total average. However, from previous research, it is known that support for referenda is high among persons with populist preferences (Jacobs, Akkerman & Zaslove, 2018).

Support for the idea of a strong leader figure – a staple of a far-right, authoritarian view on politics – is measured by a survey item asking *how acceptable it would be to have a strong leader who is above the law* (0 – Not at all acceptable to 10 – Completely acceptable). Support for an authoritarian leader is rather weak and all countries score well below the midpoint of the scale (5). The strongest support for authoritarian leadership is found in Hungary, Poland, and Italy, with average scores of 4.11, 4.28 and 4.44 respectively. That these countries score comparatively high on support for authoritarian leadership can be linked to the fact that far-right populists are currently (or were until recently) in power in these countries. In all other countries, the average support for authoritarian leadership falls below 4.

Table 3.1. Democratic preferences and evaluations – country averages

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|--|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? | 7.79 | 7.65 | 8.45 | 8.22 | 8.39 | 8.07 | 8.03 | 8.26 | 8.11 | 8.71 | 8.15 |
| On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? | 4.91 | 5.52 | 6.74 | 5.70 | 3.82 | 5.41 | 6.37 | 5.35 | 5.31 | 6.50 | 5.56 |
| How important you think it is for democracy that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums? | 7.10 | 6.75 | 7.55 | 7.05 | 7.58 | 7.20 | 6.35 | 7.54 | 7.45 | 7.13 | 7.17 |
| How acceptable for you would it be for [country] to have a strong leader who is above the law? | 3.85 | 3.89 | 2.89 | 3.83 | 4.11 | 4.44 | 3.78 | 4.28 | 3.44 | 2.51 | 3.72 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Understandings and evaluations of democracy are not randomly distributed among the population but can be socially structured. To investigate this in greater detail, we estimated a series of multivariate regressions that model how support for democracy is linked to socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, migration background) and socio-economic variables (occupational class and income).² In the case of the importance of democracy, several relevant patterns emerge from the analysis. In all countries, a significant age gradient is detected: The older respondents are, the more important they find it to live in a democratically governed country. In all countries, the difference between the youngest (18 to 24 years old) and the oldest (55 to 65 years old) is between 0.8 and 2 points, which is considerable on a scale from 0 to 10. Furthermore, we find that in all countries those with a lower educational level and incomes in the lowest quartile rate the importance of democracy significantly lower. Especially the younger cohorts and persons at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder are at risk of losing faith in democracy as a political system. Gender, migration background and occupation turn out to be far less relevant to understand the importance of democracy.

Turning to satisfaction with democracy, the patterns become less consistent across countries. In most countries (7 out of 10), persons with a higher educational degree are most satisfied with the democratic functioning. Interestingly, precisely the three countries where far-right populists are (or were until recently) in power are an exception to this pattern. In Italy and Poland, no link between educational attainment and satisfaction with democracy is found. In Hungary, the highest educated are even less satisfied with current democracy than the lower educated. An explanation for this exceptional pattern is that FIDEZS is less popular among the higher educated (see section 3.6 on voting intentions); the discontent of the higher educated with Orban's policies spills over to their satisfaction with the democratic functioning of the state. Furthermore, we detect lower levels of satisfaction with democracy among the unemployed in five countries (France, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Sweden). In six countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden), dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy is higher among the lower incomes. These last effects show that – even if the patterns are not found universally – economic hardship is potentially associated with political discontent.

3.3 Institutional trust

Institutional trust and support for democracy are intricately linked. At its core, institutional or political trust refers to “evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with the normative expectations held by the public, which include that it be fair, equitable, honest, efficient, and responsive to society's needs” (Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 358). One of the primary connections between political trust and support for democracy lies in their mutual reinforcement. A high level of institutional or political trust “is often interpreted as a sign of good democratic health” (Winsvold et al., 2024: 759). Moreover, citizens who have higher levels of political trust are more likely to perceive democracy as a legitimate and effective system of governance and are also more likely to be more satisfied with democracy (Norris, 2002). Conversely, eroding trust in political institutions can lead to scepticism and disillusionment with democratic processes, thereby undermining support for democracy.

² These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2.

To gain more insights into the levels and distribution of institutional trust, the survey asked respondents how much they personally trusted each of the following institutions: the national parliament, the legal system, the political party one likes best, the European Union, the trade unions and the public news media. Respondents had to answer on a scale from 0 (No trust at all) to 10 (Complete trust). Table 3.2 displays per country the average score on this scale for each of the six institutions.

Table 3.2. Trust in different institutions – country averages

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|--|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Trust in national parliament | 4.52 | 4.95 | 5.38 | 4.79 | 3.52 | 4.45 | 5.51 | 4.43 | 4.65 | 5.55 | 4.78 |
| Trust in the legal system | 4.54 | 5.08 | 6.58 | 5.81 | 3.90 | 4.84 | 6.30 | 4.46 | 4.81 | 5.69 | 5.20 |
| Trust in the political party you like best | 5.31 | 5.60 | 6.05 | 5.69 | 5.45 | 5.27 | 6.73 | 5.90 | 5.50 | 6.31 | 5.78 |
| Trust in the European Union | 4.38 | 4.96 | 5.36 | 4.84 | 5.34 | 4.79 | 5.48 | 5.36 | 5.34 | 5.03 | 5.09 |
| Trust in the trade unions | 4.67 | 5.18 | 5.93 | 5.35 | 4.50 | 4.13 | 5.94 | 4.90 | 4.53 | 5.47 | 5.06 |
| Trust in the public news media | 4.21 | 5.20 | 5.56 | 5.17 | 3.08 | 4.28 | 5.61 | 3.85 | 4.30 | 5.32 | 4.66 |
| <i>Institutional trust scale (0-10)</i> | 4.42 | 5.08 | 5.84 | 5.26 | 3.50 | 4.52 | 5.81 | 4.25 | 4.59 | 5.52 | 4.88 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

WSI

Most countries are characterized by low to moderate levels of institutional trust, with country averages on the 0 to 10 scale generally hovering between 4 and 6 for the different institutions. In all but two countries – i.e., Germany and Denmark – people have the highest level of trust in the political party they like best. On the one hand, these levels of trust in the *political party respondents like best* are considerably higher than the *trust in politicians* in general that is reported in other studies (e.g., Ruelens, Meuleman & Nicaise, 2018), which illustrates that workers do make a distinction in their rejection of / support for political actors. On the other hand, these scores for the party respondents like best are still relatively low, indicating that a considerable share of workers has not one political party they put a lot of trust in.

Another rather highly-trusted institution is the legal system – in most cases it is the second-most trusted institution, in Germany and Denmark it is even the most trusted institution. In all countries trust in the legal system is (slightly) higher than the trust people have in their national parliaments. It is also notable that people trust their national parliament to more or less the same degree as they trust the European Union. While the European Union is often criticized for having a democratic deficit, this is not reflected in the trust levels of the European populations. A possible interpretation is that the mistrust in the EU is not so much the distrust in European institutions specifically, but rather reflects general mistrust in institutions. Hungary is a notable exception here. Surprisingly, the level of trust Hungarians have in the European Union is considerably higher (5.34) than the trust they have in their national parliament (3.52). Clearly, the Hungarian workforce is divided on the EU-critical stance of the Hungarian government. In Hungary, citizens display low trust in their national institutions generally (except for the political party they like best). This low level of institutional trust is most likely the result of

the political and social polarization which has occurred since Victor Orban became Prime Minister in 2010 with his far-right populist FIDESZ party (Vegetti, 2019).

There is considerable variation between countries in the levels of institutional trust they have in different institutions. Illustratively, the country averages for trust in the public news media in Poland (3.85) and Hungary (3.08) are considerably lower than in most other European countries (the average for all countries is 4.66). Trust in the trade unions hovers between 4 and 6, with the lowest scores in Italy (4.13), Hungary (4.50), Spain (4.53) and France (4.67). Trust in the trade unions is most outspoken in the Netherlands (5.94), Denmark (5.93), and Sweden (5.47).

To gain more insight into differences in institutional trust between countries, we constructed a scale measuring the trust in three national institutions as the mean on the items referring to the national parliament, the legal system and the public news media.³ Table 3.2 shows the country scores for this institutional trust scale. The considerable variation across countries in terms of institutional trust levels is clearly confirmed by the distribution of this institutional trust scale. While Denmark (5.84) and the Netherlands (5.81) perform reasonably well in terms of institutional trust, Hungary in contrast does very poorly (with a score of 3.50) and Poland has the second lowest score (4.25). Both countries are characterized by serious political and social polarization, which admittedly could both be a cause and a consequence of the low levels of institutional trust.

Similar to people's view of democracy (see section 3.2), their institutional trust is also to some extent socially structured. To better understand the drivers of institutional trust, we again estimated a series of multivariate regressions that model how institutional trust is linked to socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, migration background) and socio-economic variables (occupational class, income).⁴ Some notable patterns emerge from this analysis. First, in all countries except Hungary and Poland we find that institutional distrust is more prevalent among the lower educated. In Poland, no educational gradient is found, and in Hungary we find the opposite association, i.e. people with lower levels of education exhibit higher levels of institutional trust. This adds to the finding from the previous section (3.2) that only in Hungary, the less educated are also more satisfied with the state of democracy in their country. This can possibly be explained by the fact that the populist regime in charge in Hungary led by Victor Orban mainly draws its electoral and political support from the Hungarian lower educated.

For the other predictors, the patterns are less consistent across countries. In about half of the countries, we find that unemployed people are more likely to have lower levels of institutional trust. In particular, in France, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary and Sweden we find a significantly negative relationship between unemployment and levels of institutional trust. Regarding migration background we find mixed patterns. While in some countries located in southern Europe – i.e., France, Italy, and Spain – people with a migration background report higher levels of institutional trust than people without a migration background. In three other countries in northern Europe – i.e., Denmark, Germany, and Netherlands – people with a migrant background tend to have lower levels of institutional trust. For the remaining four countries there is no significant relationship between these two variables. With respect to age cohort, genders or household income, no consistent link with institutional trust can be found.

³ Exploratory Factor Analysis indicates that these three items indeed measure a single dimension in a sufficiently reliable and valid way, with factor loadings equal to 0.86, 0.85 and 0.75 respectively in the pooled dataset. In all countries, Cronbach's alpha is larger than 0.80 for this scale.

⁴ These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 3.3.

3.4 Populist attitudes

As an alternative to liberal democracy and its distrusted institutions, the far right proposes a populist view of politics. The survey contains four statements that tap directly into populist attitudes, and more specifically into the people-centrist component. Respondents are asked to indicate to what extent they agree with these statements using a five-point agree-disagree scale (disagree strongly, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, agree strongly). Table 3.3 shows the percentage of European workers that agrees or strongly agrees with the statements expressing populist views. This table makes clear that populist attitudes are widely shared in all European countries. Across the pooled sample, 56.3% of respondents (strongly) agree with the statement that *it would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people*. Only in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden less than half of respondents endorse this statement. In Italy, Poland, and Spain, about 7 in 10 respondents agree with this statement. The statements that *the people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions* and that *the power should be returned to the people* are (strongly) endorsed by about half of the respondents. The percentage agreeing that *ordinary citizens know better than specialized politicians* is slightly lower in the pooled sample (33.1%), but still far from a marginal position. All in all, the idea that a shift of power from political elites to the ordinary people is warranted (an idea that is opposed to the logic of representative democracy) is quite widespread among European workers.

Table 3.3. Populist attitudes - % of (strong) agreement per country

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|---|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions. | 58.5 | 47.6 | 47.6 | 57.2 | 51.3 | 50.9 | 32.9 | 56.3 | 65.5 | 41.5 | 51.2 |
| The power should be returned to the people. | 58.4 | 46.7 | 39.7 | 48.3 | 52.7 | 52.3 | 30.1 | 47.7 | 61.3 | 38.3 | 47.8 |
| It would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people. | 63.2 | 55.4 | 39.2 | 58.4 | 55.7 | 67.8 | 42.9 | 73.2 | 69.1 | 36.7 | 56.3 |
| Ordinary citizens know better than specialized politicians. | 43.3 | 34.4 | 29.9 | 35.8 | 29.4 | 35.2 | 19.3 | 39.7 | 39.9 | 22.3 | 33.1 |
| Populism scale (0-10) | 6.61 | 6.01 | 5.62 | 6.14 | 6.23 | 6.32 | 4.86 | 6.47 | 6.71 | 5.30 | 6.03 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey– 2023

WSI

Exploratory Factor Analysis shows that the four distinct statements measure a single underlying attitudinal dimension. This is also confirmed by reliability analysis: in each of the countries, Cronbach's alpha exceeds 0.80. To gain more insight into differences in populism between countries and social categories, we can therefore make use of a populism scale. This populism scale is constructed as the mean over the four items, and ranges from 0 to 10 (with higher scores referring to stronger populist attitudes). The lowest averages on the populism scale are observed in the Netherlands (4.86), Sweden (5.30) and Denmark (5.62). Yet even in these countries, the average is around 5, which is the midpoint of the scale, indicating that people-centrism is a widely shared preference there as well. France (6.61) and Spain (6.71) are the

countries where populist attitudes are most prevalent. Interestingly, this country ranking in political attitudes does not align with the electoral outcomes (see also Jungkunz et al., 2021). The survey was conducted in the same time period when the far-right populist PVV of Geert Wilders obtained a landslide victory in the Dutch national elections, while that country has the lowest average on populist attitudes. Hungary, Italy, and Poland – countries where far-right populist forces are (or were until recently) in power – do not figure at the top of the country ranking. This suggests that the people-centrist notions of the populist ideology are not confined to the extreme right, but widely shared across the whole political spectrum.

By means of multivariate regression analysis (see Appendix 3.4), we investigated whether populist ideas are more popular in particular societal groups. The most consistent effects are found for educational level and income. In seven countries out of ten, populist attitudes are significantly less outspoken among the higher educated and in the highest income quartile. There is no evidence for an outspoken generational divide in populist attitudes. In Germany, Hungary and Spain, the youngest age cohort (18-24 years old) shows the lowest level of populism. Yet in Denmark, least support for populist ideas is recorded among the oldest cohort (55-65 years old). In France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden males show slightly more populist ideas, but in the other countries a significant gender difference is absent. All in all, the explanatory power of the demographic and socio-economic indicators is rather limited – they explain between 2 and 11% of the individual differences in populist attitudes. This is a strong indication that the populist notion of people-centrism has gained popularity in all layers of the European populations, irrespective of generation or social class.

3.5 Intergroup attitudes

As noted above, the nativist or anti-immigrant discourse propagated by far-right populist leaders is based on the idea that the native population is perceived as a homogeneous group, with their interests in opposition to immigrants and a perceived corrupt liberal political establishment that prioritizes multicultural policies over safeguarding traditional ways of life. It has become commonplace for populist leaders in European countries to rally electoral support from the native population by portraying immigrants as competitors for jobs and resources, and as a perceived threat to national identity and values. In order to assess how far the nativist discourse or ideology is supported or may find a receptive audience among people in Europe, we have to look in more detail at people's intergroup attitudes. Hence, in what follows we will examine, first, people's anti-immigration attitudes and, second, their agreement to group-focused enmity (GFE), that are generalized derogatory attitudes towards outgroups rooted in an ideology of inequality (Zick et al., 2008).

In order to assess people’s attitudes towards immigrants, the survey asked the respondents for their opinion of the impact of *people coming to live here from other countries* (thus: immigrants) on their country’s economy, cultural life and life in general in their country. For each of these domains, the respondents had to indicate on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 how they perceived the contribution of immigrants, with higher scores referring to a more positive evaluation. Table 3.4 displays per country the average score on the 0 to 10 answering scales for each of these three questions.

Table 3.4. Perceived impact of immigrants on different aspects of society – country averages

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|---|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries? (0: Bad; 10: Good) | 4.94 | 5.12 | 5.53 | 5.07 | 4.86 | 5.54 | 5.38 | 5.92 | 5.74 | 5.14 | 5.32 |
| Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0: Undermined - 10: Enriched) | 4.81 | 5.29 | 5.23 | 4.91 | 5.14 | 5.38 | 5.5 | 5.78 | 6.02 | 5.57 | 5.36 |
| Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? (0: Worse - 10: Better) | 4.49 | 4.76 | 5.35 | 4.49 | 4.6 | 4.74 | 4.98 | 5.45 | 5.5 | 5.19 | 4.95 |
| <i>Anti-immigration attitudes scale (0-10)</i> | 5.25 | 4.94 | 4.63 | 5.18 | 5.13 | 4.78 | 4.71 | 4.28 | 4.25 | 4.70 | 4.79 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



The results show that in all countries attitudes towards immigrants are at best lukewarm and in most countries, immigrants are generally not perceived to make a very positive contribution towards the economy, cultural life or life in general. The scores for the cultural and economic dimension are quite similar in most countries, meaning that cultural and economic forms of perceived immigrant threat are about equally widespread. It is also notable that anti-immigrant attitudes are relatively similarly widespread across the surveyed countries (see also Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2018). This picture is also confirmed when an anti-immigrant attitudes scale is created based on the three items. The scale runs from 0 to 10, with higher scores referring to a more negative stance on immigration. The scale shows that people have indeed relatively similar views towards immigrants in most countries. In particular, all countries’ scores are within 1 scale point from one and another on this anti-immigration scale. While France has the highest score (5.25) followed by Germany (5.18) and Hungary (5.13), Spain and Poland have the lowest scores (4.25 and 4.28) on the anti-immigration scale.

In order to better understand what drives people's anti-immigration attitudes, we again estimated a series of multivariate regressions that model how the anti-immigration scale is linked to socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, migration background) and socio-economic variables (occupational class, income).⁵ The most notable predictor of anti-immigration attitudes turns out to be educational level. In all countries, respondents with a higher education score significantly lower on the anti-immigrant attitudes than the low and/or middle educated. Besides education, also occupational class seems to play a role: the higher professionals display less anti-immigrant sentiments than the blue-collar workers in seven countries and the white-collar workers in eight countries. That education and occupation play a more important role than income (significant effects are found in three countries only) suggests that material deprivation is not the main driving force behind these socio-economic effects. Instead, it is likely that the socialization of tolerant values that is implicit in education and particular occupations is more relevant to understand the development of attitudes towards immigration (Hello, Scheepers & Slegger, 2006; Velásquez & Eger, 2022). Finally, and arguably somewhat unsurprisingly, in seven out of ten countries people with a migration background show significantly fewer negative sentiments about immigrants' contribution towards their country's economy, cultural life and life in general. In the three remaining countries (Germany, Hungary, and Poland), a negative effect is found as well, yet it is too small to be statistically significant. For age and gender, no universal patterns are found. In Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden, the older cohorts show more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Yet in Poland, it is precisely the cohort between 55 and 65 years old that has the most positive outlook on immigration. In Germany, Hungary, Poland and Spain, males have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than females. But in Sweden, the opposite is true.

Ethnic communities rooted in migration are not the only outgroup that are targeted by far-right populists, however. In recent years, for example, rights of LGBTIQ+ people have been questioned by the political far right. To assess attitudes towards outgroups in general, we make use of the concept of "group-focused enmity" (GFE) that was introduced by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and colleagues (2002; Zick et al., 2008). It refers to a "generalized devaluation of outgroups" which is characterized by "hostile attitudes toward different outgroups, who are considered to be unequal, socially threatening, and/or culturally deviant" (Meuleman et al., 2019: 223). In recent years a large amount of empirical evidence has shown that prejudices against a broad spectrum of social groups, encompassing diverse ethnic and religious communities, as well as women, sexual minorities, the elderly, individuals with disabilities, and those who are homeless, are usually very strongly correlated. This confirms GFE's hypothesis that there is a stable structure of interrelated prejudices which are triggered by a single set of antecedents (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011).

In order to assess people's GFE, respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-points scale to what extent they agreed or disagreed with twelve – arguably somewhat provocative – statements about the following six outgroups that are often prejudiced against: the unemployed, Muslims, Jews, women, homosexuals and transgender people. For each of these outgroups, there was both a positively and a negatively phrased statement. Table 3.5 below shows the twelve statements, which are grouped according to whether or not they were positively or negatively phrased. For the positively phrased statements, the table shows per country the proportion of respondents who (strongly) *disagreed* with a specific statement. For the negatively phrased statements, the table shows the proportion of respondents who (strongly) *agreed* with a specific statement. Thus, importantly, this means that for both sets of statements, higher percentages are indicative of negative prejudices towards that particular group.

⁵ These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 3.5.

Table 3.5. Group-focused enmity (GFE) – % of (strong) (dis)agreement per country

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| % (strongly) agree | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Unemployed people live a comfortable life at the expense of society. | 40.9 | 53.7 | 32.1 | 47.7 | 24.8 | 28.1 | 43.3 | 49.1 | 34.2 | 29.9 | 38.4 |
| Equal rights for homosexuals are a threat for our norms and values. | 19.1 | 19.4 | 17.3 | 21.1 | 26.3 | 17.3 | 15.9 | 27.9 | 15.1 | 10.2 | 19.0 |
| Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind. | 16.3 | 24.5 | 17.5 | 21.1 | 23.7 | 21.3 | 14.4 | 32.2 | 22.7 | 10.4 | 20.4 |
| A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family. | 17.3 | 16.5 | 15.6 | 19.4 | 20.8 | 23.9 | 16.3 | 20.9 | 14.9 | 10.5 | 17.6 |
| There are too many Muslims in [country]. | 44.5 | 47.0 | 46.9 | 51.3 | 26.2 | 38.5 | 41.8 | 25.9 | 42.4 | 41.2 | 40.6 |
| Sex change operations are morally wrong. | 19.1 | 20.5 | 23.2 | 22.6 | 36.8 | 21.1 | 21.4 | 25.1 | 15.8 | 20.3 | 22.6 |
| % (strongly) disagree | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Most unemployed people do a lot of effort to try to find a job. | 30.4 | 46.7 | 24.9 | 31.5 | 24.8 | 32.1 | 36.9 | 36.4 | 30.7 | 26.0 | 32.0 |
| It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women. | 18.7 | 16.1 | 12.5 | 16.7 | 35.7 | 20.3 | 12.9 | 31.6 | 12.0 | 14.5 | 19.1 |
| In general, Jews are trustworthy. | 7.3 | 12.1 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 17.5 | 10.6 | 7.8 | 21.2 | 11.3 | 8.4 | 11.4 |
| Women are as suitable as men to lead a big company. | 15.7 | 21.5 | 21.8 | 18.5 | 22.3 | 21.7 | 20.0 | 21.7 | 19.4 | 18.6 | 20.1 |
| The Muslim culture fits well into [country]. | 75.7 | 80.7 | 82.6 | 80.8 | 93.2 | 87.7 | 79.3 | 91.3 | 79.1 | 84.2 | 83.4 |
| Transgender persons should be free to live their own life as they wish. | 31.0 | 33.2 | 25.7 | 32.1 | 54.9 | 29.4 | 30.3 | 43.5 | 22.3 | 24.1 | 32.7 |
| Group-focused enmity scale (0-10) | 3.86 | 4.29 | 3.86 | 4.15 | 4.59 | 4.19 | 3.83 | 4.78 | 3.80 | 3.50 | 4.09 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

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Some notable observations can be made on the basis of the results shown in Table 3.5. Based on the items used in the survey, especially Muslims turn out to be frequent targets of negative prejudices. These findings illustrate how ‘the Muslim question’ has come to dominate public debates across Europe, resulting in worrying levels of Islamophobia (O’Brien, 2016). In the total sample, 40.6% are of the opinion that there are too many Muslims and 83.4% disagree with the statement that *the Muslim culture fits well into your country*. In Poland and Hungary, this percentage even exceeds 90%. At the same time, in Poland and Hungary the percentages respondents saying that there are too many Muslims is considerably lower than the average, which is probably the result of the restrictive immigration policies instituted by these two countries in the preceding years, which in turn ensured very low levels of Muslim immigrants being welcomed to these countries. The unemployed are an out-group that is a frequent target of negative prejudices, as well. In the total sample, 38.4% of respondents agree that *unemployed people live a comfortable life at the expense of society*. Furthermore, 32% disagree that *most unemployed people do a lot of effort to try to find a job* (in Belgium, this percentage even amounts to 46.7%). These responses reflect the presence of the negative stereotype of the

lazy, work-shy unemployed. For the other target groups – Jews, women, homosexuals, and transgender persons – the negative statements are endorsed by between 10 and 30% of the population. Noteworthy are the widely shared negative attitudes towards Jews in Poland, towards transgender persons in Hungary and towards homosexuals in Poland and Hungary.

The primary purpose of these items, however, is to create a scale measuring GFE that represents a general derogatory attitude towards different types of outgroups. Based on the twelve items, such a scale was created, ranging from 0 (very low levels of GFE) to 10 (high levels of generalized prejudice). Based on this scale, we find the highest values for the GFE scale in the two Eastern European countries Poland (4.78) and Hungary (4.59). Considerably lower levels of GFE are detected in Sweden (3.50), but also in Spain (3.80), the Netherlands (3.83), France (3.86) and Denmark (3.86).

On the basis of a series of multivariate regressions⁶, we found that GFE is consistently and significantly associated with gender, people's level of education and household income levels. In all countries but Poland, where there is no gender association, males report higher levels of generalized prejudice than females. In all countries, those in the lowest income quartile score significantly higher on GFE (in most countries the difference between the highest and lowest income group reaches about 0.5 on the 0-10 scale). In all countries but Denmark, the higher educated score lower on GFE than the low and/or middle educated.

Besides these strong and anticipated patterns, we also find three patterns that are less expected but also less consistent. First, in six countries – i.e., France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden – people with a migration background were significantly more negative towards other minority groups in general. The explanation is that in these countries, migrant communities have a more conservative stance regarding gender roles, homosexuality, and transgender issues. Second, in seven out of ten countries, unemployed people expressed lower levels of GFE. This is partly the result of the fact that 'the unemployed' were one of the groups which people were asked to give their opinion on. If the scale is recreated without the statements about the unemployed, the effect disappears in all but two countries. Third, age effects are present in six countries only. But in the countries where these effects are present, we see invariably that either the youngest cohort shows higher levels of GFE (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden) or that the oldest cohort shows lower levels of GFE (Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain). In any case, there is no evidence that younger generations in Europe are less prejudiced than their parents or grandparents; on the contrary.

3.6 Voting intentions

A crucial question is whether the climate of dissatisfaction with liberal democracy, distrust in political institutions, populist preferences and negative attitudes towards out-groups translates into a vote for the political far-right. In the survey, respondents were asked who they would vote for, if the EU elections would be held today. Table 3.6 displays these voting intentions by country. To be clear: these voting intentions should not be interpreted as a prediction of the election results. Not only was the survey organized with some distance (six months) before the elections. Moreover, this survey was only conducted among the working population (whose voting intentions might deviate from the entire electorate). We also include 'would not vote' as a relevant category in our tables, as this answer provides useful information about (dis)engagement with EU politics. However, this choice renders a direct comparison with actual election results unsuitable.

⁶ These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 3.5.

The group of respondents indicating to have no intention to turn up at the voting booth for the EU elections is by no means negligible. In Hungary (24.3%), Italy (21.3%) and France (22.0%), those who would not vote make up more than 20% of the working force. Also, in Denmark (14.9%), Belgium (15.5%) and Spain (17.4%) the numbers are very high. In these countries, this group of non-voters can in terms of size be considered as one of the larger political formations. In the Netherlands (6.6%), and Poland (9.4%), the appetite to participate in the EU elections is considerably larger. Now that the elections have taken place, it is clear that the actual voter turnout was even considerably lower than reported here.⁷ In any case, these results show that a relevant group of workers had no interest to participate in the EU elections.

The main focus of this analysis are intentions to vote for far-right populist parties. To identify the far-right populist parties in the respective countries, we rely on the classification of *the Populist*, which identifies parties that combine a nativist stance with ideas that separates society into two antagonistic groups – the people vs. the elite (Rooduijn et al., 2023). In Table 3.6, the far-right populist parties are printed in bold. Considerable cross-national differences in intentions to vote for far-right populists are apparent, but in all countries, far-right populists obtain sizeable shares of the voting intentions.

Not surprisingly, far-right populist parties enjoy a lot of popularity in the countries where they are in power at the time of the survey. Of the Hungarian labour force, 24.0% intend to vote Orban's FIDESZ. In Italy, 28.2% of respondents plan to vote for one of the two far-right populist parties, namely Fratelli d'Italia of current prime minister Meloni (20.8%) and Lega (7.4%). Clearly, the far-right does not automatically lose popularity once they enter power. A slightly different situation is observed in Poland, 23.2% of the respondents intend to vote for the far-right populist PiS. This party has been in power since 2015 but became second in the 2023 election and is only the second-most popular formation in the survey as well (after Tusk's Koalicja Obywatelska). In Sweden, the far-right Sverigedemokraterna are not formally inside the current government but lend parliamentary support to it. In our survey, 18.6% of Swedish respondents indicate their intentions to vote for this party, making Sverigedemokraterna the second electoral force (after the Socialdemokraterna).

In the Netherlands, France and Belgium, far-right populist parties were not in power at the time of survey but were still the most popular political forces according to our survey. In France, the Rassemblement National receives 25.0% of voting intentions, which is more than double of any other political party. Besides the Rassemblement National, Reconquête is a second far-right populist party that has noticeable popularity (4.7% of voting intentions). Notice that France, in addition to the strong popularity of far-right populists, have a remarkably high percentage of respondents (22.0%) intending to abstain from voting. In the Netherlands, Wilders' PVV is by far the most popular party (23.2%), while a second far-right populist party Forum voor Democratie receives far fewer voting intentions (3.3%). These results are in line with the results of the 2023 Dutch National elections that were held around the time of the survey. The far-right populist Vlaams Belang receives 16.1% of the voting intentions of the Belgian sample. This number grossly underestimates the popularity of Vlaams Belang in Flanders, however, as this party only participates in that region.⁸

⁷ For actual turnout figures, see: <https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/turnout/>

⁸ In Belgium, the electoral success of the populist far-right between Flanders and Francophone Belgium is very distinct. While Vlaams Belang is among the most popular political formations in Flanders, Francophone Belgium does not have a significant far-right populist party. Because citizens in the Francophone part of the country do not have the option to vote for the far-right, the further exploration of voting intentions in Belgium will focus on Flanders only.

Table 3.6. Voting intentions for the EU elections of June 2024 – percentages

| France | | Belgium | | Denmark | |
|--|------|--|------|----------------------------------|------|
| Rassemblement National | 25.0 | N-VA | 8.9 | Socialdemokraterne | 16.1 |
| Reconquête | 4.7 | Vlaams Belang | 16.1 | Det Konservative Folkeparti | 5.7 |
| La France Insoumise | 9.1 | Vooruit (sp.a) | 5.3 | SF- Socialistisk Folkeparti | 9.0 |
| Les Républicains | 6.5 | Groen | 5.2 | Dansk Folkeparti | 9.7 |
| Parti Socialiste | 7.6 | PS | 7.6 | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti | 6.0 |
| Europe Ecologie - Les Verts / Les Ecologistes | 9.0 | Ecolo | 6.1 | Liberal Alliance | 8.7 |
| Other | 16.1 | MR | 8.1 | Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne | 5.8 |
| <i>I would not vote</i> | 22.0 | PVDA-PTB | 10.2 | Danmarksdemokraterne | 6.0 |
| | | Other | 16.9 | Other | 18.1 |
| | | <i>I would not vote</i> | 15.5 | <i>I would not vote</i> | 14.9 |
| Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | |
| CDU / CSU | 22.1 | FIDESZ (Fidesz Magyar Polgári Párt) | 24.0 | Movimento a 5 Stelle | 15.7 |
| SPD | 13.4 | Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (MH) | 9.8 | Partito Democratico | 12.8 |
| Die Linke | 5.9 | DK (Demokratikus Koalíció) | 8.8 | Lega | 7.4 |
| Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen | 11.9 | Momentum Mozgalom (MoMo) | 6.2 | Forza Italia | 6.7 |
| AfD | 18.1 | Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (MKKP) | 9.9 | Fratelli d Italia | 20.8 |
| Other | 17.4 | Other | 17.1 | Other | 15.2 |
| <i>I would not vote</i> | 11.3 | <i>I would not vote</i> | 24.3 | <i>I would not vote</i> | 21.3 |
| The Netherlands | | Spain | | Sweden | |
| PvdA | 6.6 | PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) | 23.1 | Miljöpartiet | 6.5 |
| VVD | 13.6 | PP (Partido Popular) | 20.9 | Moderaterna | 14.6 |
| Forum voor Democratie | 3.3 | VOX | 11.4 | Socialdemokraterna | 24.2 |
| GroenLinks | 6.6 | SUMAR | 9.3 | Sverigedemokraterna | 18.6 |
| D66 | 5.7 | Other | 17.9 | Vänsterpartiet | 7.9 |
| PVV | 23.2 | <i>I would not vote</i> | 17.4 | Other | 18.0 |
| Nieuw Sociaal Contract | 7.3 | | | <i>I would not vote</i> | 10.2 |
| Other | 27.1 | | | | |
| <i>I would not vote</i> | 6.6 | | | | |
| Poland | | | | | |
| Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) | 23.2 | | | | |
| Koalicja Obywatelska (Platforma Obywatelska, Nowoczesna, Inicjatywa Polska, Zieloni) | 28.5 | | | | |
| Trzecia Droga | 15.0 | | | | |
| Lewica (Nowa Lewica, Razem) | 12.6 | | | | |
| Konfederacja | 6.9 | | | | |
| Other | 4.5 | | | | |
| <i>I would not vote</i> | 9.4 | | | | |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

Note: These figures exclude respondents who indicate that they are not eligible to vote. Far-right populist parties are printed in bold. Smaller parties (<5% of the voting intentions) are pooled in the 'Other' category.

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In the three remaining countries, the populist far-right is perhaps not the biggest political formation in terms of voting intentions, but still an important political force. In Germany (AfD: 18.1%), almost one in five of the respondents has the intention to vote for far-right populists. In Denmark (Dansk Folkeparti: 9.7%) and Spain (VOX: 11.4%), the populist far-right party is the most popular party for about 10% of the electorate.

These results make clear that far-right populist parties enjoy a great deal of popularity in almost all countries under study. A pressing question, however, is the one of voter retention for the far-right populist parties. We can shed light on this issue by crossing voting intentions for the upcoming elections with voting for far-right populists during past elections. Doing so allows us to distinguish between four groups within the electorate:


- (1) *New FRP voters*: voters who never voted for far-right populists in the past but who intend to do so for the first time in the upcoming elections.
- (2) *Loyal FRP voters*: voters who have voted for far-right populists in the past and plan to do so again during the upcoming elections.
- (3) *Former FRP voters*: voters who voted for far-right populists in the past but intend to vote for a different party this time.
- (4) *Non-FRP voters*: voters who have never voted for a far-right populist party and do not intend to this during the upcoming elections either.

Figure 3.1 displays the proportion of each of these groups per country. Several relevant conclusions can be drawn. First, in all countries the non-FRP voters are a majority of the electorate. The lion's share of European labour force has never voted for a far-right populist party and does not have the intention to change this for the EU election. In some countries, however, this is only a very small majority. In France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders, and Poland, the non-FRP voters make up between 50 to 60% of the working population. The other side of the coin is that, in these countries, 40 to 50% of workers has at some point been attracted by far-right populist parties. Second, those who intend to vote for the populist far-right in the 2024 EU elections are mostly loyal FRP voters rather than new FRP voters. In other words, the popularity of far-right wing populist parties is not a new phenomenon for the 2024 EU election. Rather, the far-right populist electorates have been built up steadily over the past years and decades. Yet, some variation can be seen across countries in this respect. Not surprisingly, in countries where the populist far-right has attracted many voters in the past and was or still is in power, the share of new voters FRP is relatively small. In Italy, Poland, and Hungary, less than 5% of those who intend to vote FRP in the 2024 EU elections has never voted FRP before. Conversely, in France, Flanders (Belgium) and Germany 20 to 25% of the FRP voting intentions come from new voters. In these countries, the far-right populist parties are successful at attracting new contingents of voters. Third, the former FRP voters are a non-negligible group. In most countries, 10 to 20% of the electorate indicates that they have voted for far-right populists in the past but has no intention to vote FRP this time. Exceptions here are Denmark, where more than 30% of the electorate are former FRP voters and Spain, where only 7.7% of the electorate has turned its back to the populist far-right. This indicates that far-right populism is not only a story of electoral growth, but that voters of these parties can become disappointed and change their preferences as well.

However, additional analyses (not shown here) make clear that the voters turning away from the populist far-right often intend to vote for another party on the right-hand side of the political spectrum. This is the case in France (les Républicains), Belgium-Flanders (N-VA), Hungary (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom), Italy (Forza Italia), the Netherlands (VVD), Poland (Konfederacja), Spain (Partido Popular) and Sweden (Moderaterna). In these countries, the right-wing party mentioned between brackets is at least ten percentage points more popular among former FRP voters than among the general population. Former FRP voters are also overrepresented

among supporters of smaller parties (e.g., in France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden). Interestingly, in Hungary, Poland, and Italy, former FRP voters have an increased chance of indicating that they would abstain from voting. Only in Germany (SPD) and Belgium (PVDA), the political left seems to succeed in gaining some popularity among former FRP voters. In terms of social profile, especially the oldest age group (Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden) and the lower educated (France, Germany, Poland, and Sweden) are loyal FRP voters.

Figure 3.1. Intentions to vote for far-right populist parties in the 2024 EU elections vs. past voting behaviour



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



To gain more insight in who intends to vote for the populist far-right in the 2024 EU elections, logistic regression models are estimated.⁹ A first series of models uses socio-demographic and economic variables (gender, age, education, migration background, occupational class, and income) to explain intentions to vote for a populist far-right party. Hardly any consistent effects are found, which indicates that the popularity of FRP parties is rather uniform across the different social strata. The only variable that has a consistent effect across a majority of countries is education. In all countries but Denmark, the highly educated group has less intentions to vote for a populist far-right party in comparison to the lower or middle educated respondents (or both). In countries such as Belgium-Flanders, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, the lowest educational group has at least double the odds of voting for a FRP

⁹ The full results can be found in Appendix 3.6.

party compared to the high educated. As said, the other variables have less consistent effects. In five out of ten countries, male respondents are found to have significantly stronger intentions to vote for the populist far right than females. In the other countries, no gender differences are found. Regarding income, persons in the lowest income quartile are more likely to vote FRP in three countries (Germany, Poland, and Spain), but less likely to vote FRP in two other countries (France and Italy). Interestingly, we find no effects of occupational class in any of the countries.


To understand the reasons behind FRP voting intentions, a second series of logistic regression models scrutinizes the impact of attitudinal variables – satisfaction with democracy, institutional trust, trust in the EU, populist attitudes, anti-immigration attitudes and group-focused enmity – on intentions to vote FRP in the 2024 EU elections.¹⁰ Figure 3.2 displays these effects in terms of odds ratios: the estimates represent how the odds of having an intention to vote FPR change if the respective attitudinal variable increase with a single unit. Effects larger (smaller) than 1 indicate that an attitudinal variable increases (decreases) the odds to vote FRP. Figure 3.2 also includes 95% confidence intervals for the estimates to visualize the level of uncertainty. If these confidence intervals do not include the value 1, the effect is statistically significant and printed with a black dot.

As expected, several attitudinal dimensions turn out to be highly relevant to understand intentions to vote for the populist far-right. Strong and consistent effects are found for anti-immigration attitudes and group-focused enmity. The more pessimistic views one holds of immigration and the higher one scores on GFE, the more likely it is that one intends to vote for a populist far-right party. These effects are statistically significant in all countries in the case of GFE, and in eight countries in the case of anti-immigration attitudes. Section 3.5 already showed that negative attitudes towards outgroups are, generally speaking, stronger among the lower educated and blue-collar workers. This implies that anti-immigration attitudes and GFE function as a mediator between education and occupation on the one hand, and FRP voting intentions on the other: That these social groups have a more negative view on immigrants and other minorities leads them to be more supportive of the political far-right.

Interestingly, Hungary and Poland are the two countries where FRP preferences are not linked to anti-immigration attitudes. In these countries, the political struggle between the populist far right and the other parties apparently supersedes the issue of immigration. Not surprisingly, Hungary and Poland are two of the countries where the populist far-right is or recently were in power. Note that in Italy – a third country where the FRP are in power – the effect of anti-immigration attitudes is weaker than in the other countries as well (yet still statistically significant). Yet, the main finding remains that, in countries where the FRP is part of the opposition, the nativist and anti-immigration component is a core component of the electoral success of the populist far-right.

¹⁰ We estimate these effects for every attitudinal predictor separately but controlling for the socio-economic and demographic variables discussed in the previous paragraph.

Figure 3.2. Effects of attitudinal dimensions on intentions to vote for a populist far-right party



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Note: This figure shows odds ratios obtained via logistic regression models (and their 95% confidence intervals). These odds ratios show how the attitudinal dimensions affect the likelihood of intending to vote FRP. An odds ratio larger (smaller) than 1 implies that an increase in the attitudinal dimension increases (decreases) the likelihood of intending to vote FRP. If the confidence interval does not include 1, then the effect is statistically significant. Insignificant effects are indicated with a grey dot. All effects are controlled for gender, age, education, migration background, occupation, and income.

Besides the nativist element, also attitudes towards democracy and politics seem to be drivers of populist far-right voting intentions. In most countries, populist attitudes are conducive towards intentions to vote for populist far-right parties. Three countries, however, deviate from this general pattern: In Poland and Italy, no effect of populist attitudes is found, and in Hungary the effect is even negative. Again, the fact that the populist far-right is or recently was in power in these countries is the key to understand the particular effects. Our measure of populist attitudes has a strong anti-elitist component. In contexts where the far-right is or was close to the centre of power, the population starts perceiving them as the political elite. As a result, anti-elitist feelings can target FRP parties who are perceived as part of the political elite. Also, in the case of satisfaction with democracy and trust in the national institutions, deviating effects are found in Italy, Poland, and Hungary. In the majority of the countries, citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy and who distrust the national institutions are more inclined to vote for a far-right party (although this effect is not significant in France). In Italy, Hungary, and Poland, on the contrary, dissatisfaction and distrust lower the probability of voting for the populist far-right. Again, these specific patterns should be interpreted in the light of the fact that in these countries, a populist far-right party is or recently was in power. When the populist far-right assumes executive power by forming a government, they become the face of the functioning of democracy and its institutions that are distrusted. In these contexts, it is the primarily opponents of the far right that show high levels of dissatisfaction and distrust. To conclude, a marked difference between the effects of trust in national vs. EU institutions can be observed. Trust in the EU is found to consistently lower the propensity to vote for the populist far-right, including in Poland, Hungary and Italy (although the effect in Italy is not significant). This illustrates how anti-EU rhetoric is a staple of the far-right populist discourse throughout Europe.

3.7 Conclusions

This chapter set out to map how prevalent far-right preferences are spread in the European working populations. Therefore, we analysed intentions to vote for a far-right populist party in the 2024 EU elections as well as the core attitudinal components of the political far right: dissatisfaction with democracy, institutional distrust, populist views and anti-minority attitudes.

On the upside, the survey shows that the European labour force in all countries under study find the principle of democracy very important. At the same time, we do find worrying signs for the future of democracy. Satisfaction with how democracy works is markedly weaker than the support for the principle of democracy. How satisfied citizens are with the democratic functioning varies considerably across countries, with Hungary showing the lowest level of satisfaction. We also detect low to moderate levels of trust in institutions. In all countries – except Hungary – the national parliament is trusted to more or less the same degree as the European Union. The lowest levels of institutional trust are found in Hungary and Poland. At the same time, populist attitudes are very widespread among European working populations. The idea that power should be returned from the political elite to ‘the people’ is very popular in all countries and strata of society. Finally, negative attitudes towards minority groups are quite widespread in all populations as well. Sizeable parts of the populations consider immigrants as an economic and cultural threat. Considerable numbers of citizens are dismissive of outgroups in general (such as Muslims, Jews, LGBTQ+-persons, ethnic minorities or unemployed persons). Educational level is a key factor to understand hostility towards outgroups in general and immigrants in particular.

sGiven this attitudinal and ideological context, it is not surprising that our survey finds that a considerable number of voters are leaning towards far-right parties for the 2024 EU elections – something that is confirmed by the actual election results. In all countries studied, the populist far-right has become a medium-sized or even dominant political force. Although intentions to vote for a FRP party are present in all layers of the working population, men, and people in the labour force with low levels of education plan to vote for an extreme right-wing party with above-average frequency. At the same time, however, the majority of working people in all countries neither plan to vote right-wing nor have voted right-wing in the past.

Further analyses show that, looking within countries, intentions to vote for the populist far-right are consistently linked to several attitudinal dimensions. As expected, persons with negative views on immigrants and minorities in general express more intentions to vote for an extreme right-wing party. In most countries, dissatisfaction with democracy, a lack of trust in national institutions and populist attitudes are a fertile breeding ground for the political far-right. The picture is completely different in Hungary, Poland, and Italy, where right-wing parties are in government (or were until recently). The opposite effect can be seen there: the higher the level of satisfaction with democracy, and the more trust in national institutions, the higher the intention to vote for an extreme right-wing party. This makes it clear that people have different interpretations of what democracy entails, and that the concept of democracy can also be successfully instrumentalised by right-wing or totalitarian regimes. This also shows that correlations that are taken for granted in political science – namely that distrust in institutions goes hand in hand with support for right-wing parties – do not apply equally to countries with extreme right-wing governments. Furthermore, only in Poland, Hungary and Italy, a pattern can be found that anti-elitist, populist views are negatively associated with preference for extreme right-wing parties. If the populist far right is in power, it could therefore lose its credibility to represent the will of "the people". The anti-establishment element of populism and dissatisfaction with democracy can even turn against the populist forces in power.

While within countries variables such as institutional distrust, dissatisfaction with democracy and anti-minority attitudes are strongly predictive of support for the populist far-right, these attitudinal dimensions cannot explain the electoral success of the far right between countries. Populist views or anti-minority attitudes (particularly against Muslims) are widespread in almost all countries. Nevertheless, the extent of support for extreme right-wing parties varies considerably from country to country and does not necessarily align with the attitudinal differences. The supply side of politics – that is, the respective spectrum of available parties to vote for and the specific positions these parties assume in the party competition – play a crucial role in the country-specific voting preferences for extreme right-wing parties (Spies, 2013). Only where extreme right-wing parties have been able to establish themselves as credible and attractive competitors, they succeed in mobilizing the latent discontent among the European working populations.

4 The Work Environment and industrial Citizenship: Navigating Work Quality, Workers' Voice and Job-related Concerns

4.1 Introduction: Democratic and Social Participation at the Workplace

To secure their livelihood, employees resort to selling their labour, which consumes a considerable amount of their time. Economic and political thinkers like Adam Smith and Karl Marx already acknowledged that, because of the centrality of people's job in their daily lives, the way work is organized will have a fundamental impact on people's general outlook on life and their views on politics in particular (Budd, Lamare & Timming, 2018; see also Honneth, 2023).

As such, the (anti-)democratic attitudes and political preferences discussed in Chapter 3 are directly associated with what happens on the work floor. The working environment defines the scope of action of individuals in the context of gainful employment but also beyond with far-reaching consequences for their possibilities to participate in society in general and in democratic processes in particular (Kohlrausch, 2024). For several reasons, the organization of work can have spill-over effects on political attitudes (Pateman, 1970). For one, gainful employment is still a central mechanism of social integration. Precarious work conditions, powerlessness as well as a lack of voice and social recognition may create experiences of social disintegration leading to feelings of resentment and frustration. These feelings of resentment may be – and often are – capitalized on by far-right populist forces. Moreover, the work floor can also function as a site of democratic learning, where democratic skills and attitudes are transferred between people and generations (Almond & Verba, 1963). The formal institutions for workers' representation – trade unions and workers' councils – play a crucial role in these processes.

Before testing whether work processes spill-over to the political realm, this chapter first explores to what extent democratic and social participation takes place at the workplace. We do this by starting from the key concept of industrial citizenship. This concept has its roots in T.H. Marshall's classical work 'Citizenship and Social Class' (1950). In his seminal publication, Marshall stresses that citizenship is not confined to civil or political rights (such as freedom of speech, liberty of the person or the right to participate in elections), but also has an important social component. Marshall's social citizenship implies that the state has the responsibility to guarantee its citizens 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society'. However, in capitalist economies the market-led organisation of gainful employment reflects power imbalances between employer and employees and often is at odds with the formal equality guaranteed by civil and political citizens' rights before the law and in political representation (Marshall, 1950). In fact, in the world of work market forces limit the room for manoeuvre of workers and create highly unequal social opportunities. The containment of these market forces has been subject of long-standing conflicts on the social regulation of work (Kohlrausch, 2024). The creation of democratic co-determination, for example through work councils or corporate practices in the workplace, are examples of the creation of democratic rights in the sphere of gainful employment. The collective organization of workers through trade unions – and particularly collective bargaining – can be seen as a secondary form of citizenship, complementary to people's political citizenship. Trade unionism implies that political rights are used collectively for economic purposes (Streeck, 1997). Labour protection rights contribute to better working conditions and as a result to the decommodification of work (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Marshall refers to collective and

individual rights that are located in the sphere of the economy or gainful employment and protect workers from the power of the market as “industrial citizenship rights”.

Moreover, industrial citizenship combines aspects of labour rights, social rights, as well as political rights. Labour rights include the right to fair wages, safe working conditions and reasonable working hours. Social rights in the context of industrial citizenship involve access to social security, healthcare, education, and unemployment benefits. These rights ensure that workers have a safety net and can maintain a decent standard of living, even when faced with economic uncertainties or unemployment. Workers’ political rights encompass the right to participate in democratic processes and organize themselves, for example by forming and joining trade unions, both within the workplace and in broader societal governance. This includes being involved in decision-making processes that affect their working conditions and economic environment. These rights are fundamental to industrial citizenship as they protect workers from exploitation contribute to the de-commodification of work and provide mechanisms for collective bargaining and democratic representation and voice on the shopfloor.

This chapter sheds more light on the state of industrial citizenship in the ten countries under study by assessing the workers’ perceptions. For this purpose, we will on the one hand investigate the political side of industrial citizenship, i.e. workers’ voice or the extent to which workers feel included in the decision-making processes at their workplace. On the other hand, we scrutinize aspects of job conditions and job content to gain insight in the quality of work. Besides these key components of industrial citizenship, we also study (1) how satisfied workers are with their job, and (2) how secure and protected European workers feel by analysing their concerns regarding two sources of uncertainty that might impact their careers, i.e. digitalization and the impact of climate policies.

For each of these concepts, we give descriptive statistics and present explanatory models that uncover which demographic, socio-economic and job-related variables are relevant predictors. Given their pivotal role, all the models include indicators of the presence of work councils and membership of trade unions to see if these institutions of collective workers’ representation foster industrial citizenship and temper job-related concerns.

Note that the analyses in this chapter focus on employed respondents only. Unemployed persons are left out because many of the concepts explicitly refer to the workplace and are therefore not applicable to the unemployed.

4.2 Workers’ voice

A key component of industrial citizenship is the political dimension, i.e. the right of workers to participate in democratic processes at the workplace and their involvement in decision-making processes that affect, among others, working conditions. In the European Social Model, trade unions play a key mediating role in this social dialogue as representatives of workers’ interest. The survey contains a four-item scale to tap into perceptions of workers’ voice, that is the feeling that employees have the right to co-determine what happens on the work floor. This scale is taken from the work of Kiess & Schmidt (2020; 2024), who distinguish four important elements of workers’ voice, each captured by a single 5-point agree-disagree item. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of workers in the samples that ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with each of the statements.

A first statement refers to the workers' individual experience of participation and recognition as a responsible subject: *'I feel ignored when it comes to decisions in my day-to-day work'*. Given the reverse wording of the statement, high percentages of agreement point towards low levels of workers' voice. In the total sample, about one out of four respondents (strongly) agree with this statement. In other words: three quarters do not feel ignored explicitly. In the total sample, 42.2% (strongly) disagree with the statement, and 33.8% choose 'neither agree nor disagree' (not shown in Table 4.1). In Hungary (31.6%), Spain and France (27.6% in each), we find the largest shares of workers who feel ignored in the decision-making process. In Sweden (20.5%) and especially in the Netherlands (16.5%), the perception of being excluded from daily decision-making is considerably lower.

A second item refers to perceived obstacles for collective decision-making via institutions representing workers' interests, such as work councils and trade unions: *'In my company, I can talk openly about work councils and trade unions without having to fear disadvantages'*. Across all countries, only 45.8% of workers state that they can openly talk about workers' representation, without fear for repercussions. 20.8% (strongly) disagree with the statement, and 33.8% select the middle option 'neither agree, nor disagree'. Apparently, a relevant share of the working population experiences a hostile climate towards workers' representation at their workplace. In the North of Europe, the workplace seems to be most friendly for work councils and trade unions. Illustratively, in the Netherlands (52.1%), Denmark (56.5%) and Sweden (59.9%), the percentage of workers agreeing that they can openly talk about representation is well above the average. Conversely, in Poland (37.6%), Spain (38.8%), Belgium (39.7%) and Hungary (40%) lower percentages are observed.

A third item refers to the collective level and measures the presence of a culture of solidarity and collective action in the workplace: *'The best way to solve problems or conflicts in the company is together with my colleagues'*. This communal aspect of workers voice is largely endorsed. In the pooled sample, no less than 64.7% indeed look at collective solutions for problem-solving (while only 10.1% disagrees or strongly disagrees). International variation is more limited than in the case of the previous item. Yet again we find the Netherlands (69.6%), Denmark (68.1%) and Sweden (72.1%) at the top of the ranking. This time, however, the Northern countries are joined by Hungary (69.8%). That Hungarian workers score high on culture of solidarity but perceive higher levels of union repression is probably related to the political context and illustrates that solidarity between workers can be strong enough to find its way even outside the formal institutions. In the Southern countries – Italy (54.7%), Spain (58.0%) and France (57.5%) – the culture of collective action is less widespread.

The fourth and final item measures the belief in efficacy of personal commitment to improve the situation on the work floor: *'If I become active in my company, I can change something for the better.'* Overall, about half of the workers have the belief that they can change things for the better, while only 15.5% believe that this is not the case. Consistent with what we saw before, this work-place self-efficacy (analogous to political self-efficacy; Caprara et al., 2009) is higher in the Netherlands (55.9%) and Sweden (53.8%), but also in Germany (53.5%). Especially in France (43.4%), workers have less belief in their capacities to improve the situation on the workplace.

Table 4.1. Workers' voice statements - % of (strong) agreement per country

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|--|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| I feel ignored when it comes to decisions in my day-to-day work. | 27.6 | 24.6 | 23.1 | 22.9 | 31.6 | 24.2 | 16.4 | 22.6 | 27.6 | 20.5 | 24.1 |
| In my company, I can talk openly about works councils and trade unions without having to fear disadvantages. | 41.6 | 39.7 | 56.5 | 48.6 | 40.0 | 42.0 | 52.1 | 37.6 | 38.8 | 59.9 | 45.8 |
| The best way to solve problems or conflicts in the company is together with my colleagues. | 57.5 | 61.4 | 68.1 | 66.6 | 69.8 | 54.7 | 69.6 | 67.4 | 58.0 | 72.1 | 64.7 |
| If I become active in my company, I can change something for the better. | 43.4 | 46.3 | 49.1 | 53.5 | 48.9 | 48.9 | 55.9 | 50.3 | 46.4 | 53.8 | 49.7 |
| <i>Mean workers' voice scale (0 - 10)</i> | 5.83 | 5.85 | 6.38 | 6.21 | 5.85 | 5.80 | 6.48 | 5.97 | 5.75 | 6.58 | 6.08 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

WSI

While the four items reveal interesting patterns on their own, they were designed to measure a single underlying construct, i.e. the workers' voice component of industrial citizenship (Kieess & Schmidt, 2020). Exploratory Factor Analysis shows that the four items indeed measure a single underlying dimension.¹¹ Based on the four items, a workers' voice scale (or "democratic efficacy at the workplace" as Kieess & Schmidt 2024 labelled it recently) was created, ranging from 0 (very weak voice) to 10 (very strong voice). Across all countries, the average score on the workers voice scale equals 6.08. This is above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that workers are slightly more positive when it comes to having voice on the work floor. The highest average can be seen in Sweden (6.58), the Netherlands (6.48), Denmark (6.38) and Germany (6.21). Spain (5.75), Italy (5.80) and France (5.83) figure at the bottom of the ranking. Interestingly, these international differences align – to a certain extent – with the collective bargaining regimes presented in Chapter 2. The two countries from the Northern bargaining regime – Denmark and Sweden – display above-average scores of experienced workers' voice. Whether this pattern can be traced back to the high union density, the consensus-based corporatism, or to other factors (such as the universal welfare states) remains to be investigated. Workers experience least democratic co-determination in the three countries of the Southern regime – France, Italy, and Spain. Notably, the Southern countries score substantially lower than the other countries particularly on the 3rd item on a culture of solidarity and collective action. The Centre-West countries show more variation, with higher levels of experienced workers' voice in the Netherlands and Germany, while Belgium is closer to the pattern of the Southern regime. The position of the Centre-East countries is harder to evaluate, given the

¹¹ Cronbach's alpha for this scale ranges between 0.61 in Denmark and 0.68 in Italy. These values point towards internal consistency that is less than ideal, but still acceptable. The lower levels of reliability are largely due to the fact that the first item is reversely worded. Factor loadings for this item are indeed weaker (ranging from -0.38 in Poland to -0.51 in Sweden) than for the other items (all >0.50 and most >0.60). To cover the entire theoretical breadth of the concept, we decided to keep the weaker item in the scale, nevertheless. The correlation between the 3-item and 4-item version of the scale equals 0.94, meaning that for practical purposes they are almost identical.

specific political context (namely: the strength of the far-right populist parties) in these countries.

The workers' voice scale can also be used to analyse the impact of individual characteristics. For that purpose, we estimate a series of regression models.¹² These models include, besides the demographic (age, gender, migration background and educational level) and socio-economic (occupational class and household income) variables used in the previous chapter, also the following work-related indicators:


- union membership: current member, former member or non-unionized
- sector of employment: government, private sector, public sector, state enterprise or other sector
- company size: 1, 2-9, 10-49, 50-249 or 250+ employees at the workplace
- contract type: contract of unlimited duration vs. limited duration or no contract

Three variables stand out. The first one is household income. Workers with a lower household income (who are most likely employed in lower-paying jobs), feel less included in decision-making processes at work. In seven countries, those in the lowest income quartile score significantly lower than those in the highest quartile. The highest quartile also differs from the second and third quartiles in four and two countries respectively. Second, occupational class is significantly related to workers' voice in a majority of countries. Higher professionals score higher on the workers' voice scale than blue collar workers (in six countries) and white-collar workers (in four countries). These two findings illustrate that workers' voice is not equally distributed along the social ladder but concentrated in the higher-ranked and better-salaried positions.

Third, in six countries, the workers' voice scores are significantly higher when a work council is present (in the other four countries, the difference is not significant). Figure 4.1 below visualizes the differences between workers where a work council is present and not present. This provides evidence that the institutionalization of employee representation actually contributes to workers experiencing that they are included in decision-making processes. Interestingly, union membership has a less consistent impact on workers' voice, with a negative effect in two countries (i.e., Denmark and the Netherlands) and a positive one in two others (i.e., France and Poland). That the presence of work councils matters more than individual membership illustrates that workers' representation has a beneficial effect that permeates the entire work floor and is not limited to union members.

¹² These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 4.1.

Figure 4.1. Experienced workers' voice (0–10) by the presence of a work council – country averages



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

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Note: This graph shows the estimated mean of workers' voice by work council presence, controlling for the predictors in the multivariate regression model. The graph displays 95% confidence intervals. Countries where the difference is significant are flagged with an asterisk (*).

4.3 Mapping the quality of work

A second relevant concept for understanding the link between the workplace and democracy is the quality of work. The quality of work indicates the degree to which workers experience social rights and labour rights are present on the shop floor. Honneth (2023) argued that working conditions define the room for manoeuvre individuals have for democratic and social participation. He argued that work experiences – such as locus of control, intellectual stimulation and social recognition – enable individuals to consider themselves as active and effective democratic actors even beyond the world of work floor. Furthermore, these experiences provide competences and resources individuals need to participate in society and democracy.

Quality of work can be defined as a “*relative concept regarding a job-worker relationship, which takes into account both objective characteristics related to the job and the match between worker characteristics on the one hand and job requirements on the other*” (CEC, 2001: 65). Quality of work is a proclaimed central component of the European Employment Strategy, although criticism has been voiced that the emphasis on the quality of work has disappeared over time (Dieckhoff & Gallie, 2007). To gain insight into the quality of work in Europe, the survey includes nine statements regarding job characteristics that tap into three key components of work quality: job autonomy, job content and working conditions (Smith et al., 2008; Gallie, 2013). Using a four-point scale (i.e., not at all true; a little true; quite true; very true), respondents had to indicate to what extent each statement applied to their work situation. Table 4.2 displays per country the percentage of workers that answered that a particular statement was ‘quite true’ or ‘very true’ for their personal situation.

As a point of departure, we take the concept of job autonomy. This concept assesses the degree of independence and discretion of a worker to independently make decisions, set goals, and determine the methods and procedures to accomplish one's tasks. The following three statements relate to different aspects of the job autonomy-concept, i.e. being able to decide on the daily organization of work (*'Management at my work allows me to decide how my own daily work is organized'*), determining the pace of one's work (*'I can choose or change my pace of work'*), and contributing own ideas (*'I can contribute my own ideas and perspectives to the work'*). The three statements largely show very similar patterns (see Table 4.2). In most countries, around half (that is, between 45 and 55%) of the workers state that these statements are 'quite true' or 'very true' for their work situation. In other words, the work force is more or less evenly split in workers that enjoy high levels of autonomy and workers that experience less discretionary power to organize their job. Cross-national differences are rather modest and should not be overinterpreted, but we observe slightly lower levels of autonomy in the countries of the Southern bargaining regime (France, Italy and especially Spain). In the Netherlands and Poland, workers report levels of job autonomy that are higher than average.

The next two items assess people's assessment of the content of their jobs. In the total sample, 51.5% of European workers find it 'quite true' or 'very true' that their *'job gives them the chance to learn new things'*. This implies that the other half does not perceive their job as an environment where personal development is promoted. In Poland (60.3%) and Sweden (62.9%), the share of workers that reports learning opportunities is the highest. In contrast, in Hungary (44.8%) and Spain (42.5%), this percentage is considerably lower. The type of jobs that probably offers least learning opportunities are routine jobs that involve monotonous tasks. About 3 out of 10 workers in the survey state that their job indeed mainly consists of *'monotonous tasks'*. Somewhat surprisingly given the results vis-à-vis the learning experiences, we found that the prevalence of jobs characterized by monotonous tasks was the highest in Poland (44.3%), followed by Spain (37.9%). In the Netherlands and Sweden, only about 20% of workers reported having a monotonous tasks-based job.

Four items were included in the survey to assess people's working conditions. Two items are aimed at measuring job stress, which is defined here as the physical, emotional, and psychological strain workers experience in response to pressure and demands encountered in their work environment. The two items measuring stress are formulated as follows: *'My job requires that I work very hard'* and *'I never seem to have enough time to get everything done in my job'*. This operationalization of stress thus focuses on time pressure and hard work rather than stress-related symptoms. On average across all countries, almost 6 out of 10 workers find it 'quite true' or 'very true' that they are required to work very hard. However, considerable cross-country differences can be observed here. The feeling that one is required to work very hard is especially prevalent in Poland (79.8%) and Italy (64.4%). In Denmark (44.1%) and Germany (48.7%), this feeling is markedly less widespread. Across all countries, 40% of workers indicate that they never have enough time to complete their tasks. The feeling of time pressure is again high in Poland (46.7%) and Italy (50.6%). Workers in Hungary (32.2%) and the Netherlands (31.0%) report least time pressure at work.

The extent to which people have social support at the workplace and is assessed by a single item, namely *'I can get support and help from my co-workers when needed'*. About two-thirds of the workers experience social support from colleagues, and in none of the countries this percentage is less than 50%. Nevertheless, substantial cross-national variation exists. In the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, more than 70% of the sampled working respondents feel socially supported at the workplace. In France, Italy, and Spain, this is only 55.9, 58.6 and 60.3% respectively. Finally, about a quarter of the sample finds it true that their *'job offers good*

opportunities for promotion'. Germany (32.2%) and again Poland (35.2%) figure at the top of the ranking, and Hungary (20.1%) at the bottom.

Table 4.2. Quality of work statements - % of quite true or very true per country

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|--|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| 1. Management at my work allows me to decide how my own daily work is organized. | 45.7 | 47.3 | 53.6 | 48.5 | 44.8 | 44.3 | 52.3 | 61.0 | 38.6 | 53.1 | 49.1 |
| 2. I can choose or change my pace of work. | 39.9 | 48.1 | 50.7 | 55.7 | 49.7 | 43.5 | 58.3 | 63.8 | 40.8 | 48.9 | 50.2 |
| 3. I can contribute my own ideas and perspectives to the work. | 47.2 | 49.1 | 59.1 | 53.6 | 54.6 | 51.5 | 62.3 | 62.5 | 47.2 | 67.3 | 55.6 |
| 4. My job gives me the chance to learn new things. | 47.1 | 47.0 | 53.4 | 51.9 | 44.8 | 51.2 | 53.4 | 60.3 | 42.5 | 62.9 | 51.5 |
| 5. My job consists mainly of monotonous tasks. | 30.9 | 24.7 | 31.4 | 23.5 | 27.4 | 32.0 | 19.9 | 44.3 | 37.9 | 20.9 | 29.2 |
| 6. My job requires that I work very hard. | 54.6 | 51.0 | 44.1 | 48.7 | 60.3 | 64.4 | 55.8 | 79.8 | 58.8 | 59.0 | 57.6 |
| 7. I never seem to have enough time to get everything done in my job. | 39.4 | 36.2 | 34.2 | 33.9 | 32.2 | 50.6 | 31.0 | 46.7 | 37.3 | 39.8 | 38.0 |
| 8. I can get support and help from my co-workers when needed. | 55.9 | 62.9 | 67.4 | 66.4 | 63.1 | 58.6 | 73.2 | 71.3 | 60.3 | 73.2 | 65.4 |
| 9. My job offers good opportunities for promotion. | 25.8 | 23.5 | 24.3 | 32.2 | 20.1 | 26.6 | 27.1 | 35.2 | 25.0 | 27.2 | 26.7 |
| <i>Mean quality of work scale (0-10)</i> | 4.51 | 4.77 | 5.17 | 5.25 | 4.81 | 4.65 | 5.36 | 5.56 | 4.56 | 5.53 | 5.03 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

WSI

Exploratory Factor Analysis shows that six of these items constitute a one-dimensional scale measuring quality of work.¹³ The created scale ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores referring to better job quality. In the pooled sample, the average job quality score equals 5.03. Consistent with the discussion of the separate items, we found the highest levels of job quality in Poland (5.56), Sweden (5.53) and the Netherlands (5.36). In Italy (4.65), Spain (4.56) and France (4.51) the reported quality of work was almost a full scale point lower.

The quality of work scale also allows us to investigate which socio-demographic and employment-related factors contribute to the quality of work by means of multivariate regression analysis (including the same demographic, socio-economic and work-related predictors as in the previous section). The regression analysis¹⁴ identifies three consistent correlates of the quality of work: occupational class, income, and educational level. In all ten countries, workers in higher professional jobs report significantly higher levels of quality of work compared to white collar and/or blue-collar workers. These differences are not only statistically significant, but also substantively relevant. The quality of work-gap between blue-collar workers and higher

¹³ These items are statements 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9 (the items of job stress and monotonous tasks are thus not included). With these six items, Cronbach's alpha ranges from 0.72 (Denmark) to 0.79 (Italy), which is satisfactory. In all countries, all factor loadings are higher than 0.40, except for the item on promotion chances in the Netherlands (0.39), Sweden (0.39) and Denmark (0.37).

¹⁴ These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 4.2.

professionals amounts to more than a full point on the 0-10 scale. Further, in seven out of ten countries, persons in the highest quartile of household income report higher job quality compared to the lowest income quartile. Similarly, the higher educated score consistently higher on the quality of work scale, and in seven out of ten countries statistically significant differences are found. In this respect, educational attainment and occupational class appear to be more relevant predictors of the quality of work than the demographic variables or company characteristics. Moreover, in half of the countries (i.e., France, Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden), males obtain higher scores on the scale measuring the quality of work. In six countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden), older workers (55-65 years) score significantly lower on the quality of work than the age cohort from 35 to 44 years old. No consistent effects of sector of employment or company size are found. Considering previous research by for example Arranz, García-Serrano & Hernanz (2018), it is a bit surprising that there are no strong differences according to contract type. In Poland and Spain, we do find that workers with an open-ended contract are more satisfied in terms of job quality, but in the other eight countries no significant differences are found. Finally, having a work council present at the workplace has a beneficial effect on the job quality in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. We see no differences related to union membership in most countries. Only in France, union members report higher job quality than former members or non-unionized workers.

4.4 Job satisfaction among European workers

Extending beyond direct aspects of industrial citizenship, we also assess the quality of jobs by investigating how satisfied workers are with different aspects of their job (Stefana et al., 2021). The survey contains three job-related satisfaction questions (each measured on a scale from 0 to 10). These indicators provide important insights into relevant issues that were not included in the previous section, such as monetary compensation and work-life-balance. These aspects of job satisfaction are, conceptually speaking, not a direct part of having industrial citizenship rights, but rather a potential and likely outcome of it. Table 4.3 shows the averages by country for the three satisfaction items.

Overall, we found relatively high levels of job satisfaction (question: *How satisfied are you with your main job?*), with an average score over all countries of 7.20 on the 10-point scale. A limited amount of international variation is present, with the lowest levels in France (6.81) and Italy (6.98). Particularly in Denmark (7.60) and the Netherlands (7.61), workers are satisfied with their job in general. When we look at pay and work-life balance specifically, the levels of satisfaction are generally somewhat lower. The average pay satisfaction (question: *Considering all your efforts and achievements in your job, how satisfied are you with your pay?*) equals 6.24. The Dutch (6.91) and Belgians (6.83) are most satisfied with the salary they receive. In France (5.85), Sweden (5.80) and also Hungary (5.61) pay satisfaction is about one point lower. Satisfaction with work-life balance (question: *How satisfied are you with the balance between the time you spend on your paid work and the time you spend on other aspects of your life?*) is the aspect of satisfaction that shows least cross-national variation. The country averages range from 6.11 (Sweden) to 6.99 (the Netherlands), with a pooled average of 6.55.

Based on the three satisfaction items, we construct a single job satisfaction scale, running from 0 to 10.¹⁵ Analog to the findings regarding the single aspects of job satisfaction the country differences are not very high with the lowest values in Sweden (6.33), France (6.37), and

¹⁵ Cronbach's alpha exceeds 0.75 in all countries and is even higher than 0.80 in six countries. Exploratory Factor Analysis yields factor loadings of at least 0.65 in all countries, which is a clear indication that the three satisfaction items tap into a single underlying dimension.

Hungary (6.39) and the highest values in the Netherlands (7.17). This scale is used in our multivariate regression analysis to uncover which demographic, socio-economic and job-related factors contribute to job satisfaction.¹⁶ Interestingly, job satisfaction is structured differently than the quality of work index (see section 4.3), indicating that these are two distinct concepts. Unlike in the case of the quality of work, education only plays a small role. In the two countries where an educational gradient is observed – Hungary and Poland – the higher educated are *less* satisfied. The higher educated thus score higher on the quality of work but are at the same time not more satisfied. This suggests that the higher educated have different expectations regarding their jobs. Regarding occupational class, the findings are more compatible with what we saw in case of the quality of work, but the effects are weaker and less consistent. Higher professionals show higher levels of job satisfaction compared to blue-collar workers in six countries. The difference between higher professionals and white-collar workers is only statistically significant in five countries (France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Sweden). Household income seems to have an impact on job satisfaction as well, which is not surprising, given that pay satisfaction is part of the scale. In all countries, those in the lowest income quartile are less satisfied than people in the highest income quartile, and these differences are significant in six out of ten countries.

Of the job-related variables, the presence of a work council is the most relevant predictor of job satisfaction. In half of the countries (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden), the presence of a work council increases the satisfaction of employees significantly. In four countries (France, Germany, Poland, and Spain) union members report significantly higher job satisfaction. Further, in three countries (i.e., Italy, Poland, and Spain), a contract of unlimited duration increases the job satisfaction. Sector of employment or company size do not show meaningful links with job satisfaction.

Table 4.3. Indicators of job satisfaction – average per country

| | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|---|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| How satisfied are you in your main job? (0 = extremely dissatisfied; 10 = extremely satisfied) | 6.81 | 7.29 | 7.60 | 7.25 | 7.17 | 6.98 | 7.61 | 7.11 | 7.04 | 7.07 | 7.20 |
| Considering all your efforts and achievements in your job, how satisfied are you with your pay? (0 = extremely dissatisfied; 10 = extremely satisfied) | 5.85 | 6.83 | 6.46 | 6.46 | 5.61 | 6.10 | 6.91 | 6.05 | 6.23 | 5.80 | 6.24 |
| And how satisfied are you with the balance between the time you spend on your paid work and the time you spend on other aspects of your life? (0 = extremely dissatisfied; 10 = extremely satisfied) | 6.45 | 6.82 | 6.70 | 6.68 | 6.39 | 6.31 | 6.99 | 6.60 | 6.36 | 6.11 | 6.55 |
| <i>Job satisfaction scale (0-10)</i> | 6.37 | 6.98 | 6.92 | 6.80 | 6.39 | 6.47 | 7.17 | 6.59 | 6.54 | 6.33 | 6.66 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

WSI

¹⁶ These models are not shown here but are included in Appendix 4.3.

4.5 Job-related worries regarding transformation: Digitalization and climate change policies

European societies and their labour markets are undergoing rapid transformations due to macro-societal trends, such as globalization and technological innovation, but also as a result of a series of crises – including economic crises and climate change. A recurrent theme in political sociology is that such transformations create conflicts between on the one hand the ‘winners’ who can seize the opportunities such changes, transformations and crises may hold, and on the other hand the ‘losers’ who see their (relative) positions and status threatened (Kriesi et al., 2006).

In scientific and political debates there has been discussion on where the status threats come from (Kohlrausch & Höcker, 2020). Some authors argue that the transformation of society and economy comes along with the devaluation of a certain kind of work (e.g., industrial work), qualifications and lifestyles. In this regard transformation processes such as the social-ecological change or the digitalization create feelings of declassification, which is not (only) based on social, but above all on cultural experiences. In this line of arguing status threats reflect the emergence of new rather cultural cleavages between “cosmopolitans” and “communitarianists” (Zürn & Wilde, 2016). Conversely, economic approaches have in common is that they understand the emergence right-wing populist orientations as the result of intensified distributional conflicts and rising financial worries particularly of the low-income groups resulting from the transformation processes described above.

According to both lines of argumentation, the feelings of resentment among the losers of these transformations can be a fertile breeding ground for anti-democratic attitudes and populist preferences (Abts & Roggenhofer, 2024; Betz, 1994; Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos, 2020). The survey assesses two specific worries regarding the impact of transformations on jobs. First, respondents are asked to what extent they are *‘worried that digitalization (that is, the increased use of computers, robots and artificial intelligence) might negatively affect their job and career’*. After all, new technologies are profoundly changing the character of jobs in a way that might create a digital divide between workers with and without strong digital skills (Vasilescu et al., 2020). Across all countries, almost half of the workers indicate that they are ‘not worried at all’ about the impact of digitalization on their jobs and careers. 42.7% of workers state to be ‘somewhat worried’ and a minority of 8.5% expresses strong concerns. The percentage of workers that is ‘strongly worried’ varies across countries. Below-average percentages of strong concern are seen in Sweden (5.2%), the Netherlands (4.8%), Denmark (7.7%) and also in Hungary (6%). At the other side of the spectrum, France stands out with 15.2% of working respondents indicating that they have strong worries about digitalization.

Although this topic often fails to make it to the top of the political agenda in election times, a worldwide and major threat to contemporary societies is climate change. In this respect, policy makers are considering and implementing a series of climate policies that either attempt to prevent climate change or rather mitigate its consequences. Such a green transition can have far-reaching implications for labour markets, with certain jobs disappearing and jobs being created in other segments of the labour market (Marin & Vona, 2023). These changes are politically sensitive and might even create a backlash of worry and protest among workers, as the actions of farmers against environmental protection measures (Van der Ploeg, 2020) or demonstrations of the yellow vests (*gilet jaunes*) against – among others – rising fuel prices in France show (Wilkin, 2021). To measure these sentiments, the survey included an item asking respondents *‘to what extent they are worried that the measures governments take against climate change might negatively affect their job and career prospects’*. In the total sample, 51.8% of workers indicate that they are ‘not worried at all’ about climate change policies

affecting their jobs. 38.5% are ‘somewhat worried’ and 9.6% express strong worries. Similar as in the case of digitalization, the Dutch, Swedish and Hungarian workers show the lowest levels of concern. That the Netherlands score low on climate policy concern is somewhat surprising, given the recent electoral successes of the BBB (Farmer-Citizen Movement) – a party that is rooted in the farmers’ protests related to the nitrogen crisis. In Spain and France (the home country of the yellow vests), worries about the impact of climate change policies are much more outspoken.

Table 4.4. Job-related worries about digitalization and climate policies – average per country

| | | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden | Total |
|--|--------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-----------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| <i>Concern about the impact of digitalization on job</i> | Not at all worried | 35.7 | 41.3 | 52.1 | 48.9 | 53.0 | 48.5 | 55.6 | 41.2 | 42.8 | 67.6 | 48.7 |
| | Somewhat worried | 49.1 | 48.2 | 40.2 | 42.1 | 41.0 | 41.8 | 39.6 | 51.1 | 47.1 | 27.1 | 42.7 |
| | Strongly worried | 15.2 | 10.5 | 7.7 | 8.9 | 6.0 | 9.7 | 4.8 | 7.8 | 10.0 | 5.2 | 8.5 |
| <i>Concern about impact climate change measures on job</i> | Not at all worried | 42.2 | 47.9 | 54.7 | 48.6 | 56.1 | 50.7 | 60.7 | 44.8 | 41.2 | 70.7 | 51.8 |
| | Somewhat worried | 44.4 | 41.5 | 35.6 | 38.6 | 36.9 | 40.4 | 33.2 | 47.1 | 45.5 | 22.5 | 38.5 |
| | Strongly worried | 13.4 | 10.5 | 9.7 | 12.9 | 7.0 | 8.8 | 6.1 | 8.1 | 13.2 | 6.9 | 9.6 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023




To see in which segments of the working population the worries are most prevalent, we estimate regression models using demographic, socio-economic and job-related variables as predictors.¹⁷ Worries about digitalization and the impact of climate policies follow largely similar patterns. First, it is striking to see that neither the educational level nor the occupational class of working respondents appear to have an impact on how worried workers are.¹⁸ Also, sector of employment, company size and type of contract turn out to be rather irrelevant. This is surprising, given that digitalization and climate policies affect certain segments of the labour market more strongly than others. Instead, the predictor that stands out is household income. In many countries, workers with a household income in the lowest quartile are significantly more worried than the highest incomes. Figure 4.2 visualizes this pattern. These results suggest that a lack of monetary income implies that workers do not have the resources to confidently cope with transformations. It also expresses a pronounced unequally perceived lack of social protection regarding the implementation of transformation processes. The fact that fear of transformation is primarily associated with low income supports economic rather than cultural explanations for feelings of rejection of transformation processes.

¹⁷ These models are not shown here but are included in Appendices 4.4 and 4.5.

¹⁸ This general finding is based on the models included in Appendices 4.4 and 4.5 with the occupational class “professionals” as reference category. The results somewhat depend on the choice of the reference category. Additional analyses with post-hoc Duncan tests of mean comparisons reveal some statistically significant differences between the occupational classes particularly for the job concerns regarding climate policies: they are most widely shared among blue-collar workers in Germany, Belgium and Sweden. Additionally, they are more often shared among blue-collar workers than among white-collar workers in Denmark, Hungary and the Netherlands. In Poland, they are more often shared among professionals than among white-collar workers. For the job-concern regarding digitalization, there is only in Sweden a significant mean difference – blue-collar workers state more concerns than professionals.

Besides income, we see that union membership is positively related to worries about digitalization in six countries (i.e., Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden) and to the impact of climate policies in five countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland). This could be a result of unions making workers aware about societal change affecting labour markets. However, reverse causality is also a possibility in this respect: i.e. workers who are worried are more likely to join a union to seek protection. Finally, it is noteworthy that we do not observe strong age gradients when it comes to worries about digitalization and climate policies. It is certainly not the case that the younger cohorts (who are sometimes considered as digital natives) are less worried about digitalization. On the contrary, in the Netherlands and Sweden, the 18- to 24-year-olds show significantly higher levels of concern. And in Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain, the lowest levels of concern about digitalization are observed among the oldest cohort (55-65 years old). A possible explanation is that these persons are close to retirement and might think they will have exited the labour market before large-scale changes will take place. A similar pattern is observed in the case of worries about climate change policies. In France, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Sweden, the oldest cohort shows significantly less concern compared to the middle-aged (35-44).

Figure 4.2. Job-related worries by quartiles of household income - % of respondents expressing (strong) worries with transformations



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

4.6 Linkages between industrial citizenship, job-satisfaction, and job-related worries

The previous sections in this chapter discuss five scales – that is, workers' voice, quality of work, job satisfaction, concerns about digitalization and concerns about the impact of climate policies – in relative isolation. Because workers' voice and quality of work both capture elements of industrial citizenship, we expect high correlations between them. Moreover, it is expected that experiencing these industrial citizenship rights is not only associated with a higher job-satisfaction, but also with less job-related worries. To uncover the linkages between the scales, Table 4.5 presents the correlations between all possible pairs of the scales for the ten countries in the study.

Notably, the patterns of correlations are relatively similar across the countries. As expected, both conceptualized aspects of industrial citizenship workers' voice and quality of work show strong and statistically significant positive correlations (>0.45 and <0.58). In almost all countries, it is the highest correlation we can find between the variables of the workplace environment.

Both indicators of industrial citizenship show strong and statistically significant correlations with job satisfaction in all countries. First, we observe consistently high associations between workers' voice and job satisfaction (>0.41 and <0.51). Thus, both quality of work and job satisfaction correlate positively with the experience of being included in decision-making at work. This correlation could go two ways. On the one hand, poor-quality work and dissatisfaction about these conditions could frustrate workers to the extent that they turn away from democratic processes on the work floor. On the other hand, workers' voice could be an instrument to ameliorate the actual quality of work and create a climate of satisfaction. In any case, these results underscore that the political component of industrial citizenship is inseparable from the labour rights. Moreover, the quality of work also yields high correlations with job satisfaction (>0.41 and <0.55). As expected, workers who report better job conditions, more autonomy and more interesting job content – three elements of the quality of work scale – are at the same time more satisfied with their jobs. After all, job satisfaction can be considered as one's subjective evaluation of the more objective features that are included in the quality of work-concept.

Turning to job-related worries, we see that concerns that digitalization might impact one's job correlate strongly with concerns about the impact of climate change policies on one's job. These significant positive correlations are almost uniform across the countries, and range between 0.40 (Sweden) and 0.52 (Italy). This pattern is remarkable, given that digitalization and climate policies are expected to affect quite different segments of the labour markets. This suggests that job-related concerns like those measured here are not reactions to a concrete and imminent threat. Rather, they can be seen as expressions of a rather diffuse worry about the prospects about the future career. This does not devalue the importance of these concerns, however. Even if they are diffuse, they can still have consequences for democratic attitudes (this hypothesis is further investigated in Chapter 5).

Finally, we observe negative but weak correlations between the two concerns on the one hand, and quality of work, job satisfaction and workers' voice on the other hand. Workers in good-quality jobs who are satisfied with their professional situation are slightly less worried about digitalization and the impact of climate policies and vice versa. When workers feel included in decision-making processes, they are less worried about the future of their careers, and those who are less concerned experience greater voice at the workplace. These patterns are less clear-cut, however, and in some cases statistically insignificant.

Table 4.5. Correlations between the five work environment scales – by country

| | | France | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | Hungary | Italy | The Netherlands | Poland | Spain | Sweden |
|--|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Indicators of industrial citizenship: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Workers' voice | Quality of work | 0.52 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.58 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.55 |
| Industrial citizenship & job satisfaction | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Workers' voice | Job satisfaction | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.48 | 0.46 |
| Quality of work | Job satisfaction | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.55 |
| Indicators of concerns | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Digitalization concern | Climate policy concern | 0.44 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.40 |
| Industrial citizenship & concerns | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Workers' voice | Digitalization concern | -0.11 | -0.25 | -0.15 | -0.17 | -0.17 | -0.16 | -0.19 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.23 |
| Workers' voice | Climate policy concern | -0.07 | -0.19 | -0.12 | -0.13 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.16 | -0.08 | -0.06 | -0.19 |
| Quality of work | Digitalization concern | -0.06 | -0.16 | -0.01 | -0.06 | -0.12 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.02 | -0.11 |
| Quality of work | Climate policy concern | -0.01 | -0.12 | 0.04 | -0.05 | -0.11 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.07 | 0.03 | -0.04 |
| Job satisfaction & concerns | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Job satisfaction | Digitalization concern | -0.11 | -0.20 | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.13 | -0.10 | -0.11 | -0.06 | -0.05 | -0.08 |
| Job satisfaction | Climate policy concern | -0.07 | -0.18 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.14 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.06 |

Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

Note: correlations that are statistically significant ($p < .05$) are printed in bold.



4.7 Conclusions

In this chapter, we analysed a series of concepts related to the work environment and the concept of industrial citizenship, focusing on workers' voice, quality of work, job satisfaction, concerns about digitalization and climate policies across different European countries. This comprehensive examination provides valuable insights into the intricate dynamics of labour in the contemporary industrial landscape.

Workers' voice, or the ability of employees to participate in decision-making processes, is a crucial aspect of industrial citizenship. Our findings show that only a minority of workers feel excluded from decision-making. Countries belonging to the Northern bargaining regime score best on experiences of workers' voice, while the Southern regime countries are ranked at the bottom. Higher income and professional status are positively correlated with a stronger workers' voice, as is the quality of work and job satisfaction. This correlation suggests that empowering workers to have a say in workplace decisions can enhance both their job quality and satisfaction.

Our analysis of the quality of work aspect of industrial citizenship – a concept including job autonomy, work conditions, and job content – revealed significant disparities across Europe as well. Again, the countries belonging to the Southern bargaining regime – that is, France, Spain, and Italy – generally score lower on the quality of work scale. The Northern regime countries (Denmark and Sweden) but also the Netherlands exhibit markedly higher scores. Differences in reported quality of work are furthermore structured along lines of education, income, and occupational class, with higher professionals, higher incomes, and higher educated individuals enjoying better job quality. This stratification highlights the critical role of socioeconomic status in determining the quality of one's work environment.

Job satisfaction among European workers is relatively high and strongly correlated to the quality of work scale. Yet despite this strong correlation, the factors influencing job satisfaction are structured differently from those affecting work quality. Education does not have a pronounced effect on job satisfaction, suggesting that social classes have different expectations about employment. An intriguing anomaly is Sweden, which, despite having the second-highest quality of work, shows the lowest average job satisfaction. This paradox may indicate that high expectations or unique cultural aspects in Sweden could be influencing perceptions of job satisfaction. Apart from Sweden, the country pattern remains relatively consistent with Southern European countries like Spain, France, and Italy at the bottom of the job satisfaction scale.

The analysis also addressed the workers' concerns regarding digitalization and climate policies – especially their potential impact on job prospects. A notable finding is that only a small group of about 10% of the workforce expresses strong concerns about these issues. This group predominantly comprises individuals with lower incomes, suggesting that economic vulnerability exacerbates fears about job security in the face of technological and environmental changes. The strong correlation between concerns about digitalization and climate policies indicates that these worries may stem from a general sense of uncertainty rather than specific imminent threats. This sense of insecurity among lower-income workers poses a challenge to their social rights and underscores the need for policies that provide better protection and reassurance.

The presence of institutionalized workers' representation, such as work councils, was found to significantly enhance job satisfaction and workers' voice. This finding underscores the importance of formal structures that facilitate employee participation in workplace governance. When such institutions are in place, workers report higher job satisfaction and (in some but not all countries) also feel more included in decision-making. In that sense, work councils have the potential to contribute to a more robust sense of industrial citizenship.

5 The political consequences of the work environment. How industrial citizenship spills over to (anti-)democratic attitudes and political preferences

5.1 Introduction: The link between industrial citizenship and political preferences

Chapter 4 discussed a series of elements of the work environment, namely aspects of the notion of industrial citizenship such as the quality of work and the experience of being included in the decision-making process, but also workers' satisfaction with their jobs and insecurities regarding transformations of jobs. This chapter moves a step further and investigates the wider political consequences of the work environment. Do factors such as workers' voice, the quality of work, job satisfaction and job-related insecurities impact the realm of politics and the (anti-)democratic attitudes and political preferences of workers? The main hypothesis hereby is the so-called 'spill-over thesis', claiming that industrial citizenship tends to spill over to political citizenship (Pfeifer, 2023). In this sense, strong industrial citizenship could work as a buffer against anti-democratic and illiberal tendencies. Or in other words: by securing industrial citizenship rights, the lure of far-right populism could be neutralized.

The link between industrial citizenship and political preferences can be understood via multiple main mechanisms (Budd & Lamare, 2021). One of the foundational works in this research tradition is Pateman's (1970) work entitled *Participation and Democratic Theory*. This book puts forward the argument that work processes – and specifically the autonomy workers have in their job – has the power to stimulate political self-efficacy. According to this argument, working autonomously fosters a degree of self-assurance that travels beyond the borders of the work organization and affects the persons' actions as a citizen. Workers who are in control at the work floor would feel more confident to engage in political activities and have more trust in their capacities to take part in democratic processes. A second and complementary theoretical argument states that industrial citizenship functions as a school of democracy. Working autonomously and being involved in workplace decision-making involves the development of skills like communicating, deliberating, and compromising. These are transferrable skills that are of crucial importance to operate as citizens in the political arena. Participating in decision-making on the work floor thus socializes skills and values that help citizens to appreciate democratic decision-making and provide them with the resources to participate effectively (Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995). Third, political sociologists have argued that work-related precarity and insecurities can create feelings of resentment that are conducive to a populist outlook (Abts & Roggenhofer, 2024; Zhirnov et al., 2023). Populist accounts provide deprived workers a narrative in which their grievances are pitted against the privileges of the dominant elites (i.e. a symbolic link) and might come to see the promises of far-right populist parties as a solution to their situation (the instrumental link; Zhirnov, et al., 2023).

All lines of argument thus stress that working autonomously, taking responsibility at work and exercising voice stimulate pro-democratic attitudes. Conversely, workers who feel excluded, dissatisfied, and insecure, would be more susceptible for the anti-democratic and illiberal messages of far-right populism. It is important to take into account, however, that these mechanisms operate in a particular institutional context. Work councils and trade unions intentionally develop strategies to increase workers' voice, both at the level of companies and in society at large. Unions set up campaigns to create political awareness among their members and participate directly in policy-making processes (Budd & Lamare, 2021). In this sense, the institutions advocating the interests of workers can act as a linchpin between industrial citizenship and the realm of politics.

The spill-over hypothesis has been investigated from various angles and often empirical support is found. Several studies have focused on workers' voice and the importance of institutionalized forms of workers' representation. Analyses of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) show that workers in organizations with work councils are more satisfied with democracy in general (Pfeifer, 2023), show greater interest in politics (Jirjahn & Le, 2024 – although this effect is present among men only) and are less supportive of the far-right AfD (Jirjahn & Le, 2023). Using panel data from the UK and Switzerland, Hadziabdic & Baccaro (2020) reveal that union members report higher levels of political interest and are more likely to participate in elections. Individuals who are employed in large organizations with high levels of workers voice are found to show higher levels of political trust, more political engagement and hold more positive attitudes towards immigrants in eleven countries (Ryan & Turner, 2021). More recently, Kiess & Schmidt (2024) have demonstrated that democratic efficacy at the workplace (that is, the experience that one's voice counts in decision making) is a protective factor against right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany. Furthermore, union membership and participation in decision-making are found to boost political interest and pro-democratic affect in 27 countries participating in the 5th round of the European Social Survey (Timming & Summers, 2020). The relevance of workplace experiences – such as autonomy, job satisfaction and task complexity – is evidenced by Lup (2022). Analysing data from the European Working Conditions Survey, Lup shows that these factors indeed contribute positively to active citizenship (including volunteering, and involvement in political parties or unions). Budd, Lammare & Timming (2018) similarly find that autonomy (along participation in decision-making) stimulates political participation. Regarding the role of precarity and insecurity, Zhirnov et al. (2023) document how feelings of financial insecurity and uncertainty about work conditions lead to populist attitudes and voting in ten European countries. Accordingly, it is also expected that greater job-concern related to main topics of transformation is associated with more anti-democratic attitudes and approval of far-right parties.


This chapter contributes to the existing knowledge by revisiting the spill-over hypothesis systematically across ten countries, uncovering the links between industrial citizenship and transformation concerns on the one hand and multiple dimensions of (anti-)democratic attitudes and political preferences on the other. Consecutively, we analyse how the workplace environment including industrial citizenship affects (1) democratic preferences and evaluations, (2) attitudes towards minority groups, and (3) voting intentions. A final section delves deeper into the role of work council presence and trade union membership in the genesis of political attitudes.

5.2 The work environment & democratic preferences

We start by focusing on the link between the five main work-related indicators presented in chapter 4 on the one hand and the importance of and satisfaction with democracy on the other. The results of this analysis are displayed in Figure 5.1. This figure shows a series of so-called forest plots containing the effect of a particular component of the workplace environment and the importance of (left-hand side) and satisfaction with (right-hand side) democracy. These effect parameters stem from regression models in which the influence of one of the five main work-related indicators is estimated, thereby controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables (age, gender, education, migration background, occupational class, income) as well as union membership and work council presence. These effects indicate how the predicted importance of / satisfaction with democracy changes when the respective work-indicator increases with one unit (while the demographic and socio-economic variables are kept constant). The plots also show 95% confidence intervals around the estimate to visualize the margin of

error. If these confidence intervals do not contain the value 0, we can conclude that the effect is statistically significant (insignificant effects are displayed with a grey instead of a black dot).

Figure 5.1. Effects of work environment variables on the importance of democracy and satisfaction with democracy



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Note: This figure shows regression effects (and their 95% confidence intervals), showing how work environment variables affect particular attitudinal dimensions. If the confidence interval does not include 0, then the effect is statistically significant. Insignificant effects are indicated with a grey dot. All effects are controlled for gender, age, education, migration background, occupation, income, work council presence and union membership.

Figure 5.1 reveals a pattern of significant effects of industrial citizenship that is remarkably consistent across various countries and indicators of democratic preferences. The experience of workers' voice – defined as the ability to express opinions and influence decisions in the workplace – shows a positive and consistent effect on democratic attitudes. In all countries, the experience of being included in decision-making contributes significantly to both the importance of and satisfaction with democracy. The remarkable consistency across countries highlights the importance of considering workplace conditions when examining political attitudes and satisfaction with democratic governance, irrespective of specific labour market


contexts, bargaining regimes or electoral systems. Furthermore, the quality of work scale shows a significant positive relationship with satisfaction with democracy in all surveyed countries. This scale also correlates significantly with the perceived importance of democracy in eight countries (with the exceptions of Spain and Italy, where the positive effect does not reach statistical significance). These findings evidence that workers with good-quality jobs are not only more satisfied with how democracy operates but also more likely to value the principle of democracy itself – independent of income or educational levels as these factors are controlled for.

The pattern observed with job satisfaction is even more pronounced. Workers who express higher job satisfaction also report higher scores on both the importance of democracy and satisfaction with its functioning. This relationship is especially strong concerning satisfaction with democracy, with effect sizes ranging from 0.34 in Germany to 0.47 in Hungary. These values imply that a one-unit increase in job satisfaction corresponds to an increase in satisfaction with democracy by 0.34 to 0.47 scale points. This strong correlation underscores the relevance job satisfaction has for democratic sentiments. While the patterns between the two dependent variables – importance of democracy and satisfaction with democracy – are largely similar, there is a notable asymmetry. Job satisfaction emerges clearly as the strongest predictor of satisfaction with democracy. In contrast, for the importance of democracy, job satisfaction does not stand out as a predictor. Instead, the experience of workers' voice plays a comparable role. This suggests that while job satisfaction influences evaluations of how the democratic system functions, the experience of having a voice at work contributes more significantly to discussions about the principles of democracy.

Next, we turn to the impact of job-related uncertainties on democratic attitudes. Despite a slightly higher level of international variability, the overall pattern indicates that workers' concerns about their job prospects negatively influence their democratic sentiments. Concerns regarding the impact of digitalization and climate policies on career prospects generally reduce how important workers find democratic governance. This effect is nearly universal (with only Poland as an exception, where the negative effect of digitalization worries does not reach statistical significance). The impact of these worries on the importance of democracy is consistent, with effect sizes mostly ranging between -0.50 and -0.25. This means that shifting from being 'somewhat worried' to 'strongly worried' about these issues results in a reduction of a quarter to half a point on the importance of democracy scale, which ranges from 0 to 10. The connection between job-related worries and satisfaction with democracy is less universal but still significant in most countries. Concerns about digitalization affect satisfaction with democracy in seven countries, excluding the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Concerns about the adverse effects of climate policies have a significant impact in all countries but Poland and Hungary. The exceptional pattern in these two countries might be attributed to the fact that dissatisfaction with democracy in these countries is mostly prevalent among opponents of the far-right populist politicians. These opponents generally support climate policies and do not fear their potential adverse effects. Conversely, in Sweden and Germany, concerns about climate policies have exceptionally strong impacts on satisfaction with democracy.

In sum, we find strong evidence that aspects of the workplace environment and industrial citizenship, as well as the absence of transformation-related job-concerns are clearly linked to democratic attitudes. Having a high-quality job and being satisfied with it, being included in decision-making and not being uncertain about the career prospects lead workers to value democracy and stimulates satisfaction with its functioning.

Figure 5.2. Effects of work environment variables on trust in national institutions and the EU



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Note: This figure shows regression effects (and their 95% confidence intervals), showing how work environment variables affect particular attitudinal dimensions. If the confidence interval does not include 0, then the effect is statistically significant. Insignificant effects are indicated with a grey dot. All effects are controlled for gender, age, education, migration background, occupation, income, work council presence and union membership.


Figure 5.2 displays the impact of industrial citizenship, job satisfaction and job-related concerns on trust in national institutions and the EU. Remarkably, the pattern of effects is very similar for national-level and EU-level institutional trust. Apparently, work environment-related factors foster trust in a generic manner, without targeting specific institutions. The patterns of effects are also highly consistent with those observed for satisfaction with democracy. This similarity stems from a strong intercorrelation between democratic satisfaction on the one hand, and trust in national and supra-national institutions on the other. Job satisfaction emerges as the most influential factor in determining institutional trust. Workers who are satisfied with their jobs, pay, and work-life balance exhibit higher levels of trust in national institutions as well as in the EU. The effects of job satisfaction on institutional trust are substantial and consistent across countries, ranging from 0.33 in Poland to 0.46 in Hungary in the case of national institutions. This indicates that a one-unit increase in job satisfaction is associated

with an increase in national-level institutional trust by 0.33 to 0.46 scale points. In the case of trust in the EU, similar effect sizes are found, except for Hungary (0.17) and Poland (0.28), where weaker effects of job satisfaction are found. In these two countries – where Eurosceptic political parties play a dominant role – distrust in the EU is less linked to the work environment. The industrial citizenship indicators quality of work and the experience of workers' voice also have positive and significant effects on institutional trust, albeit slightly weaker than job satisfaction. The effects of both variables vary around 0.20 in all countries for both levels of institutional trust. Hungary is an exception again, with weaker effects on trust in the EU specifically. This general finding indicates that improvements in the quality of work and ensuring that workers feel heard and valued can significantly enhance trust in institutions, albeit to a lesser extent than job satisfaction.

Uncertainties about career prospects, particularly worries about digitalization and climate change policies, conversely tend to undermine trust in national and supranational institutions. However, the evidence is less strong and less consistent. In the case of trust in national institutions, concerns about digitalization significantly impact institutional trust in five countries, while worries about climate change policies have a significant effect in six countries. Trust in the EU is linked to worries about digitalization and climate policy in seven and eight countries respectively. Among the countries lacking any significant effect of transformation worries on institutional trust are again Poland and Hungary. While career uncertainties do affect institutional trust, their impact is not as universal or consistent as that of job satisfaction, quality of work, or workers' voice.

An analysis of the impact of work environment on populist attitudes reveals a distinct pattern (see Figure 5.3), markedly different from those observed for democratic preferences and institutional trust. First, the experience of workers' voice does not temper the attraction to populist ideas of anti-elitism. The effect parameter for workers' voice is inconsistent across countries: negative in five countries and positive in five others. However, this relationship is statistically significant only in Sweden (negative effect) and Poland (positive effect). Clearly, feeling heard at work does not substantially influence populist sentiments. Contrary to their significant roles in influencing democratic preferences and institutional trust, the quality of work and job satisfaction only have minimal effects on populist attitudes. Quality of work appears to reduce populist attitudes significantly only in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. However, in Poland, the quality of work scale is positively related to populist attitudes. Job satisfaction aligns with reduced populist attitudes in Belgium, Sweden, and Hungary. These findings align with the observation of Chapter 3 that populist ideas are popular across various societal and labour market segments. Anti-elitist and people-centric ideas are shared widely, irrespective of work quality, job satisfaction, or feelings of inclusion in decision-making.

Figure 5.3. Effects of work environment variables on populist attitudes



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

Note: This figure shows regression effects (and their 95% confidence intervals), showing how work environment variables affect particular attitudinal dimensions. If the confidence interval does not include 0, then the effect is statistically significant. Insignificant effects are indicated with a grey dot. All effects are controlled for gender, age, education, migration background, occupation, income, work council presence and union membership.

Worries about career prospects are far more relevant in understanding the roots of populist attitudes. In all countries, concerns about the impact of digitalization and climate policies on career prospects are consistently positively related to populist attitudes. These effects are statistically significant in almost all cases. In all countries except Italy, worries about climate policies significantly contribute to populist attitudes, with exceptionally strong effects observed in

Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Similarly, in all countries but Spain, workers who fear that digitalization might affect their job prospects exhibit stronger populist attitudes. The differential pattern observed in this analysis highlights the distinct nature of populist attitudes compared to satisfaction with democracy or institutional trust. While the latter variables are more strongly linked to current job conditions such as responsibilities, autonomy, and decision-making power, populist preferences are rooted in anxieties about future job prospects.

5.3 The work environment and anti-minority attitudes

To investigate the nexus between our indicators of the workplace environment and anti-minority attitudes – a staple of far-right populist programs – we focus on two dimensions. First, migration is a topic that was prominent during the campaigns for the 2024 EU elections and for which far-right populist parties have issue ownership. For that reason, we single out migrants as a target group, and analyse anti-immigration attitudes in detail. Second, as a measure of generalized prejudice we also analyse a scale of group-focused enmity (GFE). This scale is a summary measure of prejudiced attitudes against Muslims, Jews, unemployed persons, women, homosexuals, and transgender persons (see section 3.5). Because of the focus on gender-related issues, the GFE measure we apply here is more strongly rooted in cultural conservatism than the anti-immigration attitudes measure, which also contains a strong economic component (Meuleman et al., 2018).

The distinct nature of anti-immigration attitudes and group-focused enmity also shows in the results (see Figure 5.4). There is only one dimension that has similar effects for the two dimensions: workers' voice. Workers who experience codetermination at the workplace score lower on anti-immigration attitudes in all countries and on GFE in nine out of ten countries (Hungary is the exception here). Clearly, democratic rights on the work floor have the potential to spill over to positive attitudes towards minority groups in general, and immigrants in specific.


However, there the similarity between anti-immigrant attitudes and GFE ends. Anti-immigration attitudes show a clear and consistent link with quality of work and job satisfaction. Workers in high-quality jobs and workers who are satisfied with their jobs display significantly less anti-immigrant sentiments in all ten countries. For job satisfaction, the effects are slightly stronger (ranging from -0.30 in Denmark to -0.19 in Belgium) than for quality of work (ranging from -0.23 in Poland to -0.11 in Hungary). Conversely, effects of quality of work and job satisfaction on GFE are far less consistent. Only in Belgium a significant effect of job satisfaction on GFE is found – this effect is a negative one. Quality of work reduces anti-immigration attitudes in half of the countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden).

While job quality and satisfaction are highly predictive of anti-immigration attitudes, worries about job-related uncertainties play a more prominent role in understanding GFE. Across all countries, concerns that digitalization may negatively impact future job prospects significantly increase GFE scores. A one-unit increase in the digitalization worries scale corresponds to a 0.25 to 0.35 unit increase in the GFE score in most countries. Germany exhibits an exceptionally strong effect of 0.48. Additionally, uncertainties about the impact of climate policies on employment elevate GFE scores in all countries except Hungary. Germany (0.55) and Sweden (0.60) show particularly large regression effects, indicating that climate policy worries have a substantial impact on GFE in these countries. The relationship between job-related worries and anti-immigration attitudes is less clear-cut. Concerns about digitalization significantly increase anti-immigration attitudes in four countries: France, Denmark, Germany, and Hungary. Meanwhile, worries about the impact of climate policies are positively linked to anti-immigration attitudes in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Poland. These findings suggest that while job-

related anxieties contribute to GFE, the effect is not as strong or consistent as with anti-immigration attitudes.

Thus, anti-immigration attitudes are more closely linked to workplace conditions. Better quality jobs and higher employee satisfaction can serve as effective levers to combat anti-immigrant attitudes. The reason this applies specifically to anti-immigrant prejudices, rather than generalized prejudice, likely stems from the role of labour market competition in anti-immigration discourse. Cultural and gender-related issues, which are core components of our GFE scale, are less visible in the workplace and therefore more detached from job quality and satisfaction. That GFE has a closer link with worries about digitalization and climate policies might be interpreted in the sense that GFE is responsive to broader societal uncertainties than to the workplace specifically.

Figure 5.4. Effects of work environment variables on anti-immigration attitudes and group-focused enmity (GFE)



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

Note: This figure shows regression effects (and their 95% confidence intervals), showing how work environment variables affect particular attitudinal dimensions. If the confidence interval does not include 0, then the effect is statistically significant. Insignificant effects are indicated with a grey dot. All effects are controlled for gender, age, education, migration background, occupation, income, work council presence and union membership.



5.4 Work environment and voting intentions

The previous sections of this chapter clearly demonstrated that indicators of the workplace environment play an important role in creating support for democracy and its institutions and tempering populist attitudes and prejudices. The question remains, however, whether the impact of workers' rights also spills over to the polling booth: Do the components of industrial citizenship, job satisfaction and the transformation-related job-concerns affect voting for far-right populist (FRP) parties, as well?


To investigate this question, we run a series of logistic regression models explaining intentions to vote for a far-right populist party during the 2024 EU elections. The effect of each of the five indicators is estimated in a separate model, controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables (age, gender, education, migration background, occupational class, income) as well as union membership and work council presence. Figure 5.5 displays the effect estimates in terms of odds ratios. These odds ratios represent how the odds of having an intention to vote FPR change if the respective work-related indicator increases with a single unit. Effects larger (smaller) than 1 indicate that an attitudinal variable increases (decreases) the odds to vote FRP. Figure 5.5 also includes 95% confidence intervals for the estimates to visualize the level of uncertainty. If these confidence intervals do not include the value 1, the effect is statistically significant and printed with a black dot.

First, quality of work, job satisfaction and workers' voice turn out to lack the power to consistently predict far-right populist voting intentions. In the case of these three predictors, no significant link with voting intentions is found in most of the countries. There are a couple of exceptions, however. Similar as in Chapter 3, the countries where the far-right populists are (or recently were) in power show deviating patterns. In Hungary and Italy, small but significant positive effects of quality of work are detected. In these two countries, the odds of far-right voting intentions are slightly higher among workers who have a high-quality job (in terms of autonomy, learning opportunities, social support, and promotion opportunities). In Hungary, Italy and Poland, workers who are more satisfied with their job are slightly more likely to have intentions to vote for a far-right populist party. And in Poland and Hungary, workers who feel included in workplace democracy are more attracted to far-right populist politicians. These findings echo the patterns uncovered in Chapter 3, where institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy were positively related with FRP voting intentions in these countries as well. Furthermore, FRP voting intentions are significantly tempered by quality of work in Sweden and by job satisfaction in Spain. In Germany and Sweden, the experience of workers' voice reduces intentions to vote for far-right populists. An explanation for these deviating patterns is not immediately clear.

Second, for the job-related uncertainties the patterns are slightly more consistent. For worries related to the impact of both digitalization and climate policy, the odds ratios are larger than 1 in nine out of ten countries, meaning that worries increase the likelihood of a FRP vote. However, the effects often fail to reach statistical significance, which implies that generalization to the wider population is often questionable. In the case of uncertainties related to digitalization, the positive effect is significant in three countries: France, Germany, and Sweden. Worries that climate policies might have negative consequences for one's career are slightly more decisive and increase intentions to vote FRP significantly in five countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. These effects reflect recent efforts of the far-right to campaign against public policies to combat (the consequences of) climate change.

In sum, industrial citizenship, job satisfaction and transformation concerns turn out to be considerably less consequential for voting intentions than for the different attitudinal dimensions that underly far-right political preferences. If a positive work environment provides a buffer against the electoral success of the political far-right, it is an indirect rather than a direct one.

Figure 5.5. Effects of work environment variables on far-right populist voting intentions



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Note: This figure shows odds ratios obtained via logistic regression models (and their 95% confidence intervals). These odds ratios show how the work environment variables affect the likelihood of intending to vote FRP. An odds ratio larger (smaller) than 1 implies that an increase in the attitudinal dimension increases (decreases) the likelihood of intending to vote FRP. If the confidence interval does not include 1, then the effect is statistically significant. Insignificant effects are indicated with a grey dot. All effects are controlled for gender, age, education, migration background, occupation, income, work council presence and union membership.

5.5 What is the role of trade unions and work councils?

Rights as industrial citizens are not granted automatically but have been enforced gradually via the collective action of workers. Historically as well as today, the institutions representing workers' interests – trade unions and work councils – occupy a central position in this process. So far, this chapter has largely passed by the impact trade unions and work councils have on the breeding ground for far-right populism. To remediate this, this section maps how (1) the presence of a work council in the workplace and (2) union membership are related to democratic preferences, anti-minority attitudes and intentions to vote for a far-right populist party.

Concretely, the charts below (Figure 5.6) display the average on the attitudinal dimensions for presence vs. absence of a work council; workers who are currently union members vs. former members and non-members. To make sure that the observed differences are not distorted by the differential composition (e.g., in terms of age, gender or occupational class), demographic and socio-economic variables are controlled for.¹⁹ The figures also include 95% confidence bars for the estimated means. If the estimates differ significantly according to work council presence or union membership, the country name is flagged by an asterisk.

Figure 5.6 elucidates the influence of work council presence and union membership on democratic preferences, institutional trust, and populist attitudes across the ten surveyed European countries. First, there is compelling evidence that the presence of work councils and union membership significantly enhance satisfaction with democracy. In all countries except for Denmark, the presence of work councils positively impacts satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, in all countries studied, individuals employed in workplaces with active workers' representation exhibit higher levels of trust in national institutions as well as the EU. This suggests that workplace democracy, as embodied by work councils, fosters a broader trust in democratic institutions and processes. Similarly, union membership correlates positively with institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy quite consistently. Compared to former members and non-members, union members display higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust in national institutions in all countries. Union membership enhances trust in the EU in eight countries (not in Belgium and Hungary). This pattern underscores the role of unions in promoting democratic engagement and institutional confidence among their members.

The effects on the perceived importance of democracy are less pronounced, however. In five countries (France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands), the presence of work councils is associated with a greater appreciation for the principle of democracy. In Denmark and Sweden, union members show a stronger conviction in the importance of democracy compared to former members and non-members. In the Netherlands, this difference is observed between union members and former members but not between union members and non-members. The lack of significant effects in other countries suggests that while workplace democracy and union membership influence democratic satisfaction and trust, they do not uniformly enhance the perceived importance of democracy.

Regarding populist attitudes, fewer significant effects are found. Work council presence does not significantly impact populist views in any of the countries. Interestingly, in Belgium and Italy, union members are more inclined towards populist attitudes than former members and non-members. This could be attributed to the anti-elitist rhetoric often prevalent in populist discourse, which may resonate more with union members. In the Netherlands, former union members exhibit higher levels of populist attitudes.

¹⁹ The means of so-called least squares means are shown, derived from a General Linear Model (GLM) that includes gender, age group, migration background, educational level, occupational class and household income, work council presence and union membership.

Figure 5.6. (Anti-)democratic preferences by work council presence and union membership



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023

Note: This graph shows the estimated mean of several attitudinal dimensions by work council presence, controlling for the predictors in the multivariate regression model. The graph displays 95% confidence intervals. Countries where the difference is significant are flagged with an asterisk (*).



In general, this analysis clearly shows the power of democratic learning on the work floor: those who see the institutions of workers representation in action and participate in them, feel more positive about the functioning of democracy in general. The presence and participation in workers' representation appear to cultivate a positive outlook towards democracy. The impact on support for the principle of democracy is smaller however, and the workers' organizations do not tend to lead to reductions in populist views.


Figure 5.7 investigates the relationship between the presence of work councils and union membership on the one hand, and anti-minority attitudes on the other. An intriguing paradox between anti-immigration sentiments and generalized prejudice can be seen.

On the one hand, the data reveals that workers' organizations have a notable prejudice-reducing effect on anti-immigration attitudes. In all countries examined, the presence of a work council correlates with lower levels of anti-immigration sentiment. Additionally, in eight countries, union members exhibit significantly reduced anti-immigrant attitudes, with Belgium and Hungary being the exceptions (where the difference is statistically insignificant). This indicates that work councils and unions play a crucial role in mitigating negative attitudes specifically directed towards immigrants.

Yet on the other hand, this prejudice-reducing effect does not extend to generalized prejudice, also referred to as group-focused enmity (GFE). In seven countries, union members even display higher levels of GFE compared to non-members, with former members often scoring the highest. Sweden stands out as the exception, where union members show less generalized prejudice. Furthermore, the presence of work councils is related to higher levels of GFE only in Denmark, suggesting that the dynamics of prejudice are complex and vary across different contexts.

Understanding this paradox requires focusing on the specific targets of prejudice. Anti-immigrant views are directed towards newcomers perceived as threats to local workers' job security. Work councils and trade unions seem effective in countering this perception by promoting solidarity and inclusivity among workers. Conversely, GFE encompasses a wider range of prejudices, often including gender and cultural biases, which are less central to the daily functions of workers' representatives. This broader spectrum of prejudice may not be directly addressed by workers' organizations, leading to relatively widespread culturally conservative attitudes among union members.

Figure 5.7. Anti-minority attitudes by work council presence and union membership




Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Note: This graph shows the estimated mean of several attitudinal dimensions by work council presence, controlling for the predictors in the multivariate regression model. The graph displays 95% confidence intervals. Countries where the difference is significant are flagged with an asterisk (*).

To conclude this section, Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of workers who intended to vote for a far-right populist party during the 2024 EU elections. In line with the findings of the previous section (5.4), we detect very few significant differences. Work council presence seems to matter in Poland only. Poles working in places where a work council is present, are more likely to have intentions to vote for the far-right PiS. In Poland, this also holds true for union members. A similar effect of union membership is found in the Netherlands, while Sweden shows the opposite pattern with union members being less likely to vote FRP. In seven out of ten countries, however, union members do not differ from the other groups regarding intentions to vote for the far-right.

Figure 5.8. Far-right populist voting intentions by work council presence and union membership



Source: Work and Democracy in Europe Survey – 2023



Note: This graph shows the percentage of respondents intending to vote for a far-right populist party by work council presence, controlling for the predictors in the logistic regression model. The graph displays 95% confidence intervals. Countries where the difference is significant are flagged with an asterisk (*).

5.6 Conclusions

The analyses presented in this chapter provide strong evidence that positive work environments are an indispensable ingredient of democratic societies. Industrial citizenship, job satisfaction and job-related insecurities are found to be important in shaping democratic engagement and political preferences, even if the various dimensions have distinct political repercussions.

The experience that one's voice is heard on the work floor produces noticeable democratic benefits. In all countries without exception, workers' voice stimulates satisfaction with democracy and trust in national institutions and in the EU. To understand the importance workers attach to the principle of democracy, workers' voice is the strongest predictor among the aspects of the workplace environment considered in this study. The feeling of being included in decision-making furthermore has the power to reduce prejudiced attitudes towards immigrants as well as group-focused enmity. Clearly, participating in decision-making processes is a school for democratic learning that creates skills that spill over to the political realm.

Quality of work and job satisfaction appear to work in tandem, which is not so surprising given the strong intercorrelation between these two concepts: Performing a high-quality employment – in terms of autonomy, learning opportunities, social support, and promotion chances – and being satisfied with this employment go hand in hand. Across the ten countries studied here, quality of work and job satisfaction consistently instigate satisfaction with democracy and institutional trust and, to a lesser extent, also increase support for the principle of democracy. Furthermore, quality of work and job satisfaction systematically reduce anti-immigrant sentiments (even if the relation with more generalized prejudices is not as clear).

We furthermore find compelling evidence that institutionalized workers' representation can act as a catalyst in these processes. In a majority of countries, workers who have a work council at their workplace and union members report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and institutional trust and lower levels of anti-immigration sentiments. These findings highlight the importance of collective action and organization to understand the beneficial effects of industrial citizenship.

Notwithstanding these effects of industrial citizenship and job satisfaction on democratic preferences and out-group attitudes, we simultaneously find no consistent link with intentions to vote for a far-right populist party. Often, effects on voting intentions are statistically insignificant, and in cases where significant effects are found, they go in both directions depending on the context. This finding has important repercussions. It means that it is not realistic to expect that improvements of the work environment will directly and automatically weaken the positions of far-right populist parties. Other factors outside the work environment are important to take into account to understand the electoral success of far-right parties – take, for example, political factors, such as the organisational strength of the far-right party, the credibility of competitors and the electoral system facilitating vs. blocking new parties. Yet at the same time, the absence of effects on voting behaviour does not imply that quality of work, job satisfaction and workers' voice are irrelevant for what happens in the polling booth. The link should be understood as an indirect rather than a direct one (see also the conceptual model shown in Figure 1.1). This chapter has presented compelling evidence that positive work environments shape a democratic climate in which satisfaction with democracy, institutional trust and positive attitudes towards immigrants thrive. From Chapter 3, we know that this climate of pro-democratic attitudes diminishes intentions to vote for far-right populist parties considerably. Thus, labour rights undercut the attitudinal breeding ground on which far-right populist parties tend to capitalize.

Populist preferences and voting intentions are spread in all segments of the labour market; among satisfied and dissatisfied workers; among union members and non-members alike. To understand populist attitudes, worries about the future career prospects turn out to be far more relevant than the actual job conditions and workers' voice. In almost all countries, worries that digitalization and climate policies will harm the professional future are significant predictors of populist views. And in half of the countries, climate policy-related worries are also predictive of far-right populist voting intentions.

Finally, it is noteworthy that political context matters. This chapter confirms what we saw earlier in Chapter 3: In contexts where far-right populists are in the centre of power, different mechanisms can play out. In these contexts, we find that quality of work, job satisfaction and workers' voice increase rather than decrease support for the far right. This pattern could be indicative of a reverse spill-over effect: Citizens who are dissatisfied with their far-right governments also feel disenfranchised on the work floor.

6 Conclusion

Against the backdrop of strengthened far-right populist parties in Europe, this study investigated attitudes of the labour-force shortly before the 2024 elections to the European parliament. With primary survey data from ten EU countries (N=15,000) collected by the end of 2023, the linkages between the work environment on the one hand and anti-democratic attitudes and political preferences on the other were analysed. The samples gathered by online access panels are representative for gender, age, and education specifically.

The results of the EU elections some months later in which far-right parties made considerable gains came as no huge surprise, as also most polls projected this or even bigger gains. The data at hand – that was explicitly not intended to predict the EU election results given the fact that only the active labour-force was sampled – pointed in a similar direction and shows that a considerable number of voters were leaning towards parties of the extreme right. In all countries, far-right populists obtain sizeable shares of the voting intentions in our data spanning from 28% to 23% in Italy, Hungary, France, Poland, and the Netherlands to about 10% of the electorate in Denmark and Spain. The specific strength of this data is that it provides insight in the mechanisms that are conducive to intentions to vote for far-right populist parties, with a particular emphasis on the work environment. When looking at socio-demographic predictors of far-right voting intentions, only a lower educational level as well as the gender “men” seem to be relevant in most of the countries, while other indicators show less consistent effects. Moreover, intentions to vote for the populist far-right are consistently linked to several attitudinal dimensions, most notably: negative views on immigrants and minorities in general. In most countries, dissatisfaction with democracy, a lack of trust in national institutions and populism are a fertile breeding ground for the political far-right.

The analyses of the interplay of planned and past voting behaviour yields three important findings, as well. It shows that the majority of working people in all countries neither intend to vote right-wing nor have voted right-wing in the past. The analyses also reveals that those who intend to vote for the populist far-right in the 2024 EU elections were mostly loyal far-right voters rather than new far-right voters in most countries indicating that the far-right populist electorates have been built up steadily over the past years and decades. The analyses however also indicate that far-right populism is not only a story of electoral growth in all countries, but that voters can become disappointed and turn their backs on these parties, as well, as we see for Denmark, where more than 30% of the electorate are former far-right voters without the intention to vote far-right at this EU election. Voters that turn away from the far-right mostly express a preference for another party on the right-hand side of the political spectrum. The political left does not seem to be successful in winning back voters from far-right populist parties.

When looking at the attitudinal aspects, the results reveal that the principle of democracy is considered very important by a majority of respondents in all countries surveyed, but satisfaction with the concrete functioning of democracy is weaker in comparison to this fundamental appreciation and differs greatly from country to country. Remarkably, there is also no uniform pattern in the correlation between satisfaction with democracy and support for right-wing parties. In many countries, respondents who are satisfied with democracy are less likely to support far-right parties, but the statistical correlation is usually weak. In Germany and Spain, however, it is more pronounced. However, as the extent of support for far-right populist parties varies considerably from country to country, and does not necessarily align with the attitudinal differences, it is important to stress how the respective spectrum of available parties to vote for in the countries play a crucial role for the country-specific voting preferences. Only where far-

right populist parties have been able to establish themselves as a credible alternative, they succeed in mobilizing the latent discontent among the European working populations.

In Hungary, Poland, and Italy, where right-wing parties are in government or were until recently, the picture is completely different from the described patterns above. When looking at the associations between the attitudinal aspects and the far-right voting intentions, the opposite effect can be seen: the higher the level of satisfaction with democracy, the higher the intention to vote for an extreme right-wing party. This not only illustrates how differently people interpret what democracy entails, it also makes it clear that the concept of democracy can be successfully exploited by right-wing parties. The FIDESZ government in Hungary and the former PiS government in Poland have noticeably curtailed media freedom, the rule of law and democratic opportunities in general. Similarly, Hungary, Poland and Italy show that, in contrast to the other European countries, trust in national institutions goes hand in hand with more extreme right-wing party votes – a clear sign of the influence of right-wing parties on the institutions there. Furthermore, this illustrates that established correlations in political science, according to which more trust in institutions goes hand in hand with fewer right-wing party votes, do not continue to apply equally to countries with extreme right-wing governments, but have become significantly more complex.

Moreover, only Poland, Hungary and Italy show a pattern in which “anti-elitist” populist views are not associated with an increased preference for far-right populist parties. In Hungary, it is even the case that these are associated with a lower right-wing voting preference. If the populist far right is in power, it could therefore lose its credibility to represent the will of “the people”. The anti-establishment element of populism and dissatisfaction with democracy can even turn against the populist forces in power.

Regarding the study’s focus on the work environment, the study reveals that the world of work is relevant across Europe when it comes to understanding or combating the rise of the political far right. The more gainful employment guarantees workers material participation, democratic co-determination and social recognition, the less likely they are to hold anti-democratic attitudes. The perception of industrial citizenship rights that are empirically captured in our study with the concepts of workers’ voice and quality of work aspects have a positive impact on the democratic climate. These findings are very robust across the countries studied, and take place irrespective of contextual factors, such as the collective bargaining system or the political context.

The findings clearly suggest that workers’ voice in terms of democratic participation opportunities at the workplace have a clear impact: Employees who can help shape their everyday working lives and have a say are more satisfied with democracy and value democracy as more important in all countries surveyed. Likewise, in all countries, greater democratic participation in the job correlates with greater trust in institutions and more positive attitudes towards immigration, as well as less generalized prejudices. Furthermore, in all countries there is a positive correlation between the experience of democratic participation opportunities at work and greater trust in the EU.

The association between a higher quality of work and parameters for the democratic integration of workers are very similar to those mentioned regarding workers’ voice: Employees are more satisfied with democracy and generally value it more, have a higher level of trust in national institutions and the EU as well as a more positive attitude towards the EU and immigration if their work gives them the opportunity to learn, or if they can influence the daily organization and pace of work, if they are paid appropriately, if their working hours also leave room for family and if they feel recognized in their job.

In most countries, respondents with experiences of democratic participation at work can be found where employee representation, such as works and staff councils, is present in the company. Therefore, works councils also prove to be important enablers of democratic participation and good working conditions and have the potential to contribute to a more robust sense of industrial citizenship. In addition to that does the presence of institutionalized workers' representation significantly enhance the job satisfaction. But the impact of these institutions also expands to democratic attitudes in the findings: In a majority of countries, workers who have a work council at their workplace and also union members report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and institutional trust and lower levels of anti-immigration sentiments. These findings highlight the importance of collective action and organization to understand the beneficial effects of industrial citizenship.

While there are very clear links between the conditions in the world of work and the climate of democratic attitudes in all the countries surveyed, the picture is less clear when it comes to voting preferences for far-right populist parties. This makes clear that factors outside the work environment – such as the supply side of politics, the respective party spectrum and the extent to which extreme right-wing parties have been able to establish themselves in the countries – also play an important role in the country-specific voting preference for extreme right-wing parties. Comparisons are therefore only possible to a limited extent. In Germany and Sweden, respondents with more workers' voice are noticeably less likely to express a preference for extreme right-wing parties; in Spain, job satisfaction in particular and, in Sweden, quality of work are also associated with a lower probability of voting for extreme right-wing parties. In most other countries, this effect is also present, but only weakly pronounced.

In Hungary and Poland, and somewhat less pronounced in Italy, there is again an opposing trend. If one takes into account the finding that in all the countries considered – i.e., also in countries where right-wing governments have been able to shape the national institutions – industrial citizenship rights go hand in hand with higher trust in institutions, good working conditions also appear to have system-stabilizing effects – regardless of the political colour of the country. However, in Poland, Hungary and Italy, workers' voice, quality of work and job satisfaction are also associated with a higher level of trust in the EU, which in turn is associated with a lower preference for extreme right-wing parties. This shows that trust in the EU is a core component of democratic attitudes, even in countries governed by extreme right-wing parties.

Summarizing, the role of the work environment in the electoral success of the political far-right is an indirect rather than a direct one. Even if there is no straightforward link with voting intentions, there is strong evidence that industrial citizenship provides a buffer against anti-democratic attitudes (such as dissatisfaction with democracy, institutional distrust, and derogatory attitudes towards minority groups). In turn, this anti-democratic attitudinal climate is the fertile breeding ground in which far-right populist voting intentions are rooted. In other words, anti-democratic attitudes play a mediating role between the work environment and the polling booth, as depicted in the conceptual model of this study (see Figure 1.1).

Therefore, the observed mechanism can best be described as follows: The absence of democratic participation, poor working conditions, and the resulting potential for frustration as well as experiences of disadvantage and powerlessness are a breeding ground for the emergence of anti-democratic attitudes in all countries surveyed, which can then be mobilized by extreme right-wing parties. Or in other words: Labour rights create the democratic attitudes that make it harder for far-right populist parties to obtain electoral successes.

Finally, it is noticeable that the perception of transformation and its impact on the respondents' jobs is more consistently relevant to the voting preference for a far-right populist party. Specifically, in half of the countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, France, and Sweden), respondents with concerns about transformation, i.e., the fear of negative effects on their own work due to digitalization or political climate change measures, have a significantly higher preference for extreme right-wing parties. These transformation concerns are particularly relevant among respondents with low incomes, as they are particularly widespread among poorer respondents in all countries surveyed. It is also evident that those who are worried about the transformation of their job are less satisfied with democracy in the vast majority of countries and express less trust in institutions. Given the enormous transformation challenges European societies are confronted with, how the job worries of those in employment are dealt with also has consequences for attitudes towards democracy. Considering the very unequal socio-demographic distribution of these concerns, a socially just and cushioned form of transformation becomes particularly important. At the same time, in some countries, those who report greater autonomy at work and generally better working conditions are less concerned about the changes in the world of work. Accordingly, working conditions and opportunities for co-determination also appear to be a lever for mitigating concerns about the transformation.

We live in a time in which democracy is under enormous pressure. This makes it all the more important to identify and strengthen structures and institutions that promote democratic attitudes and reinforce democratic forces. The findings of this report show that gainful employment is a crucial mechanism for social and political integration. It is therefore of paramount importance to create conditions that ensure that gainful employment guarantees long-term social security as well as material and democratic participation on the work floor for as many people as possible. The following instruments are important steps towards a fairer and more democratic labour market throughout the EU:

- *Implementing Minimum Standards on the Labour Market.* The European minimum wage directive makes it clear that gainful employment must guarantee social participation for all. Directive 2022/2041 on “adequate minimum wages in the European Union” defines two central fields of action that have also been identified in this report as relevant for strengthening democratic structures and attitudes within the analysed countries. On the one hand, this is the emphasis on collective bargaining as a prerequisite for appropriate wages and salaries. The directive thus underlines the connection between a high level of collective bargaining coverage and higher minimum wages and salaries as well as lower wage inequality. Countries whose collective bargaining coverage is not at least 80% must demonstrate how they are gradually increasing collective bargaining coverage. On the other hand, the directive obliges EU countries to establish clearly defined criteria for an appropriate wage. Even if the directive does not define this as a binding standard, it explicitly mentions values such as 60% of the gross median wage. Such a definition of the minimum wage focuses on the concept of social participation and integration and the central role work and wages play by structuring it. Participation is in this context not defined by the fulfilment of minimum basic needs, but relative to the respective standard of living of a society. Member states have a binding obligation to transpose the directive into national law by November 15, 2025 at the latest.

- *Democracy at work.* There are over 40 EU Directives, accumulated over the past almost 50 years, which provide for employee involvement across a range of policy fields, from employment law to company law and occupational health and safety. The resulting fragmented collection of rules is full of gaps, overlaps, and contradictions. Variable transposition into national law and jurisprudence at the national level has led to further fragmentation. Every new EU legislative initiative which impacts workers in some way leads to the legislators picking and choosing among all these precedents, with political compromises further adding to the volatile mix. Furthermore, the actual practice and enforceability of information and consultation varies widely across the EU, and is particularly underdeveloped in central and eastern Europe. With a view to consolidating and strengthening this patchwork of rules, the ETUC proposed a Horizontal Framework Directive on Information, Consultation and Participation in 2016. This idea was taken up by an own-initiative Report in the European Parliament in 2021, and the EU Commission has pledged to take it up in the context of the evaluation of the 2019 cross-border company mobility directive, scheduled for 2027.
- *Just transitions.* The findings presented in this report have once again highlighted the importance of socially safeguarding social transformation processes. Employees need social protection and security as well as long-term employment prospects in order to be able to follow the path of change towards a digitalized and decarbonized world. Particularly regarding socio-ecological change, trade unions emphasize the need for a stronger interlinking of the European Green Deal projects with employment, structural, industrial, service and labour market policy measures. The EU Council recommendation “to ensure a just transition to climate neutrality” from 2022 already emphasizes the need for stronger employment-oriented support. This recommendation must be followed by action and measures.

To summarize: Overall, democratic participation at the workplace and good working conditions across Europe are a breeding ground for attitudes that strengthen democracy. However, the extent to which these then translate into corresponding voting preferences depends heavily on the supply side of the respective party system and the political climate of the country in question.

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Appendix to Chapter 3

A 3.1. Multivariate regression model explaining the importance of democracy (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 8.32 | *** | 8.05 | *** | 8.89 | *** | 8.75 | *** | 8.71 | *** | 8.42 | *** | 8.74 | *** | 8.57 | *** | 8.52 | *** | 9.36 | *** |
| Male | 0.12 | | 0.27 | ** | -0.05 | | 0.10 | | 0.11 | | 0.05 | | 0.03 | | 0.03 | | -0.08 | | -0.23 | * |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | -0.26 | | -0.26 | | -0.74 | *** | -0.66 | ** | -1.21 | *** | -0.26 | | -0.62 | *** | -0.34 | | -0.60 | * | -0.65 | *** |
| 25-34 yo | -0.13 | | -0.55 | *** | -0.57 | *** | -0.56 | *** | -0.04 | | -0.32 | | -0.27 | | -0.40 | ** | -0.54 | *** | -0.03 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | 0.32 | * | 0.52 | *** | 0.56 | *** | 0.39 | * | 0.55 | *** | 0.38 | * | 0.12 | | 0.36 | * | 0.37 | ** | 0.20 | |
| 55-65 yo | 0.65 | *** | 0.62 | *** | 0.91 | *** | 0.60 | *** | 0.78 | *** | 0.77 | *** | 0.54 | *** | 0.68 | *** | 0.82 | *** | 0.51 | ** |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.15 | | 0.08 | | -0.31 | * | -0.05 | | -0.07 | | -0.05 | | -0.29 | * | -0.18 | | -0.15 | | -0.18 | |
| Low education | -1.15 | *** | -0.97 | *** | -0.75 | *** | -0.69 | *** | -1.00 | *** | -0.36 | * | -1.13 | *** | -0.80 | * | -0.66 | *** | -1.07 | *** |
| Middle education | -0.31 | * | -0.63 | *** | -0.28 | ** | -0.32 | ** | -0.22 | | -0.21 | | -0.61 | *** | -0.29 | * | -0.34 | * | -0.45 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.16 | | 0.12 | | 0.11 | | -0.06 | | -0.08 | | 0.18 | | 0.03 | | 0.22 | | -0.12 | | -0.02 | |
| Blue collar | -0.23 | | -0.01 | | -0.12 | | -0.23 | | -0.26 | | -0.16 | | 0.02 | | 0.01 | | -0.14 | | -0.05 | |
| Unemployed | 0.07 | | -0.01 | | -0.37 | | -0.25 | | -0.21 | | -0.06 | | 0.04 | | 0.01 | | 0.19 | | -0.12 | |
| HH income: quartile 1 | -0.88 | *** | -0.59 | *** | -0.60 | *** | -0.66 | *** | -0.67 | *** | -0.98 | *** | -0.70 | *** | -0.83 | *** | -0.50 | ** | -0.79 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | -0.51 | ** | -0.47 | ** | -0.23 | | -0.32 | * | -0.22 | | -0.49 | ** | -0.24 | | -0.32 | * | -0.16 | | -0.16 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | -0.32 | * | -0.42 | ** | -0.06 | | -0.23 | | -0.01 | | -0.22 | | -0.08 | | 0.01 | | 0.09 | | -0.05 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.08 | | 0.12 | | 0.17 | | 0.10 | | 0.12 | | 0.08 | | 0.14 | | 0.08 | | 0.09 | | 0.11 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 3.2. Multivariate regression model explaining satisfaction with democracy (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 5.61 | *** | 5.71 | *** | 6.96 | *** | 6.91 | *** | 3.49 | *** | 6.03 | *** | 7.04 | *** | 5.26 | *** | 5.35 | *** | 7.50 | *** |
| Male | 0.32 | * | -0.15 | | 0.06 | | 0.11 | | 0.01 | | -0.01 | | 0.20 | | 0.11 | | 0.05 | | -0.28 | * |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | -0.29 | | 0.60 | * | 0.78 | *** | -0.02 | | 0.52 | | 0.86 | ** | 0.10 | | 0.08 | | 0.22 | | -0.01 | |
| 25-34 yo | -0.32 | | 0.21 | | -0.04 | | 0.14 | | -0.44 | | -0.01 | | -0.33 | * | -0.36 | | 0.12 | | 0.01 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.39 | * | -0.12 | | 0.57 | ** | -0.15 | | -0.22 | | 0.28 | | -0.18 | | -0.24 | | 0.08 | | -0.02 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.05 | | -0.08 | | 0.84 | *** | -0.46 | * | -0.45 | | 0.58 | ** | -0.26 | | -0.13 | | 0.37 | | 0.27 | |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.26 | | 0.26 | | -0.03 | | -0.38 | | 0.40 | | 0.24 | | -0.14 | | -0.05 | | 0.83 | *** | -0.09 | |
| Low education | -0.11 | | -0.58 | ** | -0.67 | *** | -0.50 | * | 1.60 | *** | -0.38 | | -0.67 | *** | 0.32 | | -0.39 | * | -1.43 | *** |
| Middle education | -0.51 | ** | -0.32 | * | -0.36 | ** | -0.72 | *** | 0.44 | * | -0.31 | | -0.26 | * | 0.11 | | -0.19 | | -0.54 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.10 | | 0.00 | | 0.10 | | -0.20 | | -0.02 | | 0.03 | | 0.01 | | -0.29 | | 0.03 | | -0.20 | |
| Blue collar | -0.55 | * | 0.02 | | -0.35 | | -0.44 | | 0.09 | | -0.34 | | -0.11 | | -0.22 | | -0.11 | | -0.37 | |
| Unemployed | -1.30 | *** | -0.09 | | -0.86 | ** | -0.19 | | -0.72 | * | -0.57 | * | -0.08 | | -0.61 | | -0.09 | | -0.87 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 1 | -0.37 | | -0.06 | | -0.54 | ** | -0.84 | *** | 0.11 | | -1.07 | *** | -0.86 | *** | 0.52 | * | -0.26 | | -0.68 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | -0.35 | | -0.02 | | -0.54 | ** | -0.48 | * | 0.37 | | -0.55 | ** | -0.24 | | 0.25 | | -0.16 | | -0.19 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | -0.07 | | -0.02 | | -0.09 | | -0.41 | * | -0.02 | | -0.37 | * | -0.31 | * | 0.47 | * | 0.03 | | -0.30 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.05 | | 0.02 | | 0.08 | | 0.05 | | 0.03 | | 0.06 | | 0.05 | | 0.01 | | 0.02 | | 0.09 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 3.3. Multivariate regression model explaining institutional trust (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 4.79 | *** | 5.26 | *** | 6.26 | *** | 5.97 | *** | 3.13 | *** | 5.05 | *** | 6.49 | *** | 4.03 | *** | 4.72 | *** | 6.22 | *** |
| Male | 0.33 | ** | 0.07 | | 0.24 | * | 0.30 | * | -0.08 | | -0.07 | | 0.40 | *** | 0.05 | | -0.11 | | -0.03 | |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | 0.22 | | 0.75 | ** | 1.02 | *** | 0.31 | | 0.59 | | 0.70 | * | -0.24 | | -0.14 | | 0.40 | | 0.05 | |
| 25-34 yo | -0.13 | | 0.28 | | -0.21 | | 0.35 | | -0.01 | | -0.05 | | -0.48 | ** | -0.13 | | -0.04 | | 0.08 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.27 | | -0.07 | | 0.49 | ** | 0.10 | | -0.18 | | 0.07 | | -0.28 | | -0.16 | | 0.04 | | 0.31 | |
| 55-65 yo | 0.09 | | 0.12 | | 0.81 | *** | -0.17 | | -0.12 | | 0.19 | | -0.41 | ** | -0.21 | | 0.13 | | 0.51 | ** |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.46 | ** | 0.10 | | -0.37 | ** | -0.42 | * | 0.40 | | 0.63 | ** | -0.31 | * | 0.48 | | 0.70 | *** | -0.02 | |
| Low education | -0.04 | | -0.39 | * | -0.84 | *** | -0.73 | *** | 1.84 | *** | -0.39 | * | -0.72 | *** | 0.16 | | -0.49 | ** | -1.23 | *** |
| Middle education | -0.35 | * | -0.35 | ** | -0.52 | *** | -0.78 | *** | 0.46 | ** | -0.28 | | -0.33 | ** | 0.13 | | -0.22 | | -0.65 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.30 | * | -0.24 | | -0.47 | *** | -0.17 | | -0.16 | | -0.21 | | -0.22 | | -0.39 | * | 0.02 | | -0.35 | * |
| Blue collar | -0.55 | ** | -0.19 | | -0.62 | *** | -0.40 | | -0.10 | | -0.23 | | -0.48 | *** | -0.12 | | -0.13 | | -0.66 | *** |
| Unemployed | -1.00 | *** | -0.58 | * | -0.99 | *** | 0.02 | | -0.80 | * | -0.47 | * | -0.37 | | -0.43 | | -0.24 | | -0.58 | * |
| HH income: quartile 1 | -0.18 | | 0.12 | | -0.29 | | -0.45 | * | 0.12 | | -0.50 | ** | -0.34 | * | 0.68 | *** | 0.10 | | -0.15 | |
| HH income: quartile 2 | -0.23 | | -0.05 | | -0.15 | | -0.22 | | 0.43 | * | -0.19 | | 0.06 | | 0.35 | | -0.02 | | -0.25 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.02 | | -0.02 | | 0.22 | | -0.21 | | -0.05 | | 0.00 | | -0.18 | | 0.46 | ** | 0.10 | | -0.17 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.04 | | 0.02 | | 0.14 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.03 | | 0.07 | | 0.02 | | 0.03 | | 0.08 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 3.4. Multivariate regression model explaining populist attitudes (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 6.02 | *** | 5.27 | *** | 5.73 | *** | 5.57 | *** | 5.64 | *** | 5.65 | *** | 3.49 | *** | 6.34 | *** | 6.33 | *** | 4.13 | *** |
| Male | 0.29 | * | 0.06 | | -0.03 | | 0.06 | | 0.15 | | -0.17 | | 0.35 | ** | -0.01 | | 0.24 | * | 0.33 | ** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | -0.31 | | -0.29 | | 0.05 | | -0.83 | *** | -0.54 | * | -0.21 | | 0.10 | | -0.07 | | -0.70 | ** | -0.25 | |
| 25-34 yo | 0.37 | * | 0.05 | | 0.03 | | -0.28 | | 0.20 | | -0.15 | | 0.14 | | -0.08 | | -0.37 | * | 0.08 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.21 | | 0.31 | | -0.44 | ** | -0.04 | | 0.02 | | -0.09 | | -0.12 | | -0.03 | | -0.18 | | 0.11 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.04 | | 0.16 | | -0.69 | *** | -0.02 | | -0.06 | | 0.34 | * | 0.01 | | 0.24 | | 0.02 | | -0.04 | |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | -0.29 | | 0.10 | | 0.08 | | 0.21 | | 0.16 | | -0.44 | * | 0.06 | | -0.53 | * | -0.42 | * | 0.03 | |
| Low education | -0.28 | | 0.84 | *** | 0.12 | | 0.70 | *** | 0.32 | | 0.56 | *** | 1.42 | *** | -0.38 | | 0.00 | | 0.44 | * |
| Middle education | 0.41 | ** | 0.49 | *** | -0.08 | | 0.66 | *** | 0.52 | *** | 0.39 | ** | 0.81 | *** | 0.16 | | 0.26 | | 0.56 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.02 | | 0.24 | | -0.16 | | -0.10 | | -0.08 | | 0.21 | | -0.06 | | 0.08 | | 0.14 | | 0.15 | |
| Blue collar | -0.06 | | 0.48 | * | 0.22 | | 0.08 | | 0.29 | | 0.39 | * | 0.12 | | 0.06 | | 0.26 | | 0.35 | |
| Unemployed | 0.37 | | -0.02 | | -0.05 | | -0.22 | | -0.02 | | 0.03 | | -0.23 | | 0.43 | | 0.30 | | 0.73 | ** |
| HH income: quartile 1 | 0.46 | * | 0.22 | | 0.32 | * | 0.44 | * | 0.25 | | 0.44 | ** | 0.96 | *** | 0.09 | | 0.41 | * | 0.90 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | 0.68 | *** | 0.10 | | 0.20 | | 0.21 | | -0.03 | | 0.38 | * | 0.95 | *** | 0.10 | | 0.37 | * | 0.63 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.16 | | 0.05 | | 0.15 | | 0.31 | | 0.14 | | 0.28 | | 0.51 | ** | -0.19 | | 0.23 | | 0.37 | * |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.04 | | 0.04 | | 0.03 | | 0.04 | | 0.03 | | 0.04 | | 0.11 | | 0.02 | | 0.03 | | 0.08 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 3.5. Multivariate regression model explaining anti-immigration attitudes (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 4.61 | *** | 4.56 | *** | 4.05 | *** | 4.24 | *** | 4.85 | *** | 3.77 | *** | 3.99 | *** | 3.92 | *** | 3.80 | *** | 3.38 | *** |
| Male | 0.00 | | 0.11 | | 0.01 | | -0.29 | * | -0.39 | ** | -0.14 | | 0.00 | | -0.27 | * | -0.34 | ** | 0.72 | *** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | 0.33 | | -0.96 | *** | -1.49 | *** | -0.42 | | -0.48 | | -0.75 | ** | -0.23 | | 0.32 | | -0.15 | | -0.21 | |
| 25-34 yo | 0.04 | | -0.50 | ** | -0.44 | * | -0.40 | | -0.28 | | 0.01 | | 0.04 | | 0.16 | | 0.25 | | 0.17 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | 0.52 | ** | 0.33 | * | 0.25 | | 0.46 | * | 0.06 | | -0.01 | | 0.43 | * | -0.17 | | 0.19 | | 0.50 | * |
| 55-65 yo | 0.33 | | 0.66 | *** | 0.11 | | 0.59 | ** | -0.25 | | 0.15 | | 0.41 | * | -0.63 | *** | 0.03 | | 0.56 | ** |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | -0.76 | *** | -0.60 | *** | -0.63 | *** | -0.26 | | -0.26 | | -0.81 | *** | -0.43 | ** | -0.40 | | -0.86 | *** | -0.37 | * |
| Low education | 0.49 | * | 0.68 | ** | 0.92 | *** | 0.45 | * | -0.20 | | 0.80 | *** | 0.80 | *** | 0.14 | | 0.48 | ** | 0.77 | ** |
| Middle education | 0.51 | *** | 0.49 | *** | 0.64 | *** | 1.02 | *** | 0.64 | *** | 0.51 | ** | 0.48 | *** | 0.30 | * | 0.33 | * | 0.65 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | 0.36 | * | 0.35 | * | 0.60 | *** | 0.36 | * | 0.07 | | 0.33 | * | 0.35 | * | 0.37 | * | 0.25 | | 0.40 | * |
| Blue collar | 0.48 | * | 0.19 | | 0.64 | *** | 0.69 | ** | 0.17 | | 0.36 | | 0.40 | * | 0.47 | ** | 0.70 | *** | 0.62 | ** |
| Unemployed | 0.44 | | 0.56 | * | 0.52 | * | 0.08 | | 0.29 | | 0.41 | | 0.48 | | 0.44 | | 0.19 | | 0.63 | * |
| HH income: quartile 1 | 0.02 | | -0.22 | | 0.14 | | 0.18 | | 0.38 | * | 0.81 | *** | 0.15 | | 0.36 | * | 0.24 | | -0.04 | |
| HH income: quartile 2 | 0.05 | | -0.15 | | 0.08 | | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | 0.43 | * | 0.01 | | 0.18 | | 0.13 | | 0.26 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | -0.01 | | 0.02 | | -0.25 | | 0.16 | | 0.21 | | 0.43 | * | 0.21 | | -0.02 | | 0.15 | | 0.22 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | 0.14 | | 0.08 | | 0.04 | | 0.06 | | 0.06 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.07 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 3.5. Multivariate regression model explaining group-focused enmity (GFE; 0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 3.32 | *** | 3.53 | *** | 3.41 | *** | 3.49 | *** | 4.02 | *** | 3.49 | *** | 2.81 | *** | 4.30 | *** | 3.52 | *** | 2.44 | *** |
| Male | 0.27 | ** | 0.45 | *** | 0.62 | *** | 0.40 | *** | 0.28 | *** | 0.28 | *** | 0.61 | *** | 0.09 | | 0.28 | *** | 0.87 | *** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | 0.18 | | 0.41 | * | 0.81 | *** | 0.04 | | 0.22 | | 0.10 | | 0.61 | *** | -0.35 | | 0.32 | | 0.65 | *** |
| 25-34 yo | -0.03 | | 0.19 | | 0.08 | | 0.08 | | -0.19 | | 0.00 | | 0.32 | ** | 0.11 | | 0.04 | | -0.17 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.19 | | -0.08 | | -0.01 | | -0.16 | | -0.17 | | 0.12 | | -0.10 | | -0.06 | | -0.10 | | -0.10 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.21 | | 0.04 | | -0.36 | ** | -0.23 | | -0.26 | * | 0.10 | | -0.39 | ** | 0.01 | | -0.28 | * | 0.05 | |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.29 | ** | 0.09 | | 0.52 | *** | 0.24 | * | -0.04 | | 0.26 | | 0.22 | * | -0.14 | | 0.60 | *** | 0.31 | ** |
| Low education | 0.67 | *** | 0.45 | *** | 0.17 | | 0.47 | ** | 0.80 | *** | 0.41 | *** | 1.22 | *** | 0.47 | * | 0.52 | *** | 0.67 | *** |
| Middle education | 0.28 | ** | 0.41 | *** | 0.13 | | 0.46 | *** | 0.61 | *** | 0.19 | | 0.65 | *** | 0.30 | *** | 0.19 | | 0.43 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | 0.10 | | -0.02 | | -0.32 | ** | -0.19 | | -0.04 | | -0.09 | | -0.12 | | -0.12 | | -0.18 | | 0.06 | |
| Blue collar | 0.26 | | 0.22 | | -0.07 | | 0.00 | | 0.07 | | 0.08 | | -0.16 | | 0.29 | ** | -0.12 | | 0.11 | |
| Unemployed | -0.42 | ** | -0.30 | | -0.21 | | -0.62 | ** | -0.37 | * | -0.31 | * | -0.24 | | -0.57 | ** | -0.59 | *** | -0.50 | ** |
| HH income: quartile 1 | 0.42 | *** | 0.36 | ** | 0.24 | * | 0.54 | *** | 0.35 | ** | 0.52 | *** | 0.44 | *** | 0.45 | *** | 0.27 | * | 0.58 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | 0.24 | * | 0.29 | * | 0.03 | | 0.23 | | 0.11 | | 0.37 | ** | 0.22 | | 0.45 | *** | 0.09 | | 0.21 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.16 | | 0.20 | | 0.12 | | 0.33 | ** | 0.07 | | 0.40 | *** | 0.24 | * | 0.09 | | -0.01 | | 0.18 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.06 | | 0.09 | | 0.14 | | 0.06 | | 0.08 | | 0.05 | | 0.17 | | 0.07 | | 0.07 | | 0.14 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 3.6. Logistic regression model explaining intention to vote for a far-right populist party

| | France | | Belgium - Flanders | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-----|--------------------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 0.34 | *** | 0.24 | *** | 0.08 | *** | 0.08 | *** | 0.22 | *** | 0.32 | *** | 0.16 | *** | 0.20 | *** | 0.06 | *** | 0.07 | *** |
| Male | 1.43 | ** | 1.12 | | 1.32 | | 1.45 | * | 1.22 | | 1.06 | | 1.45 | ** | 0.96 | | 1.82 | *** | 1.98 | *** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | 1.01 | | 1.13 | | 2.45 | ** | 0.78 | | 1.02 | | 1.41 | | 1.08 | | 0.61 | | 0.69 | | 1.71 | * |
| 25-34 yo | 0.90 | | 0.88 | | 1.59 | | 0.58 | * | 0.65 | * | 0.77 | | 1.06 | | 0.59 | ** | 0.73 | | 1.56 | * |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | 1.06 | | 0.86 | | 1.34 | | 1.04 | | 1.01 | | 0.99 | | 0.90 | | 0.89 | | 0.77 | | 1.39 | |
| 55-65 yo | 1.01 | | 1.21 | | 1.68 | | 0.92 | | 0.98 | | 0.97 | | 0.71 | | 1.25 | | 0.65 | | 1.60 | * |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.50 | *** | 0.48 | * | 0.95 | | 0.92 | | 1.35 | | 0.71 | | 0.55 | ** | 0.66 | | 0.80 | | 0.75 | |
| Low education | 1.67 | * | 2.03 | * | 1.18 | | 2.11 | ** | 1.95 | ** | 1.75 | ** | 3.31 | *** | 1.52 | | 2.38 | *** | 2.98 | *** |
| Middle education | 1.61 | *** | 1.34 | | 0.87 | | 1.93 | *** | 1.20 | | 1.59 | ** | 2.25 | *** | 1.73 | *** | 1.95 | ** | 1.80 | *** |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | 1.01 | | 1.04 | | 0.76 | | 1.13 | | 1.11 | | 1.16 | | 1.31 | | 0.87 | | 1.00 | | 1.05 | |
| Blue collar | 1.45 | | 1.47 | | 0.65 | | 1.35 | | 1.13 | | 0.83 | | 1.28 | | 1.16 | | 0.91 | | 1.22 | |
| Unemployed | 1.00 | | 0.64 | | 0.57 | | 0.95 | | 1.02 | | 0.67 | | 0.75 | | 0.67 | | 0.65 | | 0.97 | |
| HH income: quartile 1 | 0.66 | * | 1.17 | | 1.17 | | 1.82 | ** | 1.18 | | 0.67 | * | 1.24 | | 1.77 | ** | 1.74 | * | 1.11 | |
| HH income: quartile 2 | 0.79 | | 1.38 | | 1.05 | | 1.33 | | 1.30 | | 0.79 | | 0.99 | | 1.40 | | 0.96 | | 1.16 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.86 | | 1.25 | | 0.71 | | 1.31 | | 0.83 | | 1.06 | | 1.24 | | 0.90 | | 1.33 | | 0.96 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Naegelkerke R-squared | 0.07 | | 0.06 | | 0.03 | | 0.06 | | 0.03 | | 0.04 | | 0.10 | | 0.07 | | 0.06 | | 0.08 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Appendix to Chapter 4

A 4.1. Multivariate regression models explaining workers' voice (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 5.57 | *** | 6.00 | *** | 6.75 | *** | 6.49 | *** | 5.97 | *** | 6.12 | *** | 6.52 | *** | 6.01 | *** | 5.83 | *** | 6.82 | *** |
| Male | 0.18 | | 0.11 | | 0.13 | | 0.03 | | -0.01 | | 0.21 | | 0.22 | * | -0.15 | | 0.22 | | 0.20 | |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | 0.43 | | -0.03 | | -0.55 | ** | -0.28 | | -0.24 | | 0.18 | | -0.38 | * | 0.75 | ** | -0.28 | | -0.63 | ** |
| 25-34 yo | -0.06 | | -0.09 | | 0.15 | | -0.32 | * | -0.10 | | -0.13 | | -0.27 | | 0.06 | | -0.20 | | 0.04 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.10 | | -0.10 | | 0.11 | | -0.14 | | -0.06 | | -0.06 | | 0.11 | | 0.06 | | -0.13 | | 0.22 | |
| 55-65 yo | 0.08 | | 0.13 | | 0.26 | | -0.03 | | 0.03 | | -0.17 | | 0.21 | | 0.22 | | 0.25 | | 0.08 | |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.10 | | -0.06 | | -0.06 | | -0.35 | * | -0.12 | | 0.42 | | -0.30 | * | -0.04 | | -0.10 | | -0.04 | |
| Low education | -0.53 | * | 0.13 | | -0.11 | | -0.21 | | 0.34 | | -0.03 | | -0.46 | ** | 0.10 | | -0.27 | | -0.20 | |
| Middle education | -0.01 | | -0.17 | | -0.15 | | -0.13 | | 0.06 | | 0.09 | | -0.26 | * | 0.04 | | -0.14 | | -0.06 | |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.21 | | -0.31 | * | -0.07 | | -0.27 | * | -0.17 | | -0.48 | ** | 0.05 | | -0.25 | | -0.08 | | -0.40 | *** |
| Blue collar | -0.22 | | -0.34 | * | -0.10 | | -0.24 | | -0.38 | * | -0.54 | ** | -0.12 | | -0.32 | * | -0.50 | ** | -0.49 | ** |
| HH income: quartile 1 | -0.33 | | -0.32 | * | -0.38 | ** | -0.61 | *** | -0.24 | | -1.18 | *** | -0.33 | * | -0.07 | | -0.68 | *** | -0.50 | ** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | -0.14 | | -0.24 | | -0.26 | | -0.35 | * | -0.03 | | -0.52 | ** | -0.23 | | 0.07 | | -0.31 | * | -0.32 | * |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.00 | | -0.09 | | -0.04 | | -0.20 | | 0.08 | | -0.47 | ** | -0.20 | | 0.23 | | -0.36 | * | -0.06 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: government | -0.30 | | -0.17 | | -0.21 | | -0.06 | | -0.18 | | 0.11 | | 0.06 | | -0.07 | | 0.28 | | 0.21 | |
| Sector: public sector | -0.24 | | -0.16 | | -0.10 | | -0.01 | | -0.51 | ** | -0.01 | | 0.12 | | -0.08 | | 0.17 | | 0.08 | |
| Sector: state-owned enterprise | -0.06 | | 0.20 | | -0.18 | | -0.25 | | -0.31 | | 0.02 | | 0.03 | | -0.13 | | 0.34 | | -0.46 | * |
| Sector: private enterprise (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: other | -0.13 | | 0.05 | | -0.14 | | 0.02 | | -0.44 | | 0.09 | | -0.20 | | -0.30 | | -0.44 | | 0.13 | |
| Company size: 1 | 0.03 | | -0.23 | | -0.46 | | 0.35 | | -0.01 | | 0.50 | | -0.28 | | 0.22 | | 0.26 | | 0.33 | |
| Company size: 2-9 | 0.37 | | 0.25 | | 0.23 | | 0.72 | *** | 0.76 | *** | 0.62 | ** | 0.32 | | 0.26 | | 0.31 | | 0.02 | |
| Company size: 10-49 | 0.23 | | 0.15 | | 0.17 | | 0.21 | | 0.11 | | 0.24 | | 0.06 | | -0.10 | | -0.02 | | 0.04 | |
| Company size: 50-249 | 0.18 | | 0.20 | | 0.05 | | 0.12 | | -0.11 | | 0.14 | | 0.14 | | -0.04 | | 0.20 | | 0.10 | |
| Company size: 250+ (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: unlimited duration (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|-----|-------|----|-------|----|-------|-----|-------|--|-------|--|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|----|-------|---|
| Contract: no unlimited duration | 0.10 | | -0.15 | | -0.27 | | -0.26 | | 0.06 | | 0.00 | | -0.06 | | -0.64 | *** | -0.13 | | -0.42 | * |
| Work council present | 0.38 | ** | 0.38 | ** | 0.32 | * | 0.55 | *** | 0.21 | | 0.16 | | 0.52 | *** | 0.11 | | 0.40 | ** | 0.23 | |
| No work council present (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Union member | 0.55 | *** | -0.06 | | -0.45 | ** | 0.03 | | 0.13 | | 0.18 | | -0.43 | *** | 0.45 | ** | 0.17 | | -0.08 | |
| Former union member | -0.15 | | -0.13 | | -0.51 | ** | -0.17 | | -0.18 | | -0.29 | | -0.39 | ** | 0.20 | | -0.20 | | -0.17 | |
| No union member (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.05 | | 0.04 | | 0.05 | | 0.07 | | 0.04 | | 0.07 | | 0.09 | | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | 0.09 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 4.2. Multivariate regression models explaining the quality of work scale (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 5.17 | *** | 5.83 | *** | 6.14 | *** | 6.61 | *** | 5.23 | *** | 5.68 | *** | 6.05 | *** | 6.28 | *** | 5.04 | *** | 6.13 | *** |
| Male | 0.38 | ** | 0.32 | ** | 0.13 | | -0.09 | | 0.32 | * | 0.22 | | 0.36 | ** | 0.03 | | 0.23 | | 0.42 | *** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | -0.23 | | 0.49 | | -0.62 | ** | 0.40 | | 0.42 | | 0.09 | | 0.05 | | 0.35 | | 0.11 | | 0.40 | |
| 25-34 yo | -0.21 | | 0.12 | | 0.41 | * | -0.26 | | 0.56 | ** | -0.23 | | -0.14 | | 0.08 | | 0.25 | | 0.30 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.73 | *** | -0.36 | * | 0.00 | | -0.29 | | -0.19 | | -0.38 | * | -0.23 | | -0.32 | * | 0.00 | | -0.13 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.37 | | -0.48 | ** | -0.30 | | -0.47 | ** | -0.37 | | -0.50 | * | -0.50 | ** | -0.49 | ** | 0.02 | | -0.46 | * |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.56 | ** | -0.02 | | -0.08 | | -0.31 | | 0.14 | | 0.22 | | -0.20 | | -0.31 | | 0.06 | | 0.13 | |
| Low education | -0.80 | ** | -0.33 | | -0.39 | * | -0.55 | ** | -0.37 | | -0.23 | | -0.75 | *** | -0.34 | | -0.41 | * | -0.20 | |
| Middle education | -0.28 | | -0.43 | ** | -0.28 | * | -0.54 | *** | -0.50 | *** | -0.17 | | -0.22 | | -0.05 | | -0.40 | * | -0.18 | |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.86 | *** | -1.00 | *** | -0.45 | ** | -0.58 | *** | -0.34 | * | -0.76 | *** | -0.26 | * | -0.70 | *** | -0.44 | ** | -0.61 | *** |
| Blue collar | -1.22 | *** | -1.21 | *** | -0.67 | *** | -0.86 | *** | -0.85 | *** | -1.21 | *** | -0.73 | *** | -1.11 | *** | -0.78 | *** | -1.17 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 1 | -0.43 | * | -0.05 | | -0.55 | *** | -1.13 | *** | -0.30 | | -0.96 | *** | -0.31 | | -0.43 | * | -0.75 | *** | -0.67 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | -0.31 | | -0.31 | | -0.52 | ** | -0.69 | *** | -0.26 | | -0.52 | ** | -0.47 | ** | -0.20 | | -0.81 | *** | -0.64 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 3 | -0.12 | | -0.14 | | -0.45 | ** | -0.58 | *** | -0.06 | | -0.36 | * | -0.17 | | -0.09 | | -0.78 | *** | -0.22 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: government | -0.19 | | 0.48 | ** | -0.33 | * | -0.04 | | -0.07 | | 0.23 | | 0.02 | | 0.33 | | 0.33 | | 0.11 | |
| Sector: public sector | -0.01 | | -0.23 | | -0.17 | | 0.06 | | -0.09 | | 0.04 | | -0.33 | * | 0.08 | | 0.20 | | -0.27 | |
| Sector: state-owned enterprise | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | -0.22 | | -0.47 | | 0.12 | | 0.37 | | -0.20 | | -0.04 | | 0.30 | | -0.49 | * |
| Sector: private enterprise (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: other | 0.09 | | 0.77 | * | -0.24 | | -0.32 | | 0.03 | | 0.45 | | -0.44 | | -0.48 | * | 0.13 | | 0.22 | |
| Company size: 1 | 0.28 | | -0.23 | | -0.69 | | 0.48 | | 0.31 | | 0.61 | | 0.12 | | 1.30 | *** | 0.97 | ** | 0.79 | |
| Company size: 2-9 | 0.42 | | 0.03 | | 0.34 | | 0.24 | | 0.57 | ** | 0.20 | | -0.14 | | 0.67 | *** | 0.62 | ** | 0.35 | |
| Company size: 10-49 | 0.40 | * | -0.14 | | 0.00 | | 0.09 | | 0.13 | | 0.24 | | -0.17 | | 0.16 | | 0.35 | * | -0.11 | |
| Company size: 50-249 | 0.36 | * | -0.18 | | 0.19 | | 0.08 | | -0.14 | | 0.06 | | -0.18 | | 0.13 | | 0.50 | ** | -0.04 | |
| Company size: 250+ (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: unlimited duration (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|---|-------|--|-------|--|-------|---|-------|--|-------|--|-------|---|-------|-----|-------|----|-------|---|
| Contract: no unlimited duration | 0.10 | | -0.13 | | 0.23 | | 0.06 | | -0.08 | | -0.14 | | -0.20 | | -0.85 | *** | -0.48 | ** | -0.21 | |
| Work council present | -0.04 | | 0.12 | | 0.10 | | 0.29 | * | 0.18 | | 0.11 | | 0.29 | * | 0.17 | | -0.02 | | 0.35 | * |
| No work council present (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Union member | 0.44 | * | -0.07 | | -0.18 | | 0.12 | | 0.03 | | -0.01 | | -0.22 | | 0.27 | | 0.18 | | -0.18 | |
| Former union member | -0.14 | | -0.19 | | -0.18 | | -0.08 | | 0.07 | | -0.34 | | 0.13 | | -0.03 | | 0.06 | | -0.14 | |
| No union member (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.10 | | 0.12 | | 0.07 | | 0.11 | | 0.09 | | 0.09 | | 0.10 | | 0.12 | | 0.10 | | 0.12 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 4.3. Multivariate regression models explaining job satisfaction (0-10)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 6.79 | *** | 6.99 | *** | 7.04 | *** | 7.25 | *** | 6.59 | *** | 6.59 | *** | 7.00 | *** | 6.59 | *** | 6.31 | *** | 6.42 | *** |
| Male | 0.18 | | 0.01 | | 0.15 | | -0.03 | | -0.14 | | 0.04 | | 0.14 | | 0.01 | | 0.15 | | 0.31 | ** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | 0.08 | | 0.23 | | 0.47 | * | 0.23 | | 0.13 | | -0.05 | | -0.24 | | 0.10 | | 0.14 | | 0.34 | |
| 25-34 yo | -0.37 | * | -0.16 | | -0.12 | | -0.27 | | 0.28 | | -0.22 | | -0.25 | * | -0.01 | | -0.20 | | 0.01 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.17 | | -0.05 | | 0.24 | | -0.14 | | 0.01 | | -0.11 | | 0.14 | | -0.12 | | 0.06 | | 0.09 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.08 | | 0.38 | ** | 0.26 | | 0.03 | | 0.08 | | 0.00 | | 0.23 | | -0.04 | | 0.16 | | 0.13 | |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.14 | | -0.11 | | -0.20 | | -0.48 | ** | -0.07 | | 0.40 | | -0.13 | | -0.69 | * | 0.02 | | 0.15 | |
| Low education | -0.02 | | -0.02 | | 0.33 | * | 0.21 | | 0.68 | ** | 0.37 | | 0.12 | | 1.04 | ** | -0.07 | | -0.10 | |
| Middle education | 0.21 | | 0.00 | | 0.03 | | 0.03 | | 0.29 | * | 0.27 | | 0.10 | | 0.44 | ** | -0.12 | | -0.05 | |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.29 | * | -0.08 | | -0.45 | *** | -0.30 | * | -0.21 | | -0.41 | * | -0.07 | | -0.21 | | -0.12 | | -0.32 | * |
| Blue collar | -0.21 | | 0.01 | | -0.38 | * | -0.38 | * | -0.50 | ** | -0.62 | ** | -0.39 | *** | -0.27 | | -0.28 | | -0.77 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 1 | -0.62 | *** | -0.36 | ** | -0.17 | | -0.86 | *** | -0.63 | *** | -0.67 | *** | -0.21 | | -0.35 | | -0.62 | *** | -0.31 | |
| HH income: quartile 2 | -0.44 | ** | -0.18 | | -0.26 | | -0.58 | *** | -0.20 | | -0.36 | * | -0.13 | | -0.41 | * | -0.27 | | -0.29 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | -0.11 | | -0.17 | | 0.13 | | -0.37 | * | -0.36 | * | -0.12 | | -0.07 | | -0.21 | | -0.27 | | 0.06 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: government | -0.07 | | 0.21 | | -0.28 | * | -0.22 | | -0.24 | | 0.35 | | 0.18 | | 0.13 | | 0.64 | ** | -0.10 | |
| Sector: public sector | 0.20 | | -0.04 | | -0.28 | | -0.07 | | -0.49 | * | 0.09 | | -0.06 | | -0.01 | | 0.28 | | -0.37 | * |
| Sector: state-owned enterprise | 0.20 | | 0.11 | | -0.43 | | 0.11 | | 0.21 | | 1.00 | ** | 0.01 | | -0.11 | | 0.64 | ** | -0.54 | * |
| Sector: private enterprise (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: other | -0.10 | | 0.62 | * | -0.03 | | -0.33 | | -0.62 | * | 0.50 | | -0.16 | | -0.04 | | 0.06 | | -0.37 | |
| Company size: 1 | -0.27 | | -0.31 | | -0.35 | | 0.40 | | 0.35 | | -0.13 | | -0.03 | | 1.14 | ** | 0.34 | | 0.95 | * |
| Company size: 2-9 | -0.05 | | -0.03 | | -0.09 | | 0.44 | * | 0.41 | * | 0.10 | | 0.15 | | 0.10 | | 0.34 | | 0.26 | |
| Company size: 10-49 | -0.03 | | -0.12 | | -0.10 | | 0.26 | | 0.09 | | 0.22 | | -0.05 | | 0.07 | | 0.30 | | -0.02 | |
| Company size: 50-249 | 0.13 | | -0.10 | | 0.22 | | 0.05 | | -0.09 | | 0.11 | | 0.25 | * | 0.20 | | 0.35 | * | 0.08 | |
| Company size: 250+ (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: unlimited duration (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: no unlimited duration | 0.09 | | -0.10 | | -0.05 | | -0.31 | | -0.02 | | -0.39 | * | -0.03 | | -0.84 | *** | -0.34 | * | -0.35 | |
| Work council present | -0.19 | | 0.29 | ** | 0.35 | ** | 0.38 | ** | 0.24 | | 0.28 | | 0.31 | *** | 0.07 | | 0.24 | | 0.31 | * |
| No work council present (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------|---|-------|--|-------|--|-------|---|-------|--|-------|---|-------|--|------|-----|------|---|-------|--|
| Union member | 0.44 | * | 0.05 | | -0.17 | | 0.32 | * | 0.12 | | 0.25 | | 0.07 | | 0.71 | *** | 0.38 | * | -0.08 | |
| Former union member | -0.24 | | -0.05 | | -0.05 | | -0.09 | | -0.09 | | -0.32 | * | -0.04 | | 0.47 | ** | 0.08 | | 0.02 | |
| No union member (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.04 | | 0.04 | | 0.07 | | 0.07 | | 0.05 | | 0.07 | | 0.08 | | 0.07 | | 0.07 | | 0.06 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 4.4. Multivariate regression models explaining job-related worries about digitalization (1-3)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 1.75 | *** | 1.42 | *** | 1.55 | *** | 1.62 | *** | 1.51 | *** | 1.54 | *** | 1.26 | *** | 1.50 | *** | 1.67 | *** | 1.10 | *** |
| Male | -0.08 | | 0.04 | | -0.02 | | -0.02 | | -0.05 | | -0.03 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | -0.04 | | 0.02 | |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | -0.04 | | 0.17 | | -0.09 | | -0.06 | | 0.15 | | -0.02 | | 0.13 | * | 0.13 | | 0.02 | | 0.23 | *** |
| 25-34 yo | 0.01 | | 0.10 | * | 0.05 | | 0.00 | | 0.08 | | 0.01 | | 0.18 | *** | 0.11 | * | 0.06 | | -0.01 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | 0.09 | | 0.02 | | -0.01 | | -0.03 | | 0.02 | | -0.05 | | 0.02 | | -0.02 | | -0.15 | ** | 0.00 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.03 | | 0.08 | | -0.12 | * | -0.08 | | -0.04 | | -0.07 | | -0.13 | ** | 0.02 | | -0.29 | *** | -0.01 | |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.02 | | 0.00 | | 0.04 | | 0.01 | | -0.09 | | -0.09 | | 0.05 | | -0.10 | | -0.06 | | 0.06 | |
| Low education | -0.05 | | 0.03 | | -0.03 | | 0.08 | | 0.02 | | 0.01 | | 0.15 | ** | -0.13 | | -0.01 | | -0.09 | |
| Middle education | -0.03 | | 0.02 | | -0.02 | | -0.01 | | -0.01 | | -0.02 | | 0.06 | | -0.03 | | 0.06 | | -0.05 | |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.05 | | 0.06 | | -0.02 | | -0.06 | | 0.03 | | 0.01 | | 0.03 | | -0.01 | | -0.04 | | 0.03 | |
| Blue collar | 0.02 | | -0.02 | | -0.06 | | -0.01 | | -0.01 | | 0.02 | | -0.10 | * | -0.05 | | -0.04 | | 0.05 | |
| HH income: quartile 1 | 0.19 | ** | 0.20 | *** | 0.12 | * | 0.18 | ** | 0.18 | *** | 0.18 | ** | 0.17 | *** | 0.29 | *** | 0.19 | ** | 0.31 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | 0.10 | | 0.19 | *** | 0.06 | | 0.07 | | 0.07 | | 0.23 | *** | 0.16 | *** | 0.19 | *** | 0.11 | * | 0.14 | ** |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.02 | | 0.09 | | -0.01 | | 0.03 | | 0.04 | | 0.10 | | 0.11 | ** | 0.12 | ** | 0.03 | | 0.13 | ** |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: government | -0.02 | | -0.03 | | -0.11 | * | 0.07 | | -0.10 | * | -0.14 | * | 0.08 | | -0.06 | | -0.03 | | -0.04 | |
| Sector: public sector | -0.10 | | -0.01 | | -0.05 | | -0.05 | | -0.18 | ** | -0.14 | | -0.07 | | -0.13 | * | 0.02 | | -0.06 | |
| Sector: state-owned enterprise | 0.08 | | -0.03 | | 0.08 | | 0.14 | | -0.04 | | 0.03 | | 0.02 | | -0.07 | | 0.09 | | 0.00 | |
| Sector: private enterprise (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: other | -0.08 | | 0.02 | | 0.04 | | -0.16 | | -0.07 | | 0.06 | | -0.12 | | -0.06 | | -0.18 | | -0.09 | |
| Company size: 1 | -0.12 | | 0.07 | | 0.03 | | 0.14 | | -0.14 | | 0.22 | * | -0.05 | | -0.07 | | 0.00 | | 0.06 | |
| Company size: 2-9 | 0.05 | | -0.03 | | -0.03 | | -0.10 | | -0.10 | | -0.09 | | -0.02 | | -0.04 | | -0.02 | | -0.01 | |
| Company size: 10-49 | 0.00 | | -0.02 | | -0.10 | * | 0.00 | | -0.03 | | -0.02 | | -0.01 | | 0.03 | | -0.04 | | -0.02 | |
| Company size: 50-249 | 0.12 | * | -0.02 | | 0.05 | | -0.04 | | -0.02 | | -0.01 | | 0.01 | | -0.03 | | -0.03 | | 0.03 | |
| Company size: 250+ (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: unlimited duration (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: no unlimited duration | 0.03 | | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | 0.06 | | 0.08 | | -0.02 | | 0.04 | | 0.04 | | 0.05 | | 0.08 | |
| Work council present | -0.02 | | 0.02 | | 0.06 | | -0.06 | | -0.01 | | 0.03 | | -0.03 | | 0.01 | | 0.08 | | -0.01 | |
| No work council present (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|------|--|------|---|------|--|------|---|------|--|------|---|------|-----|------|----|------|--|------|----|
| Union member | 0.11 | | 0.09 | * | 0.03 | | 0.12 | * | 0.06 | | 0.12 | * | 0.18 | *** | 0.15 | ** | 0.08 | | 0.12 | * |
| Former union member | 0.04 | | 0.06 | | 0.03 | | 0.06 | | 0.08 | | 0.07 | | 0.19 | *** | 0.15 | ** | 0.07 | | 0.18 | ** |
| No union member (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.03 | | 0.03 | | 0.04 | | 0.04 | | 0.04 | | 0.05 | | 0.10 | | 0.05 | | 0.07 | | 0.07 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

A 4.5. Multivariate regression models explaining job-related worries about the impact of climate policies (1-3)

| | France | | Belgium | | Denmark | | Germany | | Hungary | | Italy | | The Netherlands | | Poland | | Spain | | Sweden | |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|--------|-----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| Intercept | 1.58 | *** | 1.41 | *** | 1.56 | *** | 1.56 | *** | 1.46 | *** | 1.52 | *** | 1.27 | *** | 1.52 | *** | 1.71 | *** | 1.10 | *** |
| Male | 0.03 | | 0.06 | | 0.09 | * | 0.09 | * | -0.01 | | 0.01 | | 0.04 | | 0.05 | | -0.01 | | 0.10 | ** |
| Female (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 yo | -0.04 | | -0.01 | | -0.10 | | -0.02 | | 0.16 | | 0.07 | | 0.05 | | 0.04 | | 0.09 | | 0.22 | ** |
| 25-34 yo | 0.03 | | 0.10 | | 0.08 | | 0.05 | | 0.06 | | -0.07 | | 0.11 | * | 0.06 | | 0.05 | | -0.03 | |
| 35-44 yo (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 45-54 yo | -0.05 | | 0.00 | | -0.02 | | -0.05 | | 0.00 | | -0.11 | * | -0.02 | | -0.04 | | -0.08 | | -0.01 | |
| 55-65 yo | -0.15 | * | -0.01 | | -0.17 | ** | -0.07 | | -0.02 | | -0.15 | * | -0.10 | * | -0.04 | | -0.21 | *** | -0.11 | * |
| No migration background (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Migration background | 0.07 | | 0.06 | | 0.06 | | 0.02 | | -0.06 | | -0.03 | | 0.05 | | 0.00 | | 0.10 | | 0.00 | |
| Low education | 0.14 | | 0.21 | ** | -0.07 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.06 | | 0.08 | | -0.08 | | 0.04 | | 0.06 | |
| Middle education | 0.08 | | 0.05 | | -0.03 | | -0.10 | * | -0.01 | | -0.01 | | 0.04 | | 0.02 | | -0.05 | | -0.03 | |
| High education (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Higher professional (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White collar | -0.01 | | -0.08 | | -0.12 | * | -0.08 | | -0.04 | | -0.06 | | -0.06 | | -0.11 | * | -0.03 | | 0.01 | |
| Blue collar | -0.05 | | -0.01 | | 0.02 | | 0.07 | | -0.01 | | -0.06 | | -0.05 | | -0.09 | | -0.06 | | 0.10 | |
| HH income: quartile 1 | 0.20 | ** | 0.21 | *** | 0.13 | * | 0.30 | *** | 0.24 | *** | 0.20 | ** | 0.20 | *** | 0.29 | *** | 0.17 | ** | 0.20 | *** |
| HH income: quartile 2 | 0.10 | | 0.21 | *** | 0.06 | | 0.19 | *** | 0.11 | * | 0.16 | ** | 0.11 | * | 0.19 | *** | 0.09 | | 0.00 | |
| HH income: quartile 3 | 0.02 | | 0.06 | | -0.01 | | 0.15 | ** | 0.03 | | 0.08 | | 0.09 | | 0.07 | | 0.04 | | 0.06 | |
| HH income: quartile 4 (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: government | -0.14 | * | -0.02 | | -0.04 | | -0.09 | | -0.05 | | -0.10 | | 0.06 | | 0.02 | | -0.02 | | -0.01 | |
| Sector: public sector | -0.20 | ** | -0.03 | | -0.06 | | -0.13 | * | -0.14 | * | -0.19 | * | -0.14 | ** | -0.05 | | 0.02 | | -0.02 | |
| Sector: state-owned enterprise | -0.08 | | -0.11 | | 0.40 | *** | -0.03 | | 0.00 | | 0.05 | | 0.16 | * | 0.01 | | -0.05 | | -0.06 | |
| Sector: private enterprise (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sector: other | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | -0.01 | | -0.15 | | -0.02 | | 0.08 | | -0.06 | | 0.07 | | -0.22 | | 0.08 | |
| Company size: 1 | -0.06 | | -0.07 | | 0.17 | | 0.23 | | -0.18 | | 0.07 | | -0.08 | | -0.12 | | -0.13 | | 0.19 | |
| Company size: 2-9 | 0.07 | | 0.07 | | -0.10 | | -0.06 | | -0.01 | | -0.04 | | -0.02 | | -0.10 | | 0.08 | | 0.10 | |
| Company size: 10-49 | 0.02 | | 0.06 | | -0.03 | | -0.03 | | -0.07 | | 0.05 | | 0.03 | | -0.01 | | -0.07 | | 0.08 | |
| Company size: 50-249 | 0.06 | | 0.03 | | 0.00 | | -0.04 | | -0.06 | | 0.06 | | 0.02 | | -0.07 | | -0.08 | | 0.05 | |
| Company size: 250+ (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: unlimited duration (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contract: no unlimited duration | 0.09 | | 0.07 | | 0.00 | | 0.05 | | 0.15 | ** | 0.00 | | 0.08 | | 0.00 | | 0.05 | | 0.06 | |
| Work council present | 0.03 | | 0.01 | | -0.06 | | -0.01 | | 0.00 | | 0.05 | | -0.05 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | 0.04 | |
| No work council present (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|------|---|------|--|------|--|------|----|------|--|------|----|------|-----|------|-----|------|---|------|--|
| Union member | 0.14 | * | 0.00 | | 0.08 | | 0.15 | ** | 0.03 | | 0.11 | * | 0.18 | *** | 0.19 | *** | 0.10 | | 0.06 | |
| Former union member | 0.05 | | 0.08 | | 0.08 | | 0.02 | | 0.04 | | 0.15 | ** | 0.30 | *** | 0.14 | ** | 0.13 | * | 0.09 | |
| No union member (ref.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R-squared | 0.05 | | 0.06 | | 0.06 | | 0.07 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.11 | | 0.06 | | 0.05 | | 0.07 | |

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

EUROPEAN SURVEY ON WORK AND SOCIETY

Project number: 23-071826

Prepared for: Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI)
Contact: Bart Meuleman

Prepared by: Ipsos Belgium
Contact: Antoon Van der Steichel
Kaat Van den Abeele

Date: 06/10/2023

GAME CHANGERS



1 SURVEY OVERVIEW

| | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Data Collection Method | CAWI (<i>Computer Assisted Web Interview</i>) |
| Multi waves / countries | 11 countries |
| Language | English |
| Budgeted interview duration | 15 Minutes |
| Total sample size | N= 1500 each country |
| Target group | <ul style="list-style-type: none">■ 18-65 years old■ Active labour force |
| Type of sample to use | IIS Online Panel |
| Quota | Age, Gender & Education |
| Planned field start | 06/10/2023 |

2 SHARED RESPONSE LIST(S)

[PROG: DO NOT ASK; RECODE FROM SAMPLE]

PQ1. COUNTRY

- 1: France
- 2: Belgium
- 3: Denmark
- 4: Germany
- 5: Hungary
- 6: Ireland
- 7: Italy
- 8: The Netherlands
- 9: Poland
- 10: Spain
- 11: Sweden

3

SCREENER

YEAR/MONTH. What is your date of birth?

- YEAR
- _1910 1910
- ...
- _2015 2015
- MONTH
- _1 January
- _2 February
- _3 March
- _4 April
- _5 May
- _6 June
- _7 July
- _8 August
- _9 September
- _10 October
- _11 November
- _12 December

RESP_AGE [Hidden]. Hidden Question - RESP_AGE "this is a dummy question that will hold age"

- USE RESP_AGE [Hidden] response list

QUOTAGERANGE [Hidden]. Hidden Question - QUOTAGERANGE "this is a dummy question that will hold age breaks" for the quotas that should be defined by the PM; it CAN be edited and lines can be added to meet survey objectives.

- _18_24 "18-24",
- _25_34 "25-34",
- _35_44 "35-44",
- _45_54 "45-54",
- _55_65 "55-65"

[PROG: IF < 18 OR > 65 = TERMINATE]

[PROG: ASK ONLY IF PQ1 = CODE 1-5, 7, 8, 10 OR 11; INSERT COUNTRY SPECIFIC CORTEX QUESTION]

GENDER_NONBINARY_. Are you...?

- _1 Male
- _2 Female
- _3 Another gender
- _4 Prefer not to answer

[PROG: ASK ONLY IF PQ1 = CODE 6 OR 9; INSERT COUNTRY SPECIFIC CORTEX QUESTION]

RESP_GENDER. Are you...?

- _1 Male
- _2 Female

[PROG: INSERT COUNTRY SPECIFIC QMktSize QUESTION]

QMktSize_[COUNTRY]. Where do you live?

[PROG: DO NOT ASK; RECODE FROM SAMPLE]

[PROG: INSERT HIDDEN REGION QUESTIONS; SEE EXCEL]

[PROG: IF PQ1 = 1 UNTILL 11, THEN INSERT COUNTRY SPECIFIC CORTEX QUESTION]

[EDUCATION VARIABLE]. What is your highest level of education attained?

[PROG: INSERT HIDDEN EDUCATION QUESTION; SEE EXCEL]

- _1 Low
- _2 Medium
- _3 High
- _99 Prefer not to answer [PROG: only for PQ1. = 8]

[PN: First 8 codes are shown everywhere. Codes from 9 to 12 are shown only in some countries, as mentioned in the following. Wherever they are hidden, will be mentioned as "N/A". Code 9 is shown in US, Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey - hidden everywhere else. Code 10 is shown in US and Canada, hidden everywhere else. Code 11 is shown in Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Hungary, Poland, Romania - hidden everywhere else. Order is changeable on ad-hoc basis, but as default code 11 is placed between codes 3 and 4. Code 12 is shown in Hungary only, hidden everywhere else. Order is changeable on ad-hoc basis, but as default code 12 is placed between codes 6 and 7.]

EMP01. What is your current employment status?

Select only one

- _1 Employed full-time
- _2 Employed part-time
- _3 Self employed
- _4 Unemployed but looking for a job
- _5 Unemployed and not looking for a job/Long-term sick or disabled
- _6 Full-time parent, homemaker
- _7 Retired
- _8 Student/Pupil
- _9 [BASED ON COUNTRY : 'N/A' OR 'Military contingent']
- _11 [BASED ON COUNTRY : 'N/A' OR 'Own business manager / employer']
- _12 [BASED ON COUNTRY : 'N/A' OR 'On maternity benefit']

[PROG: IF CODE 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 OR 12 = TERMINATE]

[PROG: INSERT COUNTRY SPECIFIC CORTEX QUESTION]

[PROG: DO NOT ASK IF [PQ1. = 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 OR 11] AND [EMP01.= CODE 4] BUT AUTOPUNCH DIRECTLY TO CODE 9990]

[PROG: DO NOT ASK IF [PQ1. = 2] AND [EMP01.= CODE 4] BUT AUTOPUNCH DIRECTLY TO CODE _20]

[Business&Occupation]. What is your occupation? (If you don't find the exact occupation, select the most similar one from the list.)

[PROG: IF [PQ1. = 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 OR 11] AND [EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11] AND ["Business&Occupation cortex question" = CODE 9990, 9991, 9992, 9993 OR 9994 OR 9995 IS SELECTED], THEN SCREENOUT]

[PROG: IF [PQ1. = 2] AND [EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3] AND [BE02OCCR = CODE 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 97, 98 OR 99 IS SELECTED], THEN SCREENOUT]

[PROG: IF [PQ1. = 6] AND [EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3] AND [UK01OCCR= CODE 9991, 9992, 9993 OR 9994], THEN SCREENOUT]

[PROG: INSERT HIDDEN OCCUPATION QUESTION; SEE EXCEL]

- _1 Managers and Professionals
- _2 Technicians, Clerks, Service workers
- _3 Workers, Elementary occupations, Armed forces
- _4 Inactive / Unemployed

[PROG: ASK IF PQ1. = 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 OR 11] AND [EMP01.= CODE 4]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q11a. Have you ever had a paid job?

- 1: Yes
- 2: No

[PROG: ASK IF Q11a = CODE 1]

Q11b. What is the profession that you last exercised?

[INSERT LIST FROM [Business&Occupation]. WITHOUT OPTIONS UNDER THE EXPANDABLE HEADER 'Not working']

4 MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

[PROG: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS (from Intro. until Outro.) ARE ASKED TO ALL COUNTRIES]

Intro.

Thank you for participating in this survey on work and society in Europe. This survey is organized by the Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) in 11 different European countries and run by Ipsos.

The purpose is to understand what citizens think about important societal topics, such as work, the economy, and politics. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions that are asked – we are interested in *your* opinion. For certain questions, you will have the option not to answer them if you wish and you can continue by simply clicking Next.

Participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent at any time by not completing this survey or by contacting us later. Your survey answers will be combined with the answers from all other participants and used for scientific research analysis, and your personal data will be held for no longer than 12 months. The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) will only receive anonymous research results.

Do you accept to participate in the survey in all the above conditions and accept the collection of personal political views and nationality related data?

1. Yes, I accept
 2. No, I do not accept [TERMINATE]
-

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1 OR 2]

[PROG: SIGNLE ANSWER]

Q1. Which type of organisation do you work for?

- 1: Central or local government
 - 2: Other public sector (such as education and health)
 - 3: A state-owned enterprise
 - 4: A private firm
 - 98: Other [PROG: SPECIFY]
-

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: SIGNLE ANSWER]

Q2. How many employees in total work at your workplace, that is the local site where you work?

- 1: 1 (I work alone)
 - 2: 2-9
 - 3: 10-49
 - 4: 50-249
 - 5: 250 and over
-

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1 OR 2]

[PROG: SIGNLE ANSWER]

Q3. What type of contract do you have?

- 1: Unlimited duration
- 2: Limited duration
- 3: No contract

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: SIGNLE ANSWER]

Q4. How likely is it that during the next 12 months you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consecutive weeks?

- 1: Not at all likely
- 2: Not very likely
- 3: Likely
- 4: Very likely

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

Q5. How satisfied are you in your main job?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

Q6. Considering all your efforts and achievements in your job, how satisfied are you with your pay?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

Q7. And how satisfied are you with the balance between the time you spend on your paid work and the time you spend on other aspects of your life?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q8a. Here are a couple of statements on your job. Please indicate how true each of the following statements is about your current job.

SCALE:

- 1: Not at all true
- 2: A little true
- 3: Quite true
- 4: Very true

ITEMS:

- 1: Management at my work allows me to decide how my own daily work is organized.
- 2: I can choose or change my pace of work.
- 3: Supervising the work of others is an important part of my job.
- 4: I can contribute my own ideas and perspectives to the work.
- 5: I can get support and help from my co-workers when needed.
- 6: My job requires that I work very hard.
- 7: I never seem to have enough time to get everything done in my job.
- 8: My job consists mainly of monotonous tasks.
- 9: My job gives me the chance to learn new things.
- 10: My job offers good opportunities for promotion.

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q8b. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

SCALE:

- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Neither agree, nor disagree
- 2: Disagree
- 1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: I feel ignored when it comes to decisions in my day-to-day work.
- 2: In my company, I can talk openly about works councils and trade unions without having to fear disadvantages.
- 3: The best way to solve problems or conflicts in the company is together with my colleagues.
- 4: If I become active in my company, I can change something for the better.

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 4]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q9. For how long have you been unemployed?

- 1: Less than one month
- 2: Between one and three months
- 3: Between three months and two years
- 4: For more than two years

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 4]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q10. How likely is it that during the next 6 months you will find a stable paid job?

- 1: Not at all likely
- 2: Not very likely
- 3: Likely
- 4: Very likely

[PROG: SHOW ON SEPARATE SCREEN]

Q12_Intro. The next questions are about trade unions and other organizations that represent employees at the workplace.

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q12. Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organization?

- 1: Yes, I'm currently a member
- 2: Yes, I used to be a member, but I'm not a member anymore
- 3: No, I have never been a member

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q13. Does a trade union, works council or similar committee representing employees exist at your company or organization?

- 1: Yes
- 2: No

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: ASK IF Q13 = CODE 1]

Q14. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with this trade union, works council or committee representing employees?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

[PROG: ASK IF EMP01. = CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 11]

[PROG: [PROG: ASK IF Q13 = CODE 1]; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q15. How much influence would you say that trade unions at your workplace generally have over decisions that affect your working conditions and practices?

- 1: Not much or no influence
- 2: Some influence
- 3: A lot of influence

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the trade unions in your country?

SCALE:

- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Neither agree, nor disagree
- 2: Disagree
- 1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: The unions in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] defend the interests of employees well.
- 2: The unions in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] have too much power.
- 3: Unions are still needed today to protect our socio-economic rights.
- 4: The unions in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] are insufficiently pre-occupied with tomorrow's problems.

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q17a. To what extent are you worried that digitalization (that is, the increased use of computers, robots and artificial intelligence) might negatively affect your job and career prospects?

- 1: Not at all worried
- 2: Somewhat worried
- 3: Strongly worried

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q17b. To what extent are you worried that the measures governments take against climate change might negatively affect your job and career prospects?

- 1: Not at all worried
- 2: Somewhat worried
- 3: Strongly worried

[PROG: SHOW ON SEPARATE SCREEN]

Q18_intro. In the next part, we would like to ask you a couple of questions on politics and voting.

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q18. In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Left UNTIL 10: Right]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q19. In June, citizens in all countries of the European Union (EU) will have the opportunity to elect representatives for the European Parliament. If these elections were held today, who would you vote for?

ITEMS:

see Excel 'Items_Q19_Q20'

98: Other (please specify): [PROG: OTHER POSITION]

998: I would not vote [PROG: FIXED POSITION]

99: I am not entitled to vote for these elections [PROG: FIXED POSITION]

[PROG: DO NOT ASK IF PQ1. = 6]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q20. In past elections, have you ever voted for one of the following parties?

SCALE:

1: Yes

2: No

ITEMS:

see Excel 'Items_Q19_Q20'

Q21. Generally speaking, do you think that the membership of [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] in the European Union is a good thing or a bad thing?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: A very bad thing UNTIL 10: A very good thing]

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q22. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the European Union?

SCALE:

- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Neither agree, nor disagree
- 2: Disagree
- 1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: The European Union defends the interests of businesses too much and has too little attention for the social rights of citizens.
- 2: The European Union does not do enough to stop immigrants from coming in.
- 3: The functioning of the European Union is not sufficiently democratic.

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q23. On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you personally trust each of the following institutions?

SCALE:

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: *No trust at all* UNTIL 10: *Complete trust*]

ITEMS:

- 1: Dáil Éireann
- 2: The legal system
- 3: The political party you like best
- 4: The European Union
- 5: The trade unions
- 6: The public news media in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q24. How interested would you say you are in politics?

- 4: Very interested
- 3: Quite interested
- 2: Hardly interested
- 1: Not at all interested

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q25. How much would you say the political system in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?

- 1: Not at all
- 2: Very little
- 3: Some
- 4: A lot
- 5: A great deal

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q26. There are different ways of trying to improve things in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?

SCALE:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No

ITEMS:

- 1: Contacted a politician, government or local government official
- 2: Taken part in a lawful public demonstration
- 3: Posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or Twitter/X
- 4: Volunteered for a not-for-profit or charitable organization

[PROG: SHOW ON SEPARATE SCREEN]

Q27_Intro. Now we ask some questions about democracy.

Q27. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Not at all important UNTIL 10: Extremely important]

Q28. On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY]?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

Q29. How important you think it is for democracy that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Not at all important for democracy in general UNTIL 10: Extremely important for democracy in general]

Q30. How acceptable for you would it be for [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] to have a strong leader who is above the law?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Not at all acceptable UNTIL 10: Completely acceptable]

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q31. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

SCALE:

5: Agree strongly

4: Agree

3: Neither agree, nor disagree

2: Disagree

1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

1: The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.

2: The power should be returned to the people.

3: It would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people.

4: Ordinary citizens know better than specialized politicians.

5: A small secret group of people is responsible for making all major decisions in world politics.

6: Politicians and other leaders are just puppets of the powers behind them.

[PROG: SHOW ON SEPARATE SCREEN]

Q32_Intro. In the following section, we would like to ask you your opinion regarding a number of societal issues.

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q32. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

SCALE:

5: Agree strongly

4: Agree

3: Neither agree, nor disagree

2: Disagree

1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: To maintain law and order, stronger action should be taken against troublemakers.
- 2: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn.
- 3: The death penalty should be restored in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY].
- 4: It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top, while others are at the bottom.
- 5: Inferior groups should stay in their place.

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q33. What is your opinion regarding the following statements about inequalities in society?

SCALE:

- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Neither agree, nor disagree
- 2: Disagree
- 1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: A society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among all people.
- 2: A society is fair when hard-working people earn more than others.
- 3: A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless of what they give back to society
- 4: In [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY], a just distribution of wealth is realized.
- 5: The differences in wealth in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] are too big.
- 6: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.

Q34. Would you say it is generally bad or good for the economy of [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] that people come to live here from other countries?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Bad for the economy UNTIL 10: Good for the economy]

Q35. Would you say that the cultural life of [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Cultural life undermined UNTIL 10: Cultural life enriched]

Q36. Is [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: A worse place UNTIL 10: A better place]

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER]

Q37. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

SCALE:

5: Agree strongly

4: Agree

3: Neither agree, nor disagree

2: Disagree

1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

1: Nowadays things are so confusing that you sometimes do not know where you stand.

2: These days, things are so complicated I don't know what to do.

3: If we need something from the government, people like me have to wait longer than others.

4: People like me are being systematically neglected, whereas other groups receive more than they deserve.

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q38. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: You can't be too careful UNTIL 10: Most people can be trusted]

Q39. On the whole, how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY]?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

Q40. And how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in the region where you live?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Extremely dissatisfied UNTIL 10: Extremely satisfied]

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q41. Here are some statements regarding different groups in society. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?

SCALE:

5: Agree strongly

4: Agree

3: Neither agree, nor disagree

2: Disagree

1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: Unemployed people live a comfortable life at the expense of society.
- 2: Most unemployed people do a lot of effort to try to find a job.
- 3: It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women.
- 4: Equal rights for homosexuals are a threat for our norms and values.
- 5: Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind.
- 6: In general, Jews are trustworthy.

[PROG: INSERT COLLAPSABLE GRID; SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q41b. And what about the following statements?

SCALE:

- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Neither agree, nor disagree
- 2: Disagree
- 1: Disagree strongly

ITEMS:

- 1: A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.
 - 2: Women are as suitable as men to lead a big company.
 - 3: The Muslim culture fits well into [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY].
 - 4: There are too many Muslims in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY].
 - 5: Transgender persons should be free to live their own life as they wish.
 - 6: Sex change operations are morally wrong.
-

5 PROFILING

[PROG: SHOW ON SEPARATE SCREEN]

Q42_Intro. Finally, we would like to ask you a couple of questions about yourself and your family situation.

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question.>"; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q42. Are you born in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY]?

1: Yes

2: No

[PROG: ASK IF Q42 = CODE 2]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question.>"; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q43. Were you born in a country that belongs to the European Union?

1: Yes, I was born in a country that belongs to the European Union

2: No, I was born in a country that does not belong the European Union

[PROG: ASK IF Q42 = CODE 1]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question.>"; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q44. Where were your parents born?

1: Both my parents were born in [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY]

2: One of my parents was born abroad

3: Both of my parents were born abroad

Q46. Including yourself, how many people live with you regularly as members of your household?

[PROG: WHEN BLANK, INSERT ERROR MESSAGE: Please provide an answer. If there are no children in your household, please type 0]

1: Adults (including yourself): [PROG: INSERT NUMBER BOX; MIN 1; MAX 15]

2: Children, 0-13 years old [PROG: INSERT NUMBER BOX; MAX 15]

3: Children, 14-17 years old [PROG: INSERT NUMBER BOX; MAX 15]

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER; NON-MANDATORY]

[PROG: IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN, SHOW ERROR MESSAGE: Please try to answer this question. If you don't have an opinion, press 'Next' again to go to the next question."; IF NO ANSWER IS GIVEN AFTER THIS QUESTION, GO TO NEXT QUESTION]

Q47. What is your household's total income per month, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.

[PROG: INSERT SCALE LIST FROM EXCEL 'Income deciles per country']

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q48. Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?

- 1: Living comfortably on present income
- 2: Coping on present income
- 3: Finding it difficult on present income
- 4: Finding it very difficult on present income

[PROG: SINGLE ANSWER]

Q49. To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

"I am worried that I will have difficulties to keep my socio-economic position"

- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Neither agree, nor disagree
- 2: Disagree
- 1: Disagree strongly

Q50. In [PROG: INSERT PQ1. COUNTRY], some people are better off than others. At the top of society are the people who are best off – those who have the most money, the best education, and the most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are worst off – those who have the least money, the least education, and the least respected job or no job.

Where would you place yourself in society?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Bottom of society UNTIL 10: Top of society]

Q51. And if you think back to your childhood: where would you place the household you grew up in within the society of that time?

[PROG: INSERT SLIDER WITH 0: Bottom of society UNTIL 10: Top of society]

OUTRO.

Thank you very much for you participation in the European Survey on Work and Society

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